Bates v. Rubio's Restaurants, Inc. reminds defendants to be sure the class list is complete before the money starts flowing

While most of this opinion has nothing to do with class actions and everything to do with whether a judge can sua sponte reconsider a prior order and then recuse himself in the same minute order, Bates v. Rubio's Restaurant's Inc. (November 30, 2009) includes an important lesson for the administration of class action.  The Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three) affirmed an interesting order of the trial court that had a significant effect on the constituency of a class in a settlement.  The concise summary of key events sets the stage for the discussion that follows in the opinion:

The parties in this wage and hour class action litigation entered into a $7.5 million settlement agreement, providing for three payments of $2.5 million to approved class members. After the initial $2.5 million payment was distributed among 529 approved class members, defendant and appellant Rubio‟s Restaurants, Inc. (Rubio‟s) realized it had not provided the names of all potential class members to the settlement administrator. One hundred forty potential class members had not received notification of the settlement.

After postjudgment briefing and status conferences, the court ruled that the 140 late-identified class members should receive notice and be folded into the settlement agreement. Later, the judge reconsidered his ruling sua sponte and vacated it. In the same minute order, the judge, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(i), then recused himself from any further proceedings in the matter, in the interests of justice.

Slip op., at 2.  Rubio's argued that the recusal negated the validity of the portion of the order vacating the prior ruling.  The Court of Appeal said that was nonsense, concluding that the trial court could properly rescing its earlier ruling and later, in the same minute order, recuse itself.

The only reason for all the fuss was the fact that 140 class members can file another class action and state with great certainty that they didn't receive notice of the prior settlement.  There's your class action angle.

Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court puts the privilege in attorney-client privilege

This morning the California Supreme Court issued its opinion in Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court.  If you don't remember this case, the Trial Court granted a Motion to Compel the production of documents that included a partially redacted letter from outside counsel to Costco, commenting upon the appropriateness of classifying certain managerial employees as exempt from California’s overtime pay laws and regulations.  Then a Petition for a Writ was filed, an OSC issued, the OSC was dismissed without an opinion, the Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to issue an OSC, the matter was heard, and, finally, the Petition was denied.  The Supreme Court subsequently granted a Petition for Review.

Without getting into the nuts and bolts of the ruling at this time, the Supreme Court's determination was clearly stated in the opening paragraph:

In this case we consider whether the trial court erred by directing a referee to conduct an in camera review of an opinion letter sent by outside counsel to a corporate client, allowing the referee to redact the letter to conceal that portion the referee believed to be privileged, and ordering the client to disclose the remainder to the opposing party. We conclude the court‟s directions and order violated the attorney-client privilege, and violated as well the statutory prohibition against requiring disclosure of information claimed to be subject to the attorney-client privilege in order to rule on a claim of privilege. (Evid. Code, § 915, subd. (a).)

Slip op., at 1.  The opinion is unanimous, but Chief Justice George offers interesting remarks about the nature of what constitutes an attorney-client communication in a concurring opinion.


Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court and Roby v. McKesson Corporation opinions will be available November 30, 2009

Because of the Thanksgiving holiday, the Supreme Court announced opinion filings that will be published on Monday, November 30, 2009.  The Court's Notice is available here.

Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court, previously mentioned on this blog here, will address the following issues:

(1) Does the attorney-client privilege (Evid. Code, § 954) protect factual statements that outside counsel conveys to corporate counsel in a legal opinion letter? (2) Does Evidence Code section 915 prohibit a trial court from conducting an in camera review of a legal opinion letter to determine whether the attorney-client privilege protects facts stated in the letter?

And Roby v. McKesson Corporation will address the following issues:

(1) In an action for employment discrimination and harassment by hostile work environment, does Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, require that the claim for harassment be established entirely by reference to a supervisor’s acts that have no connection with matters of business and personnel management, or may such management-related acts be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances allegedly creating a hostile work environment? (2) May an appellate court determine the maximum constitutionally permissible award of punitive damages when it has reduced the accompanying award of compensatory damages, or should the court remand for a new determination of punitive damages in light of the reduced award of compensatory damages?

