Christopher et al. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., dba Glaxosmithkline holds, 5-4, that pharma sales reps are exempt as "outside salespersons"

The United States Supreme Court, in Christopher et al. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., dba Glaxosmithkline (June 18, 2012), examined the question of whether pharmaceutical sales representatives, whose primary duty was to obtain nonbinding commitments from physicians to prescribe their employer’s prescription drugs, were correctly classified as exempt from overtime pay requirements set forth in the Fair Labor Standards Act.  In the courts below, defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs were “employed in the capacity of outside salesman,” §213(a)(1), and therefore were exempt from the FLSA’s overtime compensation requirement. The District Court agreed and granted summary judgment to defendant. Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment, contending that the District Court had erred in failing to accord controlling deference to the DOL’s interpretation of the pertinent regulations, which the DOL had announced in an amicus brief filed in a similar action. The District Court rejected this argument and denied the motion. The Ninth Circuit, agreeing that the DOL’s interpretation was not entitled to controlling deference, affirmed.

The opinion was decided on sharply divided 5-4 lines, with one majority opinion and one minority opinion. The opinion considered three of the DOL’s regulations: §§541.500, 541.501, and 541.503. The Court referred to the three regulations as the “general regulation,” the “sales regulation,” and the “promotion-work regulation,” respectively.

First, the majority observed that the DOL’s own interpretation of its regulations was not consistent over time. In briefs filed before the Second and Ninth Circuits, “the DOL took the view that ‘a “sale” for the purposes of the outside sales exemption requires a con- summated transaction directly involving the employee for whom the exemption is sought.’” Slip op., at 9. After certiorari was granted in this matter, the DOL took the position that “ ‘[a]n employee does not make a “sale” for purposes of the “outside salesman” exemption unless he actually transfers title to the property at issue.’ ” Slip op., at 9.

Next, the majority observed that Auer deference to the DOL’s ambiguous regulations was not justified because to do so would allow for imposition of “potentially massive liability on respondent for conduct that occurred well before that interpretation was announced.” Slip op., at 10. Continuing, the Court said:

Until 2009, the pharmaceutical industry had little reason to suspect that its longstanding practice of treating detailers as exempt outside salesmen transgressed the FLSA. The statute and regulations certainly do not provide clear notice of this. The general regulation adopts the broad statutory definition of “sale,” and that definition, in turn, employs the broad catchall phrase “other disposition.” See 29 CFR §541.500(a)(1). This catchall phrase could reasonably be construed to encompass a nonbinding commitment from a physician to prescribe a particular drug, and nothing in the statutory or regulatory text or the DOL’s prior guidance plainly requires a contrary reading. See Preamble 22162 (explaining that an employee must “in some sense” make a sale); 1940 Report 46 (same).

Slip op., at 12. Then the majority noted that, despite the industry’s decades of applying an exempt classification, the DOL never initiated any enforcement action.

The majority then discussed the DOL’s interpretations and found them unpersuasive, particularly with respect to the definition of “sale.” The Court held:

This new interpretation is flatly inconsistent with the FLSA, which defines “sale” to mean, inter alia, a “consignment for sale.” A “consignment for sale” does not involve the transfer of title. See, e.g., Sturm v. Boker, 150 U. S. 312, 330 (1893) (“The agency to sell and return the proceeds, or the specific goods if not sold . . . does not involve a change of title”); Hawkland, Consignment Selling Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 Com. L. J. 146, 147 (1962) (explaining that “‘[a] consignment of goods for sale does not pass the title at any time, nor does it contemplate that it should be passed’” (quoting Rio Grande Oil Co. v. Miller Rubber Co. of N. Y., 31 Ariz. 84, 87, 250 P. 564, 565 (1926))).

Slip op., at 15. The majority then spends some time construing the regulation itself, concluding that the language of the statute was intended to broadly include all manner of transactions that, in certain industries, were tantamount to a sale in the most conventional sense. In the regulated industry of pharmaceutical sales, the majority observed that the representatives did all that was allowed:

Obtaining a nonbinding commitment from a physician to prescribe one of respondent’s drugs is the most that petitioners were able to do to ensure the eventual disposition of the products that respondent sells. This kind of arrangement, in the unique regulatory environment within which pharmaceutical companies must operate, comfortably falls within the catch- all category of “other disposition.”

Slip op., at 20-21.

