California Supreme Court activity for the week of November 29, 2010

The California Supreme Court held its (usually) weekly conference on December 1, 2010.   Notable results include:

  • On a Petition for Review, review was denied in Fisher v. DCH Temecula Imports (August 13, 201), mentioned briefly on this blog here.  [Class action ban in arbitration provision unconscionable.]   Interestingly, the California Supreme Court recently denied review in Walnut Producers v. Diamond Foods (August 16, 2010), which upheld an order striking class allegations pursuant to a class action ban in an arbitration provision.
  • On a Petition for Review, review was denied in Fireside Bank Cases (pub. August 25, 2010).  [Res judicata issues in UCL action regarding alleged Rees-Levering violations.]

California Supreme Court activity for the week of November 8, 2010

The California Supreme Court held its (usually) weekly conference on November 10, 2010. Notable results include:

  • On a Petition for Review, review was denied in Walnut Producers v. Diamond Foods (August 16, 2010), discussed briefly on this blog here.  [Arbitration agreement with class arbitration ban not unconscionable]
  • On a Petition for Review, with an associated request to depublish, review and depublication were both denied in Gutierrez v. Commerce Club (August 23, 2010), discussed on this blog here.  [Reversal of Order sustaining demurrer to class allegations]

AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion set for oral argument next week

and the Los Angeles times notes that "Consumers' right to file class actions is in danger."  David Lazarus, Consumers' right to file class actions is in danger (November 5, 2010) www.latimes.com.

District Court denies motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration while Concepcion is pending

United States District Court Judge Ronald M. Whyte (Northern District of California) denied a motion to compel arbitration, dismiss claims, or stay the matter.  Weisblatt v. Apple, Inc., 2010 WL 4071147 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2010).  The suit concerns the change away from the unlimited data plan associated with the Apple 3G-enabled iPad.  AT&T Mobility LLC moved to compel arbitration and to dismiss all claims against it.  In the alternative, AT&T Mobility moved for a stay pending a Supreme Court decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, --- U.S. ----, 130 S.Ct. 3322, 176 L.Ed.2d 1218 (2010) (No. 09-893).  Defendant Apple joined in the motion to stay.

The Court denied the motion, without prejudice, saying:

Given the likelihood that the Supreme Court will speak directly to the class action waiver issue in Concepcion, compelling arbitration at this point would be unwarranted. Even though plaintiffs' arguments regarding the unconscionability of the class action waiver may have less merit under New York law, a Supreme Court decision in Concepcion is still likely to simplify the issue. Accordingly, ATTM's motion to compel arbitration is denied without prejudice.

Slip op., at 3.  The Court went on to hold:

On balance, the court finds that a stay is unwarranted. That said, the claims with respect to ATTM will likely be affected by the Supreme Court's decision in Concepcion.  Accordingly, it makes little sense to begin discovery with respect to the claims focused on ATTM. Also, the court at this time declines to decide whether plaintiff Hanna's iPhone 3GS arbitration agreement now applies to his iPad dispute. In any event, Concepcion is likely to clarify the enforceability of the iPhone 3GS arbitration agreement as well as the iPad arbitration agreement.

Slip op., at 4.  The Court then limited discovery to written discovery against Apple.

Ninth Circuit considers "crux of the complaint" rule to determine when arbitrator decides arbitrability

It's not to early to nominate the year 2010 as the year of the arbitration wars.  In our latest installment, Obi Wan is asked to assemble forces...sorry, Clone Wars.  Today the Ninth Circuit examined the question of "whether the 'crux of the complaint' rule requires the question of arbitrability to be determined by the arbitrator when a plaintiff’s challenge to the arbitration clause does not appear in his complaint." Bridge Fund Capital Corporation v. Fastbucks Franchise Corporation, Slip op., at 14205 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 2010).

In the span of a few paragraphs, the Court set out the essentials of the "crux of the complaint" test:

“The arbitrability of a particular dispute is a threshold issue to be decided by the courts,” Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1268, unless that issue is explicitly assigned to the arbitrator, see Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2775 (2010) (holding that arbitrability is a question for the arbitrator “where the agreement explicitly assigns that decision to the arbitrator”). While the validity of an arbitration clause can be a question for the arbitrator where the “crux of the complaint is that the contract as a whole (including its arbitration provision)” is invalid, the court determines the validity of the clause where the challenge is “specifically [to] the validity of the agreement to arbitrate.” Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 444 (2006).