Barboza v. West Coast Digital GSM, Inc. holds that the obligations of class counsel to a certified class include enforcement of a judgment

After a short quiet spell, class actions return with a splash.  In Barboza v. West Coast Digital GSM, Inc., the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Four) had the opportunity to discuss the extent of class counsel's obligations to a certified class.  The conundrum arose when class counsel learned that the defendant had ceased operations, sold its assets to a third party, and intended to file for bankruptcy:

What are the obligations of class counsel when he learns that the defendant in the class action he is prosecuting has ceased operations, sold its assets to a third party, and intends to file for bankruptcy? In the case before us, counsel obtained a stipulated default and a default judgment that included more than $4 million in aggregate damages for the class, plus more than $1 million in prejudgment interest. So far, so good. But counsel then asserted that his job would be completed once his motion for attorney fees was heard, i.e., that he had no obligation to enforce the judgment on behalf of the class. The trial court disagreed. It ruled that “by assuming the responsibility of pursuing claims on behalf of the class, class counsel assumed the obligation to pursue it until the end (i.e., enforcement of the judgment) and not just until judgment.” Based upon the principles guiding class actions, we agree that class counsel's obligations to the class do not end with the entry of judgment, and hold that class counsel's obligations continue until all class issues are resolved, which may include enforcement of the judgment.

Slip op., at 2.  In its analysis, the Court of Appeal examined the sources of the obligations owed by class counsel (and the named plaintiff) to the certified class:

First, the representative plaintiffs must establish that they will adequately represent the class before a class may be certified. (Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 326.) Part of that showing involves establishing that the counsel they have chosen can and will adequately represent the interests of the class as a whole. (Cal Pak Delivery, Inc. v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1, 12; McGhee v. Bank of America (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 442, 450.) Second, both the representative plaintiffs and the counsel they have chosen owe absent class members a fiduciary duty to protect the absentees‟ interests throughout the litigation. (Janik v. Rudy, Exelrod & Zieff, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 938.) Finally, the trial court, “as the guardian of the rights of the absentees, is vested broad administrative, as well as adjudicative, power.” (Greenfield v. Villager Industries, Inc., supra, 483 F.2d at p. 832.) Thus, unlike situations in which the litigant has retained an attorney to conduct litigation, where the litigant and the attorney agree upon the scope of the engagement, and their rights and duties are governed by their agreement, in class actions, where there is no agreement with absentee class members to define the scope of the engagement, class counsel must represent all of the absent class members' interests throughout the litigation to the extent there are class issues, and it is the duty of the trial court to ensure at every stage of the proceeding that counsel is adequately representing those interests.

Slip op., at 7-8.  Ultimately, the Court of Appeal described a reasonable way out of the quandry faced by class counsel that must collect a judgment from an insolvent debtor:

It may be that, given the specialized knowledge needed to enforce judgments, class counsel is not competent to provide enforcement services without assistance. But nothing prevents class counsel from associating in counsel with that expertise, and the cost of that association can be paid by the class from any recovery achieved. And if, after diligent inquiry, class counsel determines there are no recoverable assets, counsel may present such findings to the trial court, and the trial court, as guardian of the rights of the absent class members, may determine whether counsel should be relieved of any further obligations to the class.

Slip op., at 8-9.

This opinion is a necessary reminder of the extent of the duty assumed by class counsel when that fateful line is crossed and the proposed class is certified.

Cohen panel tackles Tobacco II again in Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court

The Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Eight) generated a good bit of commentary with their construction of In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298 (2009).  Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc. (October 28, 2009) was discussed in detail on this blog, and The UCL Practitioner had an extensive post as well.  In Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. v. Superior Court (November 10, 2009), the Second Appellate District, Division Eight tackles reliance and Tobacco II for the second time.  But, in an interesting twist, Cohen receives no mention in this Opinion.

Princess Cruise Lines is, ostensibly, a summary judgment opinion.  Although it is not discussed in any detail, it appears that the summary judgment motion was brought pre-certification.  The Court described the causes of action asserted and the basics of the trial court's ruling:

The plaintiffs, real parties in interest in the proceedings before us, H. Roger Wang and Vivine Wang (from time to time collectively referred to as the Wangs), sued petitioner Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., over charges added to the price of shore excursions taken during a cruise conducted by petitioner.  The Wangs asserted five causes of action.  The first three were based on Business and Professions Code sections 17200 (first cause of action) and 17500 (second) and on Civil Code section 1750 et seq. (third).  Respectively, these statutes are California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), False Advertising Law (FAL) and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA).  The fourth and fifth causes of action were based respectively on common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation.