The minority opinion, authored by Justice Breyer, accepted the majority’s description of the job in question and agreed that deference to the DOL interpretation was not justified given the recent change in that interpretation. Instead, the minority opnion simply disagrees with the construction of the language at issue:

Unless we give the words of the statute and regulations some special meaning, a detailer’s primary duty is not that of “making sales” or the equivalent. A detailer might convince a doctor to prescribe a drug for a particular kind of patient. If the doctor encounters such a patient, he might prescribe the drug. The doctor’s client, the patient, might take the prescription to a pharmacist and ask the pharmacist to fill the prescription. If so, the pharmacist might sell the manufacturer’s drug to the patient, or might substitute a generic version. But it is the pharmacist, not the detailer, who will have sold the drug.

Minority slip op., at 3. The minority opinion concludes that the representatives stimulate sales eventually made by others:

The detailer’s work, in my view, is more naturally characterized as involving “[p]romotional activities designed to stimulate sales . . . made by someone else,” §541.503, e.g., the pharmacist or the wholesaler, than as involving “[p]romotional activities designed to stimulate” the detailer’s “own sales.”

Minority slip op., at 5. The minority emphasized the fact that doctors determine what to prescribe, based on medical need:

To the contrary, the document makes clear that the pharmaceutical industry itself understands that it cannot be a detailer’s “primary duty” to obtain a nonbinding commitment, for, in respect to many doctors, such a commitment taken alone is unlikely to make a significant difference to their doctor’s use of a particular drug. When a particular drug, say Drug D, constitutes the best treatment for a particular patient, a knowledgeable doctor should (hence likely will) prescribe it irrespective of any nonbinding commitment to do so. Where some other drug, however, is likely to prove more beneficial for a particular patient, that doctor should not (hence likely will not) prescribe Drug D irrespective of any nonbinding commitment to the contrary.

Minority slip op., at 6. The minority concluded by dismissing the majority’s fears that a salesman who takes an order would suddenly become non-exempt by transferring the order to jobber’s employee to be filled. The minority noted that the example created no basis for fear, given that the salesman had obtained a firm commitment to buy the product. Regardless of the quality of the counter-arguments, the minority opinion by Justice Breyer is just that, a minority opinion, and "sales" are evidently in the eye of the beholder.

Confusion surrounding arbitration agreements rapidly escalating in California following conflicting decisions in Hoover, Iskanian

I've been working on a project involving arbitration issues.  My uncertainty about whether to keep all of my powder dry, so to speak, caused a fair bit of my delay in commenting about two relatively new arbitration decisions from California Courts of Appeal.  In Hoover v. American Income Life Insurance Company (June 13, 2012), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Two) affirmed a trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration.  In Iskanian v. CLS Transportion Los Angeles, LLC (June 4, 2012), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Two) affirmed a trial court order granting a motion to compel arbitration and dismissing class claims.  Looks like the unremarkable results of Courts of Appeal deferring to finding of trial courts, right?  No.  So very wrong.  What these two actually do is create an explicit rift on the issue of whether statutory rights, at least in the labor context, are subject to individual arbitration.  In the process, the Iskanian Court rejects its sister-division's holding in Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 197 Cal. App. 4th 489 (2011) that Concepcion does not apply to PAGA's representative claims.  The Iskanian Court also refused to follow the NLRB's D.R. Horton decision that protects an employee's right to pursue class claims as a form of concerted activity.  The two cases also disagree as to the reach of Concepcion and Stolt-Neilsen. In sum, the relative clarity that existed in California following Gentry and Discover Bank is now a distant memory.  The California Supreme Court will need to resolve these issues soon, regardless of whether the United States Supreme Court takes on any of these issues in the future.

Hoover concerned a dispute as to whether an individual was misclassified as an independent contractor rather than an employee.  Hoover framed where its analysis would go very early in the opinion, with this footnote:

The conclusions we reach here avert any dependence, as urged by AIL, on two recent United States Supreme Court opinions, addressing the issue of class arbitrations for antitrust claims and consumer sales contracts. (Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. (2010) ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1758; AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1740.) “AT&T does not provide that a public right . . . can be waived if such a waiver is contrary to state law.” (Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 489, 500, 502-503.) We also do not need to address the unconscionability argument and the continuing viability of Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83.)

Hoover slip op., at 3 n. 2.  From this we know that (1) Hoover views Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen as limited to consumer sales contracts and antitrust issues respectively, and (2) Hoover views Brown v. Ralphs as correctly decided.

Hoover first discusses (extensively, if you are interested) the concept of waiver following too great a delay in moving to compel arbitration.  That discussion doesn't pave a lot of new ground.

