Wal-Mart ramps up spin control following decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Following the decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2010), Wal-Mart is already in full spin control mode.  In a statement released through PR Newswire, Wal-Mart expressed how happy it was that a class action involving hundreds of thousands of employees would proceed against it:

We are pleased that the court agreed with our position on several critical issues. The court significantly reduced the size of the originally certified class by as much as two-thirds. Finding that the trial court 'abused its discretion,' the appeals court also set aside the ruling on punitive damages.

Perhaps the rosy glow will fade when Wal-Mart realizes that several issues are simply returning to the trial court for further analysis.  For example, punitive damages may very well be certified on terms identical to the original order:  "With respect to the claims for punitive damages, we remand so that the district court may consider whether to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3)."  Slip op., at 6147.  Don't say anything to Wal-Mart about this just yet; even Wal-Mart deserves some happiness, no matter how brief.

Breaking News: Ninth Circuit issues en banc decision in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

The Ninth Circuit has issued its long-awaited, en banc Opinion in Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2010).  Of course, I have no idea if you were actually waiting for it, so I am only referring to myself.  As for how long it took to issue the Opinion, it took some time to write an Opinion that is about 136 pages long.  The majority described the holding as follows:

Plaintiffs allege that Wal-Mart, Inc., discriminates against women in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After detailed briefing and hearing, the district court certified a class encompassing all women employed by Wal-Mart at any time after December 26, 1998, and encompassing all Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and back pay, while creating a separate opt-out class encompassing the same employees for punitive damages. We affirm the district court’s certification of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) class of current employees with respect to their claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and back pay. With respect to the claims for punitive damages, we remand so that the district court may consider whether to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2) or (b)(3). We also remand with respect to the claims of putative class members who no longer worked for Wal-Mart when the complaint was filed so that the district court may consider whether to certify an additional class or classes under Rule 23(b)(3).

Slip op., at 6146-47.  The massive opinion and dissent are simply too long for me to thoroughly cover this morning.  However, Circuit Judge Graber offered this brief comment on the entirety of the opinion:

GRABER, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

The majority and the dissent have written scholarly and complete explanations of their positions. What the length of their opinions may mask is the simplicity of the majority’s unremarkable holding:

Current female employees may maintain a Rule 23(b)(2) class action against their employer, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and back pay on behalf of all the current female employees, when they challenge as discriminatory the effects of their employer’s company-wide policies.

If the employer had 500 female employees, I doubt that any of my colleagues would question the certification of such a class. Certification does not become an abuse of discretion merely because the class has 500,000 members. I therefore concur fully in the majority opinion.

Slip op., at 6237-38.

I will write more on this Opinion as soon as I am able, but a quick perusal suggests that this decision will have a lasting impact on certification motions in the Ninth Circuit.  Unless the U.S. Supreme Court wants to weigh in on this decision.

in brief: Ninth Circuit joins others in holding that denial of certification does not destroy CAFA jurisdiction

In United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial & Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, et al. v. Shell Oil Company (9th Cir. Apr. 21, 2010) (say that three times fast), a putative class action alleging various wage & hour violations was removed to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (CAFA).  Certification was eventually denied.  The district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and remanded the matter to state court.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit joined the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits in holding that denial of class certification does not divest the federal district court of jurisdiction.  The Court recognized the general principles that jurisdiction is evaluated at the time it is invoked, and subsequent developments do not destroy jurisdiction if it was properly invoked originally.  All else equal, this decision should reduce the overall degree of hapiness experienced by district court judges.  Now they can't put an unsuccessful, removed class action out of its misery with a remand bullet to the head.  Thus, federal district courts will have the pleasure of overseeing more individual, state law-based actions.

Nevada has a substantial interest in brothel advertisements

Yes.  Perhaps an over-generalization, but, yes.  See, Coyote Publishing, Inc. v. Miller (9th Cir. Mar. 11, 2010), wherein the Ninth Circuit held that Nevada's restrictions on brothel advertisements are constitutional because they are justified by state's "substantial interest."   These headlines sometimes write themselves.

In brief: Ninth Circuit issues new opinion in Rutti v. Lojack Corporation, Inc.