Petitioner moved for summary judgment and summary adjudication.  The trial court granted summary adjudication on the fourth and fifth causes of action because the Wangs could not show they relied on petitioner’s alleged misrepresentations.  The trial court, however, denied the motion for summary judgment because it concluded that on the UCL, FAL and CLRA causes of action the Wangs did not have to show that they relied on petitioner’s alleged misrepresentations.

Slip op., at 2.  After summarizing the discovery in the action and the trial court's rulings, the Court of Appeal discussed the issue of reliance in UCL and CLRA actions:

The court in Tobacco II first concluded that only the class representatives must meet the standing requirement under California’s UCL.  The court then proceeded to the next topic, which was “the causation requirement for purposes of establishing standing under the UCL, and in particular what is the meaning of the phrase ‘as a result of’ in [Business and Professions Code] section 17204?  We conclude that a class representative proceeding on a claim of misrepresentation as the basis of his or her UCL action must demonstrate actual reliance on the allegedly deceptive or misleading statements, in accordance with well-settled principles regarding the element of reliance in ordinary fraud actions.”  (Tobacco II, supra, 46 Cal.4th 298, 306.)

There are two aspects to this holding.  First, it is very clear that reliance is required in a UCL action.  Second, it is also clear that this is true of UCL actions involving some form of fraud, but not all UCL actions.  As the court put it:  “We emphasize that our discussion of causation in this case is limited to such cases where, as here, a UCL action is based on a fraud theory involving false advertising and misrepresentations to consumers.  The UCL defines ‘unfair competition’ as ‘includ[ing] any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice . . . .’  ([Bus. & Prof. Code,] § 17200.)  There are doubtless many types of unfair business practices in which the concept of reliance, as discussed here, has no application.”  (Tobacco II, supra, 46 Cal.4th 298, 325, fn. 17.)

Slip op., at 6-7.  Unlike Cohen, this Opinion presents as an effort to identify specific circumstances where it is valid to consider reliance in a UCL claim, using Tobacco II.  In fact, its almost as if the Court was sensitive to potential fallout from describing Tobacco II as irrelevant.  

In any event, the Court then, as one would expect in a summary judgment analysis, focused on the evidence presented by the plaintiffs:

The problem, from a pragmatic perspective, with the Wangs’ contentions about reliance is that it made no difference to them how much the excursions cost.  As Vivine Wang put it in her deposition, she told her travel agent that she wanted to go on the same excursions that her traveling group had booked and that “I want to go on the shore excursion . . . whatever it cost [sic].  It’s fine.”  At the threshold, therefore, it must be said that there was no reliance, i.e., the Wangs would have gone on the excursions whatever the price was and without reference to anything petitioner said or did in connection with the excursions.  It therefore follows that it is immaterial how the Wangs heard about the excursions and what, if anything, petitioner said or wrote about the excursions.

It must also be said that we are not inclined to ignore the Wangs’ repeated admissions that they had no contact with petitioner and received nothing from the petitioner.

Slip op., at 8.  The Court does its best to circumvent the reliance questions it raised in Cohen by citing Tobacco II for the contention that there is a limited area under the UCL where reliance can be an element of the claim, followed by a finding that the record contains admissions of absolutely no reliance.

Next, the Court issued an interesting holding that the Tobacco II discussion about reliance in certain limited situations in UCL cases applies to CLRA actions as well:

Civil Code section 1780, subdivision (a) provides:  “Any consumer who suffers any damage as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act, or practice declared to be unlawful by Section 1770 may bring an action against that person to recover or obtain any of the following:  [listing generic types of recoveries].”  (Italics added.)

It appears that the analysis of the phrase “as a result” found in Tobacco II, supra, 46 Cal.4th 298, 324-326, applies to this phrase in Civil Code section 1780, subdivision (a), which means that reliance is required for CLRA actions, with the limitations noted in Tobacco II.

Slip op., at 11-12.