Hoover gets interesting when it talks about the Labor Code claims asserted in the matter:

As a general rule, state statutory wage and hour claims are not subject to arbitration, whether the arbitration clause is contained in the CBA or an individual agreement. The CBA cannot waive the right to sue under applicable federal or state statutes because these statutory rights “devolve on petitioners as individual workers, not as members of a collective organization.” (Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. (1981) 450 U.S. 728, 745, overruled on other grounds in Gilmer v.  Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (1991) 500 U.S. 20; Zavala v. Scott Brothers Dairy, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 585, 592 [rule applicable to wage claims under Labor Code and IWC wage orders].)

Hoover slip op., at 15-16.  Continuing, Hoover held:

An individual arbitration agreement also does not apply to an action to enforce statutes governing collection of unpaid wages, which “may be maintained without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate. . . .” (§ 229.) The intent is to assure a judicial forum where there exists a dispute as to wages, notwithstanding the strong public policy favoring arbitration. (Ware v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1972) 24 Cal.App.3d 35, 43; Flores v. Axxis Network & Telecommunications, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 802, 811.) An exception to the general rule occurs when there is federal preemption by FAA, as applied to contracts evidencing interstate commerce. (Perry v. Thomas (1987) 482 U.S. 483, 490.)

Hoover slip op., at 17.  Statutory claims for unpaid wages may proceed in court, regardless of an agreement to arbitrate.  Zowwee!  But wait - there is an exception for contracts related to interstate commerce.  Does Hoover fit into that exception?  No, says the Hoover Court:

Based on this record, it cannot be said the subject agreement involves interstate commerce. AIL had the burden to demonstrate FAA coverage by declarations and other evidence. (Shepard v. Edward Mackay Enterprises, Inc. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1101; Woolls v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 197, 213-214.) The only established facts are that Hoover was a California resident who sold life insurance policies. Even though AIL is based in Texas, there was no evidence in the record establishing that the relationship between Hoover and AIL had a specific effect or “bear[ing] on interstate commerce in a substantial way.” (Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc. (2003) 539 U.S. 52, 56-57.) Hoover was not an employee of a national stock brokerage or the employee of a member of a national stock exchange. (Thorup v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., supra, 180 Cal.App.3d at p. 233; Baker v. Aubry (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1259, 1266.) Unlike the plaintiff in Giuliano v. Inland Empire Personnel, Inc. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1287, Hoover did not work in other states or engage in multimillion dollar loan activity that affected interstate commerce by negotiating with a bank that was headquartered in another state. Under these circumstances, if the FAA did not apply, the exception favoring federal preemption and arbitration did not operate.

Hoover slip op., at 17-18.  So that's going to get some unmentionables in a twist.

Iskanian is, at least in spirit, the antimatter to Hoover's matter.  Iskanian involves a certified class that avoided arbitration once before, when the issuance of Gentry caused the reversal of the trial court's first Order compelling arbitration.  Following Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen, the defendant in Iskanian tried again.  This time, the Iskanian Court affirmed the second Order compelling individual arbitration.  In the process, the Court gave Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen the broadest possible constructions, held Gentry overruled, disregarded Brown v. Ralphs and rejected protections supplied by the NLRA and preserved by D.R. Horton.

First, regarding Gentry, Iskanian said:

Now, we find that the Concepcion decision conclusively invalidates the Gentry test. First, under Gentry, if a plaintiff was successful in meeting the test, the case would be decided in class arbitration (unless the plaintiff could show that the entire arbitration agreement was unconscionable, in which case the agreement would be wholly void). But Concepcion thoroughly rejected the concept that class arbitration procedures should be imposed on a party who never agreed to them. (Concepcion, supra, 131 S.Ct. at pp. 1750-1751.) The Concepcion court held that nonconsensual class arbitration was inconsistent with the FAA because: (i) it “sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—informality—and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment”; (ii) it requires procedural formality since rules governing class arbitration “mimic the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for class litigation”; and (iii) it “greatly increases risks to defendants,” since it lacks the multilevel review that exists in a judicial forum. (Id. at pp. 1751-1752; see also StoltNielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp. (2010) 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 [“a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so”].) This unequivocal rejection of court-imposed class arbitration applies just as squarely to the Gentry test as it did to the Discover Bank rule.