In other words, when a plaintiff’s legal challenge is that a contract as a whole is unenforceable, the arbitrator decides the validity of the contract, including derivatively the validity of its constituent provisions (such as the arbitration clause). See Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 445-46 (explaining that “as a matter of substantive federal arbitration law, an arbitration provision is severable from the remainder of the contract. [U]nless the challenge is to the arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first instance.”). However, when a plaintiff argues that an arbitration clause, standing alone, is unenforceable—for reasons independent of any reasons the remainder of the contract might be invalid—that is a question to be decided by the court. See Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[O]ur case law makes clear that courts properly exercise jurisdiction over claims raising (1) defenses existing at law or in equity for the revocation of (2) the arbitration clause itself.”).

After Buckeye, we have applied the “crux of the complaint” rule as a method for differentiating between challenges to the arbitration provision alone and challenges to the entire contract. Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1268. In Buckeye, the Court held that “because [the plaintiffs] challenge[d] the Agreement, but not specifically its arbitration provisions, those provisions are enforceable apart from the remainder of the contract. The challenge should therefore be considered by an arbitrator, not a court.” 546 U.S. at 446. In Nagrampa, we distinguished Buckeye because “the complaint in Buckeye, unlike Nagrampa’s complaint, did not contain claims that the arbitration provision alone was void and unenforceable, but rather alleged that the arbitration provision was unenforceable because it was contained in an illegal usurious contract which was void ab initio.” Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1268. Fastbucks contends that Buckeye, and not Nagrampa, applies here because Plaintiffs’ complaint does not contain a specific challenge to the arbitration clause.

We disagree. This case presents a third scenario not described in either Buckeye or Nagrampa; namely, a specific challenge to the arbitration clause that is not raised as a separate claim in the complaint. See Winter v. Window Fashions Prof’ls, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 93 (Ct. App. 2008) (distinguishing Buckeye and Nagrampa and holding that arbitrability was for the court to decide where the plaintiff’s specific “challenge to the arbitration clause was [raised] in response to [a] petition to compel arbitration” rather than in the complaint). Because the material question is whether the challenge to the arbitration provision is severable from the challenge to the contract as a whole, Buckeye, 546 U.S. 444-45; Rent-A-Ctr., 130 S. Ct. at 2778, the inclusion of, or failure to include, a specific challenge in the complaint is not determinative. See Winter, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 93. What matters is the substantive basis of the challenge.

Slip op., at 14209-11.

I report on this decision primarily because the sudden explosion of arbitration issues in different contexts is interesting, at least to me.  Tomorrow I will find out whether I successfully beat back a claim that Stolt-Nielsen preempts Gentry.  It looks like I will be paying attention to arbitration decisions for some time to come.

Two sides of the arbitration agreement unconscionability coin

Two recent Court of Appeal decisions show, through contrasting facts, how an unconscionability analysis applies to a purported class action waiver.  In the first, the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Two) upholds a trial court's finding of unconsctionability related to a class action ban in an automobile RISC contract arbitration provision.  Fisher v. DCH Temecula Imports (August 13, 201).  In the second, the Court of Appeal (Third Appellate District) upheld an Order striking class allegations according to a class action ban in an arbitration agreement between walnut growers and a walnut processor. Walnut Producers v. Diamond Foods (August 16, 2010).  The Walnut Producers case contains a thorough discussion of whether the doctrine of unconscionability applies to commercial contracts (short answer: it does - the facts of formation, not the classification of the contract type, govern unconscionability analysis).

I will try to post more on these two cases soon.

District Court finds waiver of right to compel arbitration

United States District Court Judge Marilyn Hall Patel (Northern District of California) found that the defendant waived its right to enforce an arbitration agreement when it availed itself of the Court to file multiple motions to dismiss. Gonsalves v. Infosys Technologies, Ltd., 2010 WL 3118861 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 5, 2010).  The key factor, from the Courts perspective, was that Infosys sought and obtained the dismissal of certain claims in court:

The court therefore holds that Infosys-by waiting to file its motion to compel arbitration until after it filed two separate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim which ultimately resulted in dismissal, with prejudice, of Gonsalves' FEHA and wrongful termination claims-waived its right to enforce the arbitration clause in Gonsalves' employment agreement.