So, if Cohen is enough of a lightning rod to elicit review, this one may escape that same fate.

in brief: Evans v. Lasco Bathware, Inc. has a little something for everyone

While it deserves a more substantial discussion, Evans v. Lasco Bathware, Inc. (November 6, 2009) requires at least a brief mention.  In Evans, the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division One) reviewed an Order denying class certification.  The Court of Appeal affirmed.  The interesting elements of the opinion include (1) a discussion of when, in the Evans Court's view, damages become an issue of sufficient complexity to justify a denial of certification and (2) a discussion of "liability only" certification.  In this case, the complications arising when a defective shower pan caused varying degrees of damages in different homes convinced the Court to reject the "liability only" certification option in this case.  Nevertheless, that aspect of class actions is so infrequently discussed in California that it is of note that it was even considered here.

California Supreme Court activity for the week of October 26, 2009

The California Supreme Court held its (usually) weekly conference on October 28, 2009.  Notable results include:

  • A Petition for Review was denied in Messenger Courier Association of the Americas, et al. v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.  See this blog's prior post on this matter here.
  • A Petition for Review was denied in Ali v. U.S.A. Cab.  The interesting texture to this denial is that (1) I argued the appeal so I didn't cover this decision on this blog, and (2) aspects of Ali's construction of the Borello opinion are contrary to language in Messenger Courier, but both originate in the Fourth Appellate District, Division One.
  • A Depublication Request was denied in Clark v. American Residential Services LLC, et al.  See this blog's prior post on this matter here.

 

The UCL's "unlawful" prong receives a little boost in Zhang v. Superior Court

The least loved may be the greedy insurance companies.  In Zhang v. Superior Court (California Capital Insurance Company) (October 29, 2009), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Two) was called upon to determine whether the alleged failure of an insurance company to adequately pay a loss claim was actionable in light of Insurance Code section 790.03 et seq., Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Companies, 46 Cal.3d 287 (1988) and Textron Financial Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 118 Cal.App.4th 1061 (2004):

This case presents the question of whether fraudulent conduct by an insurer, which is connected with conduct that would violate Insurance Code section 790.03 et seq.—sometimes referred to as the “Unfair Insurance Practices Act”—can also give rise to a private civil cause of action under the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. The trial court ruled that it does not and, therefore, sustained defendant and real party in interest California Capital Insurance Company's demurrer to a cause of action under the UCL. We disagree and will direct the trial court to reinstate the cause of action.

Slip op., at 2.  After a thorough analysis of Moradi-Shalal in particular, the Court concluded that, because the plaintiff had also alleged false advertising, a prohibition on a private claim arising under the Unfair Insurance Practices Act was not at issue:

We take from Manufacturers Life that there is no reason to treat insurers differently from other businesses when it comes to actions under the UCL except as required by Moradi-Shalal. We understand that if a plaintiff relies on conduct that violates the Unfair Insurance Practices Act but is not otherwise prohibited, Moradi-Shalal requires that a civil action under the UCL be considered barred. Thus, if the plaintiff in this case had attempted to sue California Casualty under the UCL because the latter had “[n]ot attempt[ed] in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear” (Ins. Code, § 790.03, subd. (h)(5)) or “failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon request by them, of the coverage under which payment [was] made” (Ins. Code, § 790.03, subd. (h)(9)), a somewhat closer question would be presented. (But see fn. 1, ante.) But that is not this case.

Slip op., at 8-9.

The UCL Practitioner, with the focus on all things UCL, has much more on this decision and cross-referenced material about Textron.  By the way, I asked The UCL Practitioner if her blog was the UCL Practitioner or The UCL Practitioner (the URL giving me pause as to which was right), and the definitive blog name is The UCL Practitioner.  I obviously burn a lot of calories wondering about fringe issues.

Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. holds that forfeiture of restricted stock shares during restriction period does not run afoul of Labor Code section 201, 201 and 219

Nothing all that exciting here, but in Schacter v. Citigroup, Inc. (November 2, 2009), the California Supreme Court examined a voluntary employee incentive compensation plan that provided employees with shares of restricted company stock at a reduced price in lieu of a portion of the employee's annual cash compensation.  Under the program, if an employee resigns or is terminated for cause before their restricted shares of stock vest, the employee would forfeit the stock and the portion of cash compensation they directed be paid in the form of the restricted stock.  The Supreme Court considered whether the "incentive plan's forfeiture provision violates Labor Code sections 201, 202, and 219, which provide that employees be paid all earned, unpaid wages upon termination or resignation and prohibit agreements that purport to circumvent that requirement."  Slip op., at 1.