Iskanian slip op., at 8-9.  But the Court wasn't done:

Third, the premise that Iskanian brought a class action to “vindicate statutory rights” is irrelevant in the wake of Concepcion. As the Concepcion court reiterated, “States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.” (131 S.Ct. at p. 1753.) The sound policy reasons identified in Gentry for invalidating certain class waivers are insufficient to trump the far-reaching effect of the FAA, as expressed in Concepcion. Concepcion's holding in this regard is consistent with previously established law. (See Perry v. Thomas, supra, 482 U.S. at p. 484 [finding that § 2 of the FAA preempts Lab. Code, § 229, which provides that actions for the collection of wages “may be maintained 'without regard to the existence of any private agreement to arbitrate'”]; Southland Corp. v. Keating (1984) 465 U.S. 1, 10-11 [holding that the California Supreme Court's interpretation of the Franchise Investment Law as requiring judicial consideration despite the terms of an arbitration agreement directly conflicted with section 2 of the FAA and violated the Supremacy Clause]; Preston v. Ferrer (2008) 552 U.S. 346, 349-350 [holding, “when parties agree to arbitrate all questions arising under a contract, state laws lodging primary jurisdiction in another forum, whether judicial or administrative, are superseded by the FAA”].)

Iskanian slip op., at 9-10.  In its analysis, the Iskanian Court selectively disregarded valid federal law recognizing that vindication of statutory rights remains a basis for declining to enforce an arbitration agreement.  And all of this leaves unanswered the true foundational question: how does the federal government have the constitutional authority over a state's distribution of disputes alleging state law violations in state courts?  Even Concepcion cannot be viewed as answering that question, as it was decided in federal courts over which the federal government does have jurisdiction.  Anyhow, Iskanian had more carnage to release...

Next, the Iskanian Court rejected D.R. Horton, but without any cogent analysis as to why it was incorrectly decided. In D.R. Horton, the NLRB held that a mandatory, employer-imposed agreement requiring all employment-related disputes to be resolved through individual arbitration (and disallowing class or collective claims) violated the NLRA because it prohibited the exercise of substantive rights protected by section 7 of the NLRA.  Section 7 provides in part that employees shall have the right “to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .”  (29 U.S.C. § 157.)   The NLRB found that “employees who join together to bring employmentrelated claims on a classwide or collective basis in court or before an arbitrator are exercising rights protected by Section 7 of the NLRA.”  However, that holding was not new to D.R.Horton, as Iskanian implies.  Rather, decades of authority confirm that class and collective actions constitute protected concerted activity.  That, at least, is well-settled.

Next, Iskanian declares that since D.R. Horton analyzes laws beyond the NLRA, the Court would not defer to it.  Problematically, declining to defer is different than independently reaching the same result following a review of the relevant authority.  Here, Iskanian seems to view a right to decline to defer as a right to choose the alternative construction, absent any analysis.  Instead, the Court said:

The D.R. Horton decision identified no “congressional command” in the NLRA prohibiting enforcement of an arbitration agreement pursuant to its terms. D.R. Horton’s holding—that employment-related class claims are “concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection” protected by section 7 of the NLRA, so that the FAA does not apply—elevates the NLRB's interpretation of the NLRA over section 2 of the FAA. This holding does not withstand scrutiny in light of Concepcion and CompuCredit.

Iskanian slip op., at 13.  Iskanian is simply wrong.  D.R. Horton provided a very detailed discussion of the fact that the FAA does not authorize agreements that violate federal law, including the NLRA and related statutory provisions.  The NLRB was working squarely within its area of expertise when it concluded that an agreement interfering with section 7 rights was unenforceable as an illegal contract.  The fact that the agreement was an arbitration agreement is irrelevant.  Illegal contracts are unenforceable.  Concepcion did not change contract law precluding enforcement of illegal agreements.  Moreover, the NLRB noted in D.R. Horton that the Norris-LaGuardia Act was enacted after the FAA.  Thus, it cannot be said that the FAA "overruled" the NLRA.  Rather, if anything, the NLRA limited the FAA in that it defined a new zone of contracts that were illegal.  Iskanian Court don't care!

Next, Iskanian opined that Brown v. Ralphs was wrongly decided:

In finding that Concepcion did not apply to PAGA representative claims, the Brown majority wrote: “[Concepcion] does not purport to deal with the FAA's possible preemption of contractual efforts to eliminate representative private attorney general actions to enforce the Labor Code. As noted, the PAGA creates a statutory right for civil penalties for Labor Code violations 'that otherwise would be sought by state labor law enforcement agencies.' . . . This purpose contrasts with the private individual right of a consumer to pursue class action remedies in court or arbitration, which right, according to [Concepcion], may be waived by agreement so as not to frustrate the FAA—a law governing private arbitrations. [Concepcion] does not provide that a public right, such as that created under the PAGA, can be waived if such a waiver is contrary to state law.” (197 Cal.App.4th at p. 500.)

Respectfully, we disagree with the majority's holding in Brown. We recognize that the PAGA serves to benefit the public and that private attorney general laws may be severely undercut by application of the FAA. But we believe that United States Supreme Court has spoken on the issue, and we are required to follow its binding authority.