After granting a panel petition for rehearing, the Ninth Circuit withdrew the Opinion in Rutti v. Lojack Corporation, Inc., 578 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2009), and issued a new opinion, Rutti v. Lojack Corporation, Inc. (9th Cir. March 2, 2010).  The change is significant on the issue of commute time under California law: "[W]e vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Rutti’s claim for compensation of his commute under California law and on his postliminary activity of required daily portable data transmissions, and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."  Slip op., at 3237.  I may provide a longer post about this change later.  The earlier post on Rutti can be found here.

 

Ninth Circuit holds that the Higher Education Act (HEA), and its Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP), preempt state law claims for unfair billing practices

The Higher Education Act (HEA) was passed “to keep the college door open to all students of ability, regardless of socioeconomic background.” Rowe v. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp., 559 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009).  Congress also Congress established the Federal Family Education Loan Program (FFELP), a system of loan guarantees meant to encourage lenders to loan money to students and their parents on favorable terms. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1071-1087-4; Rowe, 559 F.3d at 1030.  In Chae, et al. v. SLM Corporation, dba Sallie Mae, et al. (9th Cir. January 25, 2010), the Ninth Circuit considered whether the HEA and FFELP preempted state law consumer protection claims in a putative class action alleging false and misleading disclosures about billing practices.

The Court excluded field preemption from its analysis, noting: "Turning now to the issues before us, we have previously held that field preemption does not apply to the HEA."  Chae, at 1382.  With that, the Court analyzed whether "express preemption" or "conflict preemption" were present.

The Ninth Circuit found that express preemption applied to the claims in Chae:

Congress has enacted several express preemption provisions applicable to FFELP participants. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1078(d), 1091a(a)(2)(B), 1091a(b)(1)-(3), 1095a(a), 1098g. These provisions expressly preempt the operation of state usury laws, statutes of limitations, limitations on recovering the costs of debt collection, infancy defenses to contract liability, wage garnishment limitations, and disclosure requirements. This last provision, 20 U.S.C. § 1098g, is entitled, “Exemption from State disclosure requirements.” The text of the statute reads: “Loans made, insured, or guaranteed pursuant to a program authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act . . . shall not be subject to any disclosure requirements of any State law.” Id. The FFELP falls within Title IV of the HEA, and is thus subject to its express preemption provision. 

Chae, at 1383.  The Court then explained its disagreement with the plaintiffs' characterization of their claims as misrepresentation claims, not disclosure claims:

At bottom, the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claims are improper-disclosure claims. The plaintiffs do not contend that California law prevents Sallie Mae from employing any of the three loan-servicing practices at issue. We consider these allegations in substance to be a challenge to the allegedly misleading method Sallie Mae used to communicate with the plaintiffs about its practices. In this context, the state-law prohibition on misrepresenting a business practice “is merely the converse” of a state-law requirement that alternate disclosures be made. See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 527. 

Chae, at 1384.  The Court was not sympathetic to the plaintiffs' argument that a finding of preemption would eliminate any recourse for unfair practices by Sallie Mae.  The Court, in a footnote, suggested that the plaintiffs' only remedy was to complain to the Department of Education.  Chae, at 1384-85, n. 6.

Finally, the Court concluded, after a lengthy discussion, that application of state consumer protection laws would directly conflict with the uniformity and stability goal behind the FFELP.

Ninth Circuit holds that a class representative can voluntarily settle individual claims but retain a personal stake sufficient to appeal the denial of class certification

In the last few years, California Courts of Appeal have examined the question of whether an putative class representative can voluntarily settle individual claims while "agreeing" with the defendant that the plaintiff would retain a right to appeal the denial of class certification.  That examination hasn't gone well for plaintiffs:  "The parties' intent cannot compel this court to issue an advisory opinion on issues in which, after the settlement, Larner no longer retains any individual, personal stake."  Larner v. Los Angeles Doctors Hospital Associates, LP, 168 Cal. App. 4th 1291, 1298 (2008).  However, the Larner Court suggested that, had Larner "reserved any right to shift attorney fees to other class members," she might have retained an interest in the litigation sufficient to support her right to appeal.  Larner, at 1304.

