Sharp Healthcare is responsible for two of the three published decisions issued today that concern class action issues.  Hale v. Sharp Healthcare (April 19, 2010) and Durell v. Sharp Healthcare (April 19, 2010) both concern putative class actions.  Both involve billing practices by Sharp Healthcare related to its "regular" billing rate.  Both concern trial court orders sustaining demurrers to UCL causes of action.  And both pronounce new situations where "reliance" is required for UCL claims.  However, the outcomes in the two appeals differ by the width of, at most, a couple of sentences of allegations; one passes muster as a "reliance" allegations and one does not.

Both cases concern the basic theory that Sharp engaged in deceptive and unfair practices by billing uninsured patients its full standardized rates for services, when it substantially discounts those rates for patients covered by Medicare or private insurance.  Both cases questioned, in slightly different ways, what actually constitutes the "regular rates" charged to patients.

In the Durell opinion, the Court focused on the causation aspect of standing:

The court sustained the demurrer to the UCL cause of action without leave to amend on the ground Durell lacks standing to pursue the claim. The court found the SAC insufficiently alleges "injury in fact" and causation. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17204.) As to causation, the court explained the SAC fails to allege Durell was harmed "as a result of" Sharp's conduct. (Ibid.) For instance, the SAC does not allege he "relied on Sharp charging its 'usual and customary rates' in receiving treatment." We turn first to the causation issue, which we find dispositive.

Durell, at 12.  The Court found the absence of allegations of "reliance" to be the key defect in Durell's pleading: 

The SAC does not allege Durell relied on either Sharp's Web site representations or on the language in the Agreement for Services in going to Sharp Grossmont Hospital or in seeking or accepting services once he was transported there. Indeed, the SAC does not allege Durell ever visited Sharp's Web site or even that he ever read the Agreement for Services.

Durell, at 14.

Plaintiff Hale, on the other hand, alleged facts that satisfied the Court's examination of "injury in fact" and standing: 

Even though the SAC alleges Hale has paid only $500 of her $14,447.65 medical bill, it also alleges the Admission Agreement obligates her to pay Sharp the balance on her account. Thus, she faces at least an imminent invasion or injury to a legally protected interest. (See Troyk, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1346.) The term "imminent" is defined as "ready to take place," "hanging threateningly over one's head," and "menacingly near." (Webster's 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 1130.) Certainly, this is not the type of action Proposition 64 was intended to squelch. Hale was a bona fide consumer of medical services.

Hale, at 11.  Though thin, the Court agreed that Hale did plead a form of "reliance" sufficient to withstand demurrer: 

We agree with Hale, however, that "to the extent [she] is bringing a fraud-based claim under the UCL, she has reasonably pled reliance." The SAC alleges Hale signed the Admission Agreement, and "at the time of signing the contract, she was expecting to be charged 'regular rates,' and certainly not the grossly excessive rates that she was subsequently billed." (Italics added.) This allegation appears in the breach of contract cause of action, but the UCL cause of action incorporates the allegations of all other causes of action. We must interpret the complaint reasonably, "reading it as a whole and its parts in their context." (Stearn v. County of San Bernardino (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 434, 439.) As Hale notes, the "difference between 'expecting' to be charged regular rates and 'relying' on being charged regular rates is a distinction without a difference." We see no utility in requiring Hale to amend her complaint to exchange the term "expecting" for the term "relying."

Hale, at 14-15.  Lesson one from these cases is that small differences in pleading facts can make a big difference.

But discussing allegations was not the headline-worthy event in these two opinions.  The Court extended the concept of "reliance" discussed in Tobacco II's discussion of the UCL "fraudulent" prong to any "unlawful" prong claim asserting a legal violation that involves deception:

Construing the phrase "as a result of" in Business and Professions Code section 17204 in light of Proposition 64's intention to limit private enforcement actions under the UCL, we conclude the reasoning of Tobacco II applies equally to the "unlawful" prong of the UCL when, as here, the predicate unlawfulness is misrepresentation and deception. A consumer's burden of pleading causation in a UCL action should hinge on the nature of the alleged wrongdoing rather than the specific prong of the UCL the consumer invokes. This is a case in which the "concept of reliance" unequivocally applies (Tobacco II, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 325, fn. 17), and omitting an actual reliance requirement when the defendant's alleged misrepresentation has not deceived the plaintiff "would blunt Proposition 64's intended reforms." (Cattie v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (S.D.Cal. 2007) 504 F.Supp.2d 939, 948.)

Durell, at 14.

With a new category of "reliance" pleading required for certain "unlawful" prong claims, the Court turned its high-powered, neutrino-powered conservative ray on the "unfair" prong of the UCL.  Durell's "unfair" prong claim also found no success.  After reviewing the post-Cel-Tech hairball, the Court applied its own prior precedent that defines a very strict test for "unfair" conduct:

Here, the court's order does not specifically address the "unfair" prong of the UCL. The SAC alleges Sharp's conduct violates public policy, and is "immoral, unethical, oppressive, and unscrupulous," a vague test of unfairness this court rejects. The SAC does not allege the conduct is tethered to any underlying constitutional, statutory or regulatory provision, or that it threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of an antitrust law. In his briefing, Durell does not address Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th 163, and its affect on the definition of "unfair" in consumer UCL cases, or this court's opinions in Scripps Clinic, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th 917, and Byars, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th 1134. We conclude the court properly granted the demurrer as to the claim under the "unfair" prong of the UCL.

Durell, at 19.

On the flip side, Hale's CLRA claim lives to fight another day, benefiting from the Court's "reliance" pleading analysis set forth in its discussion of Hale's UCL claim:

Again, however, to the extent Hale's CLRA claim is fraud-based, the SAC adequately alleges the reliance element. Thus, the court erred by sustaining the demurrer to the CLRA cause of action.

Hale, at 16.

I will look forward to reading The UCL Practitioner's assessment of these two opinions.