Iskanian slip op., at 15.  Again, Iskanian avoids any analysis of authority that might undercut its decision.  Vindication of statutory rights is currently a recognized basis for declining to enforce an arbitration agreement.  All Iskanian does is point at Concepcion and declare that it is following it.  In doing so, Iskanian goes too far and creates a rift in California law that requires immediate attention by the California Supreme Court.

Two cases, two contrary sets of conclusions.

(Surprising) California Supreme Court activity for the week of May 14, 2012

The California Supreme Court held its (usually) weekly conference on May 16, 2012.  Highly notable results include:

• Review was granted in Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association (February 6, 2012). The Court of Appeal reversed a trial verdict for a class of managers claiming misclassification and decertified the class.  The case was covered on this blog here.  I would have put the odds on obtaining review at zero when I wrote about Duran in February.  But, after reading Brinker, there were a number of comments suggesting that the Supreme Court might support the forms of sampling evidence used in the Duran trial.  Of course, review may also have been granted to clarify that decertification by the Court of Appeal was inappropriate, with the better approach being to remand for a new trial and reconsideration of the certification question by the trial court.  All that speculation aside, I am shocked, SHOCKED, to find that review was granted here.  Of course, it is also possible that the Petition for Review, which I have not seen, paints a decidedly different picture than the one presented by the Court of Appeal.

In an entertaining twist, Kirby, et al. v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc. holds that nobody gets fees under 226.7

As a general rule, the law lacks a sense of humor.  Because of that substantial absence of levity, it is up to us to find amusement in unexpected places.  Sometimes a court authors a witty opinion that is entertaining as a form of sharp commentary.  Other times, the humor is relegated to commentary on current legal news.  But that doesn't exhaust our options.  Today, in Kirby, et al. v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc. (April 20, 2012), the California Supreme Court demonstrated that humor exists in the law when a case outcome is contrary to all expectations.  When asked to decide whether the plaintiff alone, or any prevailling party, is entitled to attorney's fees for alleged violations of Labor Code § 226.7, the Court chose Answer C, none of the above.

The plaintiffs brought a wage & hour class action.  Certification was denied.  The plaintiffs dismissed the case with prejudice.  Defendant Immoos moved for fees as the prevailing party on claims for meal and rest break violations.  Plaintiffs argued that, because section 226.7 claims require payment of wages for the violation of the statute in a manner that is tantamount to a minimum wage obligation, the one-way fee-shifting statute applicable to section 1194 applies.  Defendant Immoos argued that the action was for the "non-payment of wages," thereby brining the action within the two-way fee provision of section 218.5.  Breaking its task down, the Supreme Court said:

In resolving the case before us, we must initially ask whether a section 226.7 claim is a claim for which attorney's fees could be awarded to a prevailing employee under section 1194. If so, then IFP may not be awarded fees under section 218.5 even though it prevailed on the rest period claim in this case. If not, then we must separately examine whether section 218.5 authorizes a fee award to IFP on plaintiffs' section 226.7 claim.

Slip op., at 6.  The Court immediately rejected the argument that any statutory or administrative compensation requirement is a "legal minimum wage."  Instead, the Court supplied a common sense reading to the meaning of section 1194, finding that it created a minimum hourly rate of pay, and not a one-way fee shifting provision for every form of statutory or administrative compensation.  Based on this construction, the Court concluded that section 226.7 claim is not a claim for which attorney's fees could be awarded to a prevailing employee under section 1194.

Nonpayment of wages is not the gravamen of a section 226.7 violation. Instead, subdivision (a) of section 226.7 defines a legal violation solely by reference to an employer's obligation to provide meal and rest breaks. (See § 226.7, subd. (a) [“No employer shall require any employee to work during any meal or rest period mandated by an applicable order of the Industrial Welfare Commision.”].) The “additional hour of pay” provided for in subdivision (b) is the legal remedy for a violation of subdivision (a), but whether or not it has been paid is irrelevant to whether section 226.7 was violated. In other words, section 226.7 does not give employers a lawful choice between providing either meal and rest breaks or an additional hour of pay. An employer's failure to provide an additional hour of pay does not form part of a section 226.7 violation, and an employer's provision of an additional hour of pay does not excuse a section 226.7 violation. The failure to provide required meal and rest breaks is what triggers a violation of section 226.7. Accordingly, a section 226.7 claim is not an action brought for nonpayment of wages; it is an action brought for non-provision of meal or rest breaks.