The plan worked as follows:

Under the Plan, eligible employees could elect to receive awards of restricted company stock “in lieu of cash payment of a percentage of the employee‟s annual compensation.” Participating employees could elect to receive 5, 10, 15, 20, or 25 percent of their “total compensation in the form of restricted stock.” To participate in the Plan for the following calendar year, an employee had to execute a “Capital Accumulation Plan Election to Receive Restricted Stock” form at the end of the current calendar year indicating the amount of “total compensation in the form of restricted stock” he or she wished to receive. The percentage of “total compensation” received as restricted stock could be different for the first and second six-month periods of the year. 

Restricted stock could not be sold, transferred, pledged, or assigned for a two-year period commencing on the date of the award; however, the Plan provided that participating employees “shall have the right to direct the vote” and “receive any regular dividends on restricted stock shares” during the restricted period.

For purposes of determining the number of shares to be acquired under the Plan, the purchase price of the stock was discounted at a rate of 25 percent of its then-current market price, averaged over the five days preceding the date of the acquisition, to “reflect the impact of the restrictions on the value of the restricted stock, as well as the possibility of forfeiture of restricted stock.” On the date of the purchase, the company either issued stock certificates to a participating employee, to be held by the company until the restricted period lapsed, or made a “book entry” in the company's records evidencing the award. Although a participating employee could elect to pay taxes on the restricted stock when the stock was purchased (see 26 U.S.C. § 83), “the participating employees' restricted shares [were] not included in the participating employees' gross income for federal tax purposes until the two-year vesting period had expired.”

If an employee remained in the company's employ for the two years following the purchase of restricted stock, title to the shares vested fully with the employee, free of any restrictions. However, if an employee voluntarily terminated employment or was terminated for cause before the end of the two-year period, the employee forfeited his or her restricted stock as well as the percentage of annual income designated by the employee to be paid as shares of restricted stock. In contrast, if an employee was involuntarily terminated without cause, the employee forfeited his or her restricted stock, but received in return, without interest, “a cash payment equal to the portion of his or her annual compensation that had been paid in the form of such forfeited [r]estricted [s]tock.”

Slip op., at 2-3.  The facts surrounding this particular plan's terms made the Court's decision a relatively easy one (or at least a unanimous one):

Schachter voluntarily terminated his employment before his restricted stock fully vested. By the terms of the Plan, and Schachter's own concession, he is not entitled to those unvested shares of restricted stock. Having elected to receive some of his compensation in the form of restricted stock, a transaction he was aware carried risk as well as the potential for reward, Schachter cannot now assert that he should have been paid in cash that portion of his compensation he elected to receive as restricted stock. As the company persuasively argues, Schachter's “bargained-for 'wages' have been paid in full. He received all of his promised cash compensation, received immediately exercisable voting and dividend rights in the restricted stock, and was awarded contingent rights of full ownership in that stock. The only thing that has not been 'paid' is something Schachter never 'earned' — fully vested [company] stock. Schachter therefore has no claim under [section] 201 or [section] 202.”

Slip op., at 13.

I hope we don't see a rash of employers trying to concoct illusory bonus plans or divert vested wages from employees as a result of this plan.  But given some of the crazy attempts that I have seen some employers do to accomplish such purposes, I don't hold out much hope that Schachter won't be misused somewhere by some employer or other.

Battle Royale: Latest round of lower court versus Supreme Court found in Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc.

The more time I spend reviewing decisions in the complex litigation/class action arena, the more I am convinced that the lower Courts of California are, in many instances, at odds with the California Supreme Court.  The most recent decision to suggest this schism is Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc. (October 28, 2009) from the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Eight).   Cohen is the most recent California appellate court Opinion to comment on the treatment of UCL claims by In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298 (2009), the prior two decisions being Kaldenbach v. Mutual of Omaha Life Insurance Company, et al. (October 26, 2009) (discussed on this blog here) and Morgan, et al. v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (September 23, 2009) (discussed on this blog here).  Cohen affirmed a trial court's denial of class certification of CLRA and UCL claims, but its analysis runs head first into Tobacco II and other Supreme Court decisions.  The UCL Practitioner has an extensive post analyzing Cohen against Tobacco II.  I will comment on the Cohen holding, but I also want to offer some thoughts as to why this divergence between California's highest court and the other courts throughout the state might be happening.

