The California Supreme Court lays down the law on "ascertainability" in Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc.

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I’m testing out opening sentences. The first candidate is: “The objective import of Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (July 29, 2019) is easy to ascertain.” You can see how that’s an option. It includes “objective,” as in the class definition must state the class with objective characteristics. And it drops in “ascertain,” as in this is a decision about the ascertainability requisite for certification. I like it. No second option for you.

Noel is a putative class action brought on behalf of retail purchasers of an inflatable outdoor pool sold in packaging that was allegedly misleading about the pool’s characteristics. The trial court denied the representative plaintiff’s motion for class certification on the basis that the plaintiff did not supply evidence showing how class members might be individually identified when the time came to do so. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court, reasoning that such evidence was necessary to ensure that proper notice would be given to the class. The Supreme Court said, “Nah, brah.”

The Supreme Court reviewed the history of the “ascertainability” requisite. The first view of the requisite focuses on the nature of the definition of the class:

One view of ascertainability concentrates on the proposed class definition itself. This viewwas applied in Bartold v. Glendale Federal Bank (2000) 81Cal.App.4th 816 (Bartold), superseded by statute on another point as stated in Markowitz v. Fidelity Nat. Title Co. (2006) 142Cal.App.4th 508, 524. The Bartold court explained that “[a] class is ascertainable if it identifies a group of unnamed plaintiffs by describing a set of common characteristics sufficient to allow a member of that group to identify himself or herself as having a right to recover based on the description.” (81 Cal.App.4th at p.828.) This basic view of ascertainability has been reiterated by numerous other Courts of Appeal, including the courts in Estrada, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at page 14 and Aguirre, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at pages 1299 to 1300. (See also Aguirre, at p. 1300 [listing cases].) A similar formulation regards a class as ascertainable when it is defined “in terms of objective characteristics and common transactional facts” that make “the ultimate identification of class members possible when that identification becomes necessary.” (Hicks, supra, 89Cal.App.4that p.915.)

Slip op., at 21. The second formulation of the requisite was summarized as follows:

The second basic view of ascertainability entails a more exacting inquiry. One such articulationregards the ascertainabilityrequirementas calling for an examination into“(1) the class definition, (2) the size of the class and (3) the means of identifying class members.” (Miller v. Woods (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 862, 873 (Miller); see also Noel, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 1324, Sotelo, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 648; Reyes v. Board of Supervisors (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1263, 1274.) Consistent with this view, it has been said that “[c]lass members are ‘ascertainable’ where they may be readily identified without unreasonable expense or time by reference to official records.” (Rose v. City of Hayward (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 926, 932 (Rose).) On its face, the quoted language from Rose could be understood as specifying a sufficient, as opposed to a necessary, basis for finding an ascertainable class within the Miller framework. But some courts, drawing from Rose’s focus on the mechanics of identifying class members, have gone further and required a class plaintiff to make a specific factual or evidentiary showing in order to show an ascertainable class.

Slip op., at 21-22. The Court then looked at the similar divide in the federal system, focusing extensively on the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of the requisite in Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015). After that extensive review of competing approaches, the Supreme Court concluded that the process protection provided by an objective and clear class definition was more significant to the ascertainability requirement than the goal of notice to each class member. From that conclusion a clear rule followed:

As a rule, a representative plaintiff in a class action need not introduce evidence establishing how notice of the action will be communicated to individual class members in order to show an ascertainable class.

Slip op., at 38. The Court expressly disapproved of strict reliance upon Rose as stating the requirement for an ascertainability showing. Slip op., at 41, n. 15.

The Court observed that a trial court could consider how notice will be provided to a class as a separate inquiry into, e.g., manageability. Slip op., at 42. It emphasized, however, that notice was not an aspect of the ascertainability showing. The decision of the Court was unanimous.

Christopher Wimmer and Peter Roldan of Emergent Legal and Leslie Brueckner and Karla Gilbride of Public Justice represented the successful Plaintiff and Appellant.