Slip op., at 13-14.  Thus, since section 226.7 is not an action for nonpayment of wages, section 218.5 does not apply either.  The Court followed with this observation:

It is no answer to say that a section 226.7 claim is properly characterized as an action brought for (i.e., on account of) nonpayment of wages because if a defendant employer had provided the additional hour of pay remedy, presumably the plaintiff would not have brought the action at all. Such a characterization is a departure from the way we conventionally distinguish between the legal basis for a lawsuit and the remedy sought. Consider a typical lawsuit that alleges unlawful injury and seeks compensatory damages. We may say that the suit is an action brought for violation of some legal duty. But we do not say that the suit is an action brought for nonpayment of damages — even though the action would not have been brought had the defendant paid the damages for the plaintiff's injury.

Slip op., at 14.  So that's that.  No fees for prevailing party under section 226.7 for either side.

Meanwhile, note again this little morsel:  "In other words, section 226.7 does not give employers a lawful choice between providing either meal and rest breaks or an additional hour of pay."  Oops.  Even if the employer pays the money, it isn't excused from the violation.  But, since attorney's fees aren't available directly, the chances of an action for injunctive relief are diminished.  That leaves 1021.5 or other fee-shifting bases, which are far from guaranteed.

Decision forthcoming in Kirby, et al. v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc.

On Monday, April 30, 2012, the California Supreme Court will issue its decision in Kirby, et al. v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc.  The Court of Appeal decision was discussed on this blog here.  The great question, of course, is whether the relatively employee-protective decision in Brinker will be tempered by prevailing party fee concerns.  The California Supreme Court describes the issues under review as follows:

The court limited review to the following issues: (1) Does Labor Code section 1194 apply to a cause of action alleging meal and rest period violations (Lab. Code, § 226.7) or may attorney’s fees be awarded under Labor Code section 218.5? (2) Is our analysis affected by whether the claims for meal and rest periods are brought alone or are accompanied by claims for minimum wage and overtime?

$15 million misclassification class judgment reversed in Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association

Exemption-based misclassification cases are hard to certify.  But when you certify an overtime exemption misclassification case, try it, and win a $15 million verdict, you'd think that the hard times are behind you.  Not so fast.  In Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association (February 6, 2012), the Court of Appeal (First Appellate District, Division One) reversed that verdict, decertified the class, and sent the whole thing back down to the trial court for further consideration of how to resolve the individual break claims in light of Brinker.

The plaintiffs in the case were 260 current and former business banking officers (BBO's) who claimed they were misclassified by USB as outside sales personnel exempt from California‘s overtime laws.  The procedural history was messy.  Exemption defenses were summarily adjudicated.  The defendant moved unsuccessfully to decertify.  The trial included motions about evidentiary exclusions.  It appears from the summary that a substantial amount of evidence the defendant sought to introduce was excluded from the trial.  Significantly, a small survey was conducted and then relied upon by a statistics expert to determine class-wide liability.

The Court issued a number of significant holdings, which all revolve around the propriety of proving liability in a misclassification class action with statistical evidence, as opposed to proving damages once liability is established.  For example, the Court held that use of statistical evidence to prove liability is inconsistent with cases examining such evidence at certification:

USB claims California law precludes class-wide liability determinations based on evidence obtained from a representative sample in employment cases alleging misclassification. USB relies on several state and federal wage and hour class action cases for the proposition that surveying, sampling, and statistics are not valid methods of determining liability because representative findings can never be reasonably extrapolated to absent class members in misclassification claims given that time spent performing exempt tasks may differ between employees. While all the cases cited by USB involve rulings on motions to certify or decertify class actions, they support the conclusion that improper procedures were followed in this case.

Slip op., at 47-48.  The Court also held that statistical sampling for proof of liability is inconsistent with its Bell III decision:

The procedures we approved in Bell III are only superficially similar to the procedures utilized in the present case.  Again, in Bell III we did not have occasion to consider the use of a representative sample to determine class-wide liability, since liability was not an issue on appeal. Accordingly, the only issue we addressed was the damages calculation itself, and not whether the plaintiff employees had a right to recover damages in the first place. And our assessment was based on a record evidencing cooperation and agreement among the parties and their counsel.

Slip op., at 45.  With respect to Bell III, the Court explained that the present case suffered a number of flaws (sample too small, no test studies to set sample size, lack of randomness, and no cooperation between the parties) not found in Bell III.  The Court then said:

Fifth, the restitution award here was affected by a 43.3 percent margin of error, more than 10 percentage points above the margin of error for the double-overtime award we invalidated in Bell III. In absolute terms, the average weekly overtime hour figure could conceivably be as low as 6.72 hours per week, as opposed to the 11.86 hour figure arrived at here. While we again will not set a bright line for when a margin of error becomes so excessive as to be deemed unconstitutional, we are troubled by this result.