Since some of my comments depend upon the subject matter of Cohen, I begin by providing some background about the claims in that matter.  Cohen concerns an allegation that DIRECTV advertised that the channels in its HD Package were broadcast in the 1080i HD standard (an interlaced resolution of 1920x1080 pixels), at  19.4 Mbps, but later compressed each HD channel down to 6.6 Mbps.  The 19.4 and 6.6 figures refer to the volume of data being transmitted each second, expressed as Megabits per second.   So, expressed another way, the Cohen action complained that the quality of the video broadcast on HD channels was degraded by an increase in the amount of data compression.  By way of background, the raw data rate for uncompressed HD video in the 1080i format can be well in excess of 100 Mbps, depending on frame rate and color information.  This "raw" video is then compressed.  In fact, it must be compressed - there is no practical system in place to deliver 100 Mbps to your television right now.  The older mpeg-2 compression codec, or newer codecs, like H.264, compress the "raw" HD video into something smaller, using complex formulas that reduce the data used to transmit the images.  The goal of compression is to obtain the best video-quality-to-size compromise.  In the DIRECTV case, 19.4 Mbps is compressed video that would look very good, but "degradation" artifacts would still be visible on a good HD television (some "smearing" on fast action or a blocky, pixelated appearance in areas of solid color, blacks in particular).  6.6 Mbps is very compressed 1080i HD content; it is compressed to one third the size of the already compressed 19.4 Mbps feed.  You would see more compression artifacts on a good/larger HD television.

There are a number of certification issues in Cohen.  Ascertainability receives some significant discussion.  But the portion that is likely of greatest interest is the discussion of reliance under the UCL; it is the area in which Cohen diverges from Tobacco II.  Regarding reliance in UCL actions, the Trial Court in Cohen said: "Even pre-Prop. 64 cases only allow inferred reliance where the misrepresentations were common to all class members. An inference of classwide reliance cannot be made where there is no showing that representations were made uniformly to all members of the class."  Slip op., at 7.  The Cohen Court started its discussion about the UCL with this observation that presages the outcome:

Although the rules under the UCL may or may not be different following our Supreme Court's recent decision in In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298 (Tobacco II), an issue which we address below, we do not understand the UCL to authorize an award for injunctive relief and/or restitution on behalf of a consumer who was never exposed in any way to an allegedly wrongful business practice.

Slip op., at 14.  The Cohen Court then stated its view of the holding from Tobacco II in two separate ways.  First, it offered a brief summary of the decision:

On review, the Supreme Court specifically addressed two questions: “First, who in a UCL class action must comply with Proposition 64's standing requirements, the class representatives or all unnamed class members, in order for the class action to proceed? . . . Second, what is the causation requirement for purposes of establishing standing under the UCL . . . ?” (Tobacco II, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 306, italics added.) This past spring, the Supreme Court answered these two questions by ruling (1) only the class representatives must meet Proposition 64's standing requirements of actual injury and causation; (2) only the class representatives must establish reliance in accordance with fraudulent inducement principles in order for the class action to proceed; and (3) the class representatives do not have to show reliance on particular advertisements or marketing materials with “unrealistic” specificity. (Tobacco II, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 321-329.)

Slip op., at 15.  Then, the Cohen Court offered its own summary of what it believes that the California Supreme Court actually meant:

Viewed from the other direction, Tobacco II held that, for purposes of standing in context of the class certification issue in a “false advertising” case involving the UCL, the class members need not be assessed for the element of reliance. Or, in other words, class certification may not be defeated on the ground of lack of standing upon a showing that class members did not rely on false advertising. In short, Tobacco II essentially ruled that, for purposes of standing, as long as a single plaintiff is able to establish that he or she relied on a defendant‟s false advertising, a multitude of class members will also have standing, regardless of whether any of those class members have in any way relied upon the defendant's allegedly improper conduct.

Slip op. at 15.  Notice the interesting language used by the Cohen Court: "Tobacco II essentially ruled...."  One can say that the Supreme Court "did" or "did not" rule a certain way.  But saying that it "essentially" ruled a certain way is problematic for everyone.  This suggests an outcome that is implied by Tobacco II, but not stated.  To sort that out, we have to compare Cohen to Tobacco II and determine what Tobacco II does and does not say.