After Larner, the trend continued, and with increasing momentum against plaintiffs.  Watkins v. Wachovia Corp., 172 Cal. App. 4th 1576 (2009) actually criticized Larner: "We believe that it is illogical to import the law governing 'pick off' cases into the context of a voluntary settlement."  Watkins, at 1591.  Watkins bluntly declared, "There are no public policy interests implicated by a settlement voluntarily accepted."  Watkins, at 1591.

The Ninth Circuit had occasion to examine this same issue.  In Narouz v. Charter Communications (9th Cir. Jan. 15, 2010), the Court examined "whether the settlement and voluntary dismissal by a class representative of his personal claims in a putative class action lawsuit renders moot his appeal of the denial of class certification."  Slip op., at 1172.  Identifying the issue as one open in the Ninth Circuit, the Court began its analysis with an examination of decisions arising in the context of "involuntary" claim expiration:

The Supreme Court held in Geraghty that when a class representative’s claims expire involuntarily, that representative “retains a ‘personal stake’ in obtaining class certification sufficient” to maintain jurisdiction to appeal a denial of class certification. Id. at 404. The Court reasoned that the class representative maintained at least an interest in spreading litigation costs and shifting fees and expenses to the other litigants with similar claims. Id. at 403; see also Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank, Jackson Miss. v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 334 n.6 (1980).

Slip op., at 1175.  Much like the Larner Court, the Ninth Circuit held:

We hold that when a class representative voluntarily settles his or her individual claims, but specifically retains a personal stake as identified by Geraghty and Roper, he or she retains jurisdiction to appeal the denial of class certification. In so holding, we join several other circuits. See Richards v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 453 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Potter v. Norwest Mortgage, Inc., 329 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2003); Toms v. Allied Bond & Collection Agency, Inc., 179 F.3d 103 (4th Cir. 1999); Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1984).

Slip op. at 1175.  The Court then emphasized that "a class representative cannot release any and all interests he or she may have had in class representation through a private settlement agreement" and still assert the existence of a "personal stake" in the litigation.  Slip op. at 1175.

The Court then briefly criticized the District Court's failure to create a proper record for review when it refused to certify the proposed class for settlement purposes:  "It is clear here that the district court erred in denying class certification without providing any findings or providing any analysis of the Rule 23 factors."  Slip op., at 1179.  The Court succinctly said, "Meaningful appellate review is impossible."  Slip op., at 1179.

There was also a spirited exchange between District Judge Korman (Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation), who concurred in the decision, and Circuit Judge Rymer, who dissented.

in brief: service of a complaint on a consumer is a "communication" under the FDCPA

While I can't say that this will ultimately prove to be a class issue, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) is receiving increased attention in recent years, particularly as an increase in the number of consumers in economic distress increases their interactions with debt collectors.  It is with this in mind that I pass on one sentence from a case involving the FDCPA.  In Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., (9th Cir. January 14, 2009), the Ninth Circuit held:  "We . . . conclude that a complaint served directly on a consumer to facilitate debt-collection efforts is a communication subject to the requirements of §§ 1692e and 1692f."  Slip op., at 1006.

 

California Proposition 8 elicits constitution-based, discovery rights opinion from Ninth Circuit

For those following the complicated twists and turns of litigation over California Ballot Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to provide that only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California, the litigation about that measure continues.  Today, the Ninth Circuit, in Perry, et al. v. Arnold Schwarzenegger (9th Cir. January 4, 2009), issued a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a protective order barring access to internal campaign communications of proponents of the Proposition.  I'm no constitutional law expert, but high-stakes litigation like this tends to create its own complexity, so I simply note the opinion for the constitutional law scholars, fans and practitioners.  I can say that it's not every day that you see discovery limited because it would intrude on the the First Amendment right of freedom to associate.  The one-page appendix to the opinion is also available.

 

Back to the drawing board: AT&T's arbitration agreement that bans class actions is still unconscionable

It seems to me that the telecommunications and credit card industries are more determined to make an arbitration agreement with a class action ban stick than any other industry.  Most employers have given up that dream, but not the phone company and not the bank.  The latest arbitration agreement with a class action ban comes to us compliments of AT&T Mobility LLC.  But, in Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC (October 27, 2009), the Ninth Circuit sends another class action ban to the unconscionability graveyard, and just in time for Halloween.