Slip op., at 46.

Next, the Court concluded that the exclusion of 78 sworn statements that, if admitted, would have reduced the class size by about one-third, was a prejudicial error that violated the defendant's due process right to present relevant evidence in its defense: "The evidence USB sought to introduce, if deemed persuasive, would have established that at least one-third of the class was properly classified. Thus, this evidence USB sought to introduce is unquestionably relevant and therefore admissible."  Slip op., at 55.

The Court then explained that the fatal flaw in the trial management plan was the exclusion of virtually all means by which the defendant could have defended against class-wide liability:

Fundamentally, the issue here is not just that USB was prevented from defending each individual claim but also that USB was unfairly restricted in presenting its defense to class-wide liability. With that in mind, the cases relied on by plaintiffs are inapposite. Both Long v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. (N.D.Ill. 1991) 761 F.Supp. 1320 [protective order limited discovery of information from plaintiff flight attendants to a representative sample of class members], and In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions (S.D.N.Y. 1971) 333 F.Supp. 278 [states sought recovery for alleged overcharges in the sale of certain antibiotics], concerned the damages phase of a trial, not the liability phase.

Slip op., at 58.  So, when a defendant asserts that this case stands for the proposition that it gets to defend agasint each individual class member's claim, be sure to remind the defendant and Court that the holding actually criticized the absence of any means to mount a defense, rather than specifying the specific forms that a reasonable opportunity to defend must take:

In sum, the court erred when, in the interest of expediency, it constructed a set of ground rules that unfairly prevented USB from defending itself. These ground rules were the product of the trial court. We do not suggest that the implementation of any particular additional procedural tool would have satisfied due process. We simply hold that the court, having agreed to try this matter as a class action, denied USB the opportunity to defend itself by flatly foreclosing the admission of potentially relevant evidence.

Slip op., at 60.

The Court spent some additional time commenting on the margin of error near 44 percent, which it found to be unacceptably large to form the basis of any reasonable result.  The Court concluded its opus by finding that, under the second motion to decertify, the trial court erred by failing to decertify the class.

I think I can sum all this up by observing that (1) misclassification cases in the exemption context are difficult cases and getting tougher all the time, and (2) defendants will incorrectly claim that this decision stands for a mythical due process right that the defendant gets to challenge each class member's claim.  Can't help with one, and can't stop two, but as to two, you can point out that there are many ways to provide a defendant with a reasonable opportunity to defend against class liability.

In Muldrow v. Surrex Solutions Corp., court holds that commissions need not be strict percentage of sales

Trials of class actions are uncommon.  Here, though, we have an example of a class action that made it through trial (though admittedly a bench trial, which is more like a long and painful, multi-day summary judgment hearing).  In Muldrow v. Surrex Solutions Corp. (January 24, 2012), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division One) considered "whether the trial court erred in determining that an employer was not required to pay overtime wages (Lab. Code, § 510) to a class of its current and former employees because they were subject to the commissioned employees exemption (Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 8, § 11070, subd. (3)(D))."

The class of employees was comprised of recruiters that located potential employees for clients of Surrex.  Surrex was paid only when an employee was successfully placed with a client.  The class members were paid a percentage of "adjusted gross profit."  The "adjusted gross profit" was calculated by subtracting various costs from the amount clients paid for a placement.

The Court reached two key conclusions that resulted in an affirmance for the trial court.  First, the Court concluded that "sales-related activities" should be viewed more broadly than the time involved in the sale itself:  "We also reject appellants' contention that time spent 'searching on the computer, searching for candidates on the website, cold calling, interviewing candidates, inputting data, and submitting resumes,' may not be considered sales-related activities."  Slip op., at 14.

Second, the Court concluded that "commissions" do not have to equal a fixed percentage of revenues:

We disagree that either the Keyes Motors court or the Ramirez court intended to preclude an employer from calculating commissions based on anything other than a straight percentage of profits. Most importantly, neither the Keyes Motors court nor the Ramirez court had any occasion to address this issue, because in both cases, the employees' commissions were based on a straight percentage of the price charged to the customer. (Keyes Motors, supra, 197 Cal.App.3d at p. 561 [The "mechanic earns a fixed percentage of the hourly rate charged the customer"]; Ramirez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 804 [employee received a "percentage of the price of the bottles of water and related products sold"].) " ' "It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered." ' " (Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106, 127, citations omitted.) Thus, "the Keyes Motors definition of 'commission' . . . does not control our case." (Areso, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1006.)