Returning to Cohen, the Court was more direct when it stated its intention to disregard Tobacco II as offering a controlling decision for the case before it:  "In the contextual setting presented by Cohen's present case, we find Tobacco II to be irrelevant because the issue of 'standing' simply is not the same thing as the issue of 'commonality.'"  Slip op., at 15.  The Court continued:  "In short, the trial court's concerns that the UCL and the CLRA claims alleged by Cohen and the other class members would involve factual questions associated with their reliance on DIRECTV's alleged false representations was a proper criterion for the court's consideration when examining 'commonality' in the context of the subscribers'motion for class certification, even after Tobacco II."  Slip op., at 16.  Thus, the Cohen Court devised an analysis that permits circumvention of Tobacco II, holding that a trial court can't use classwide reliance issues for a "standing" challenge, but can use those same issues to bar certification.  I posit that what we have here is most likely either a reverse engineered holding or a generally negative reaction to Tobacco II.  The limited analysis of reliance issues as they pertain to the UCL was devised to support the desired outcome.  The alternative is that the Cohen Court didn't examine Tobacco II carefully, and I find that less likely than the notion that the panel simply does not agree with the Tobacco II analysis or doesn't like the claims in the case.

I turn now to Tobacco II and argue that it directly addresses the contentions made in Cohen.  In Tobacco II, the Supreme Court summarized the trial court's decision in that matter:

The trial court found that the “simple language” of Proposition 64 required that “for standing purposes, a showing of causation is required as to each class member's injury in fact.... [T]he injury in fact that each class member must show for standing purposes in this case would presumably consist of the cost of their cigarette purchases. But significant questions then arise undermining the purported commonality among the class members, such as whether each class member was exposed to Defendants' alleged false statements and whether each member purchased cigarettes ‘as a result’ of the false statements. Clearly ... individual issues predominate, making class treatment unmanageable and inefficient.”

Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 310-311.  One can almost excuse the Cohen Court's narrow construction of Tobacco II as a "standing" decision.  After all, the paragraph above does talk quite a bit about standing.  But this overlooks the fact that causation is entangled with standing, and, for the named plaintiff, showing reliance is the method by which that plaintiff shows standing under a UCL claim asserting a "fraudulent" prong (likely to deceive) standard.  What Cohen ignores is the fact that, according to Tobacco II, the causation showing (in this instance, a reliance showing) is not an element of a UCL claim, except that, after Proposition 64, the named plaintiff must make that showing.  In fact, the next page of Tobacco II removes any doubt that pre-Proposition 64 decisions construing the UCL remain viable:  "'[T]o state a claim under either the UCL or the false advertising law, based on false advertising or promotional practices, "it is necessary only to show that 'members of the public are likely to be "deceived." ' " ' (Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 939, 951, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 45 P.3d 243.)"  Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th at 312.

Continuing, the Supreme Court said:

The fraudulent business practice prong of the UCL has been understood to be distinct from common law fraud. “A [common law] fraudulent deception must be actually false, known to be false by the perpetrator and reasonably relied upon by a victim who incurs damages. None of these elements are required to state a claim for injunctive relief” under the UCL. ( Day v. AT & T Corp.(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 325, 332, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 55; see State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1105, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 229.) This distinction reflects the UCL's focus on the defendant's conduct, rather than the plaintiff's damages, in service of the statute's larger purpose of protecting the general public against unscrupulous business practices. (Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank (1979) 23 Cal.3d 442, 453, 153 Cal.Rptr. 28, 591 P.2d 51.)

Tobacco II, 46 Cal.4th at 312.  This discussion is at odds with Cohen's treatment of Tobacco II.  Tobacco II said that "the UCL class action is a procedural device that enforces substantive law by aggregating many individual claims into a single claim, in compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 382, to achieve the remedial goals outlined above. It does not change that substantive law, however."   Tobacco II, 46 Cal.4th at 313.  And Tobacco II unambiguously holds (i.e., not "essentially" holds) that:

[T]he language of section 17203 with respect to those entitled to restitution-“to restore to any person in interest any money or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired ” (italics added) by means of the unfair practice-is patently less stringent than the standing requirement for the class representative-“any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” (§ 17204, italics added.) This language, construed in light of the “concern that wrongdoers not retain the benefits of their misconduct” (Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank, supra, 23 Cal.3d 442, 452, 153 Cal.Rptr. 28, 591 P.2d 51) has led courts repeatedly and consistently to hold that relief under the UCL is available without individualized proof of deception, reliance and injury. (E.g., Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1267, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545; Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 211, 197 Cal.Rptr. 783, 673 P.2d 660.)  Accordingly, to hold that the absent class members on whose behalf a private UCL action is prosecuted must show on an individualized basis that they have “lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition” (§ 17204) would conflict with the language in section 17203 authorizing broader relief-the “may have been acquired” language-and implicitly overrule a fundamental holding in our previous decisions, including Fletcher, Bank of the West and Committee on Children's Television.