Those crazy mad scientists in the secret AT&T Arbitration Agreement Drafting Lab (also known as the "Triple A - DL" to those in the know), their latest scheme to ban class actions was ingenious, and could have helped them take over the world!  The plan was to circumvent the holding of Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Services, Inc., 498 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2007) with a little bonus payment clause:

[T]he phone company points to a new wrinkle: unlike the arbitration clause in Shroyer, this arbitration clause provides for a “premium” payment of $7,500 (the jurisdictional limit of California’s small claims court) if the arbitrator awards the customer an amount greater than the phone company’s last written settlement offer made before selection of an arbitrator. Hence, says the phone company, the arbitration clause is not an artifice that has the practical effect of rendering it immune from individual claims.

Slip op., at 14391.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed, and shot down a preemption argument along the way:

We will find, on second blush, the new “premium” payment does not distinguish this case from Shroyer, and that under California law, the present arbitration clause is unconscionable and unenforcable [sic]. Further, we will also find no merit to the phone company’s claim the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts California unconscionability law.

Slip op., at 14391.  Back to the Triple A - DL, Snidely.  For those not satisfied with just the holding, the Court's analysis relied heavily on Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005):

The California Supreme Court addressed the unconscionability of class action waivers in arbitration agreements for the first time in Discover Bank v. Sup. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005), holding that class action waivers were at least sometimes unconscionable under California law. 113 P.3d at 1108. Class actions, the court reasoned, serve the important policy function of deterring and redressing wrongdoing, particularly where a company defrauds large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money. Id. at 1105. Class action waivers pose a problem because, “small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.” Id. at 1106. In this way, the class action waiver allows the company to insulate itself from liability for its wrongdoing and the policy behind class actions is thwarted. Id. at 1109.

Slip op., at 14394.  The Court then explained how it interpreted the test in Discover Bank:

We have interpreted Discover Bank as creating a three-part test to determine whether a class action waiver in a consumer contract is unconscionable: (1) is the agreement a contract of adhesion; (2) are disputes between the contracting parties likely to involve small amounts of damages; and (3) is it alleged that the party with superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme deliberately to cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money. Id. at 983. In Shroyer, we noted that “there are most certainly circumstances in which a class action waiver is unconscionable under California law despite the fact that all three parts of the Discover Bank test are not satisfied.” Id. Because we hold that the class action waiver at issue satisfies all three parts of the test, as was true in Shroyer, “it is unnecessary to explore those circumstances here.” Id.

Slip op., at 14395.  The application of the Discover Bank test tracks Shroyer.  The Court then disposed of AT&T's contention that the promise of a premium payment distinguished this agreement from Shroyer:

The $7,500 premium payment is available only if AT&T does not make a settlement offer to the aggrieved customer in a sum equal to or higher than is ultimately awarded in arbitration, and before an arbitrator is selected. This means that if a customer files for arbitration against AT&T, predictably, AT&T will simply pay the face value of the claim before the selection of an arbitrator to avoid potentially paying $7,500. Thus, the maximum gain to a customer for the hassle of arbitrating a $30.22 dispute is still just $30.22. We held in Shroyer that a claim worth a few hundred dollars did not provide adequate incentive for a customer to bother pursuing individual arbitration. 498 F.3d at 986. The $30.22 at issue here is even less of an incentive to file a claim. As a result, aggrieved customers will predictably not file claims—even if the odds are that after the letter-writing and arbitrator-choosing, they will get a $30.22 offer—thereby “greatly reduc[ing] the aggregate liability” AT&T faces for allegedly mulcting small sums of money from many consumers. See id. The premium payment provision has no effect on this conclusion, nor do any of the other provisions of AT&T’s revised arbitration clause. The actual damages a customer will recover remain predictably small, thus under the rationale of Discover Bank and Shroyer, AT&T’s class action waiver is in effect an exculpatory clause, hence substantively unconscionable.

Slip op., at 14397-98.  I'll spare you any excerpts from the preemption discussion.  It's sufficient to say that the Court was impressed with a repeat of arguments rejected in Shroyer.