Slip op., at 17.  The Court then focused on incentives, distinguishing Keyes Motors and Ramirez:

In this case, in contrast, appellants affected not only the revenue that Surrex received, but also the costs that Surrex would bear. Paige Freeman, a senior consulting services manager, testified that consulting service managers negotiated both the rates that Surrex paid candidate/consultants and the rate at which Surrex billed clients for those services. Appellants therefore had an impact on both the revenue (bill rate) that Surrex received and the costs (pay rate) that Surrex incurred. Thus, while in Keyes Motors and Ramirez, a commission system based on the price of the products or services provided employees with an incentive to increase the number of repairs performed (Keyes Motors) or the number of bottles of water sold (Ramirez), in this case, a commission system based solely on revenue or price would fail to reward employees who helped Surrex achieve greater profits by limiting costs. We see nothing in Ramirez or Keyes Motors that requires such a result, particularly since neither court had occasion to consider a compensation system similar to the one at issue in this case.

Slip op., at 18.  This is all very interesting, but the Court cites no authority in support of its power to define commissions so as to apply the incentives that it views as, in some manner, "better."  Instead, the Court falls back to Black's Law Dictionary for its definition of commission.  Maybe someone has some regulatory history materials handy to check and see whether the Court has the right of what the IWC intended when it created this exemption.

Peremptory challenges by different plaintiffs in two PAGA suits held valid in Pickett v. Superior Court

In my experience, there is a good deal of confusion about what is meant by the "one challenge per side" rule governing peremptory challenges to assigned trial judges under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6.  In Pickett v. Superior Court (February 22, 2012), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Five) reduced at least some of that confusion, upholding the right of the plaintiff in a second, related action to exercise a peremptory challenge after the plaintiff in the earlier-filed action had already done so.

Pickett’s action that included a Private Attorney General Act (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) (PAGA) claim.  It was deemed related to a prior-filed PAGA action brought by Eugina Bright, against the same defendant, 99¢ Only Stores, on similar allegations.  The two action sought somewhat different remdies.  Pickett’s action was reassigned to the all-purpose judge in the prior-filed action, but not consolidated with that first action.  Pickett timely filed a peremptory challenge to the trial judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6.

The trial court struck the challenge as improper.  It determined that Pickett’s action was identical to and a continuation of the action brought by Bright, who had already used her one peremptory challenge in the matter after remand following a successful appeal.  The Court of Appeal concluded that under section 170.6 and the authorities applying it, Pickett’s action is not a continuation of Bright’s action, nor is Pickett on the same “side” as Bright in one action, and therefore Pickett’s peremptory challenge should have been accepted.

An interesting extra detail is that in the Notice of Related Cases, Pickett described her claims as "identical" to Bright's.  Despite that characterization, one that the defendant sought to turn to its advantage, the Court of Appeal determined that the right to exercise a peremptory challenge should be determined by the nature of the cases and identity of the parties, not the characterization by a party in a Notice of Related Cases.

Aleman v. Airtouch Cellular confirms what we already suspected regarding reporting time pay and split shift wages

While this case ostensibly addresses issues of first impression in California, like many such decisions it was only a matter of time.  In Aleman v. Airtouch Cellular (December 21, 2011), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Two) examined claims for reporting time pay and split shift premiums.  The case was brought by former employees of AirTouch. The plaintiffs worked mostly as retail sales representatives or customer service representatives at AirTouch stores and kiosks.  Plaintiffs alleged that AirTouch did not properly pay its nonexempt employees for attending mandatory store meetings.

On the reporting time claim, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to receive "reporting time pay" for attending meetings at work, because all the meetings were scheduled and they worked at least half the scheduled time.  This issue stems from the argument that reporting time pay should be based on a two-hour minimum.  Thus, goes the argument, if you are called into a meeting one day for two hours, you should get two hours of pay, even if the meeting last 90 minutes.  This theory is dead.  If a meeting is scheduled, and the meeting lasts at least half the scheduled time, that is good enough.

On the split shift differential claim, the Court concluded, consistent with at least one treatise to examine the issue, that the split shift differential is intended only to protect the minimum wage law.  Thus, if your pay for the hours worked is enough to satisfy the split shift premium of one extra hour of pay at minimum wage, then no further pay need be supplied.

On the plus side, the Court explicitly held that an award of attorney's fees was improper, since both reporting time pay and split shift pay were governed by Labor Code section 1194, governing payment of minimum wages.  Since the one-way fee shifting statute controls the claims, defendant could not recover fees.  Phew.