Gonsalves, slip op., at 5.  This case concerns an individual employment claim, but the issue of arbitration has been and continues to be significant in class actions.  I will report on them when they are of interest.

Trial court, in Avalos v. La Salsa, Inc., offers early glimpse of how California courts may reconcile Stolt-Nielsen and Gentry

Earlier today, in Avalos v. La Salsa, Inc., JCCP 4488, the Santa Barbara Superior Court, Judge Denise deBellefeuille presiding, granted the defendants’ motion for reconsideration of a class certification order in to consider the impact of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010) on the coordinated proceedings before the Court.  After an extensive analysis of Stolt-Nielsen, including its interaction with Gentry v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. 4th 443 (2007), the Court affirmed the certification order previously entered.  While the certification aspect is mildly interesting, the Court's extensive discussion of the interplay between arbitration clauses and class actions in California is the pot of gold in this unusually thorough trial court order.  While the attached opinion is a tentative ruling, the Court adopted its tentative without modification.

You can view the embedded opinion in the acrobat.com flash viewer below:

If the viewer isn't working for you (say, if you are viewing this on an iPad or iPhone), you can download the opinion here.

Will grant of certiorari in Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC affect other cases? Not so far.

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.2009) will be reviewed by the Supreme Court in AT & T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, --- S.Ct. ----, 2010 WL 303962, 78 USLW 3454, 78 USLW 3677, 78 USLW 3687 (U.S. May 24, 2010) (NO. 09-893).  The issue presented in Concepcion has been framed by some as calling for a determination of whether the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempts the State of California from conditioning the enforcement of an arbitration agreement on the availability of class-wide arbitration.  Others have more aggressively described the issue more broadly.  In either event, the question of concern to litigants now is the effect, if any, of that decision to grant review in other cases.  In at least one case, there was no evident effect.

United States District Court Judge Jeremy Fogel (Northern District of California) denied a motion to stay that was predicated upon the Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari in Concepcion.  Kaltwasser v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 2010 WL 2348642 (June 8, 2010) (unpublished).

AT&T's preemption argument based on Stolt-Nielsen is dead before it hits the floor

United States District Court Judge Claudia Wilken (Northern District of California) has already been gifted with the privilege of considering whether Stolt-Nielsen S. A. et al. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. (discussed on this blog here) preempts any state law that would preclude enforcement of an arbitration agreement.  McArdle v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 2010 WL 1532334 (N.D.Cal. May 10, 2010).  Judge Wilken took care of that argument in one sharp paragraph:

Defendants assert that Stolt-Nielsen creates a substantial question as to whether the “FAA would preempt any holding that California law precludes enforcement of McArdle's agreement to arbitrate his disputes with” them on an individual basis. Mot. for Leave at 4. The Court disagrees. The issue presented in Stolt-Nielsen was “whether imposing class arbitration on parties whose arbitration clauses are ‘silent’ on that issue is consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).” 2010 WL 1655826, at *4. The Supreme Court did not address FAA preemption. Nor did it overrule its precedent upon which the Ninth Circuit relied in Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., which held that California law on unconscionability could render an arbitration clause unenforceable, 498 F.3d 976, 986-87 (9th Cir.2007).  Stolt-Nielsen is distinguishable both on the facts and the law and, therefore, does not require this Court to reconsider its order on Defendants' motion to stay this action pending their appeal.

Slip op., at 1.  One interesting bit of information is also included in the Order.  The Ninth Circuit recently held that Shroyer continues to control the issue of unconscionability analysis under California law.  Laster v. AT & T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir.2009). AT&T filed a petition for certiorari in Laster, upon which they expect the Supreme Court to rule by May 24.  If the Supreme Court takes up Laster, they will be forced to explicitly address carve-outs alluded to by the dissent in Stolt-Nielsen but not addressed by the majority opinion.