Tobacco II, 46 Cal.4th at 320.  If "reliance" is not an element of a UCL claim, why is there still the perception that reliance has a role to play in UCL actions (outside of named plaintiff standing)?  The Tobacco II decision may have supplied that answer as well:

Our conclusion with respect to the remedies set forth in section 17203 has nothing to do with the nonrestitutionary disgorgement disallowed in Kraus v. Trinity Management Services, Inc., supra, 23 Cal.4th 116, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 999 P.2d 718. In Kraus, we concluded that section 17203 does not allow a court to order disgorgement into a fluid recovery fund, e.g., to “compel a defendant to surrender all money obtained through an unfair practice even though not all is to be restored to the persons from whom it was obtained or those claiming under those persons.” (Id. at p. 127, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 999 P.2d 718.) This prohibition against nonrestitutionary disgorgement did not overrule any part of Fletcher v. Security Pacific National Bank, supra, 23 Cal.3d 442, 153 Cal.Rptr. 28, 591 P.2d 51, under which restitution may be ordered “without individualized proof of deception, reliance, and injury if necessary to prevent the use or employment of an unfair practice.” (Bank of the West, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1267, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545.)

Tobacco II, 46 Cal.4th at 320, n. 14.  This suggests that, in some circumstances, the quantum of a restitution order might ultimately depend upon a showing of injury by class members.  Since reliance on an unfair practice can act as a surrogate of sorts for injury (under the the right facts and right species of UCL claim), this may explain why the belief persists that reliance is an unstated element of a UCL claim.  It's either that, or a petulant refusal to understand that the UCL's fraudulent prong has nothing to do with common law fraud.

Tobacco II has already been circumvented by two of three California Courts of Appeal to apply it.  The important question is why?  Options include, at least, a desire not to reverse a trial court, a dislike of the holding of Tobacco II, a dislike of the theory of the case, or a general resistance to class actions (or some amalgam of those options).

The first option exists as an element of all appeals.  Courts of Appeal begin their analysis with a presumption that the trial court will be affirmed.  I cannot conclude that this is the primary factor in the Cohen Court's dismissive analysis.

The second option is certainly possible.  The Cohen Court sounded almost disdainful of Tobacco II when it said, "In the contextual setting presented by Cohen's present case, we find Tobacco II to be irrelevant...."  Slip op., at 15.  I find this option to be a plausible explanation.

The third option is also possible.  I do not find it a stretch to imagine the initial judicial reaction being something akin to, "Megawho per second?  You're kidding, right?"  When that happens, I think it is human nature to look for reasons not to facilitate the case or claim.  If my comments offend any judicial sensibilities, I apologize for that.  But we must recognize every participant in the judicial system -- clerk, judge, lawyer -- are human beings, with all of our prejudices and predispositions.  I also find this option to be a plausible explanation.

The fourth option is also possible.  When the various Districts and Divisions are examined over time, I have little doubt that some find panels find great utility in the class action device, while others find them abusive.  Again, this has more to do with the predisposition of the observer than anything else, as it is as easy to find a class action of great social utility as it is to find one of questionable or zero worth.  It's also worth noting that the second of my proposed options can be a subset of this fourth option.  In other words, discomfiture about the Tobacco II opinion can be motivated either by that particular opinion or by an overall judicial fatigue regarding class actions generally.

I do not want to suggest that I know which of my theories, if any, explains Cohen.  I suspect that some combination of class action fatigue and specific resistance to the claims in this particular case are at work here, but that is speculative on my part.  However, I am certain that a growing rift exists between the Supreme Court's view of major legal questions and the views held by trial and intermediate appellate courts.  As I am doubtful that anything can be done about this issue other than to raise awareness and hope for the best from our courts, I do not believe it is an issue that will resolve itself any time soon.

It is my intention to write more about the nature of this judicial divide here or elsewhere.