McCleery v. Allstate Ins. Co. affirms the denial of class certification in a complicated, multi-party suit alleging independent contractor misclassification

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I think it is not a stretch to opine that independent contractor misclassification is, by far, the easiest misclassification theory to pursue on a classwide basis (as compared to, for example, cases about the administrative exemption for store managers). In McCleery v. Allstate Ins. Co. (July 15, 2019), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division One), in an opinion issued following a grant of rehearing for the second appeal in the matter, we see why there are limits to what is possible even in the comparatively straightforward arena of independent contractor misclassification. The fact summary suggests that this was too big a bite:

Property inspectors Timothy McCleery, Yvonne Beckner, Terry Quimby and April Boyles Jackson filed this action on behalf of themselves and similarly situated persons, alleging defendants Allstate Insurance Company and Farmers Group, insurers for whom the plaintiffs provided property inspection services, and CIS Group LLC/North American Compass Insurance Services Group (CIS), Advanced Field Services, Inc. (AFS), and Capital Personnel Services, Inc. (PMG), service companies contracting to provide inspection services, concocted a scheme to insulate themselves from labor laws by nominally employing plaintiffs as independent contractors while retaining control over all aspects of their work. Plaintiffs purport to represent a putative class of approximately 1,550 property inspectors in California.

Slip op., at 3-4. At the first go-round, the trial court denied certification, summarily rejected a statistical sampling plan, and concluded that individualized determinations were required for each class members. The Court of Appeal reversed, directing the trial court to consider whether proposed sampling and statistical methods could render some or all of the individualized issues manageable. After additional briefing and an extensive survey, the trial agreed that the survey was carefully crafted to maximize accuracy but still failed to address key individual issues:

However, the court found that plaintiffs’ statistical sampling alone did not render their claims manageable. It found that Dr. Krosnick’s survey results failed to specify for which insurers inspections were performed, or to explain whether the inspectors’ failure to take meal or rest breaks was due to preference or to the exigencies of the job. Also, the survey’s anonymity foreclosed the defendants from cross-examining witnesses to verify responses or test them for accuracy or bias.

Slip op., at 17. The trial court again denied certification and the plaintiffs again appealed.

While several issues were of concern to the Court, the inability of the defendants to examine any survey respondents (who were kept anonymous from the survey expert) was viewed as an impediment to the defendants’ ability to cross-examine the actual class members who participated in the survey:

In fact, plaintiffs expressly admit they intend to answer the ultimate question in this case based solely on expert testimony—testimony founded on multiple hearsay that defendants could never challenge. As Dr. Krosnick declared, “ Respondents are not testifying witnesses. Instead, . . . . [i]t is the expert who will offer opinions . . . , and the expert can be cross-examined.” But “[a]lthough an expert ‘may rely on inadmissible hearsay in forming his or her opinion [citation], and may state on direct examination the matters on which he or she relied, the expert may not testify as to the details of those matters if they are otherwise inadmissible.’ ” (Korsak v. Atlas Hotels, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1516, 1525.)

Slip op., at 24-25. The plan to rely, almost exclusively according to the Court, on an anonymous, double-blind survey to prove liability was viewed as a bridge too far, no matter how scientifically the survey was crafted. The Court, citing Duran and Brinker, concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion when denying certification.

I admit to having some sympathy, as it is my experience that the similar insurance, lender, and real estate property inspection industries are carefully constructed in an attempt to support the notion that the end companies requesting the inspections and setting very detailed parameters for how those inspections are to occur are not employers of the people out performing those inspections for them. What this opinion will have the tendency to do is insulate the biggest companies because of the complex hairball of crossing middle-tier vendors they have created, while directing attention to the smaller middle-tier vendors that act as the go-betweens for the insurance, lender, and real estate companies.

Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. should be decided soon, addressing whether class members must be identifiable

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In what might be a significant decision, Noel v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. was argued to the California Supreme Court on May 8, 2019. The issue presented for review is as follows: “Must a plaintiff seeking class certification under Code of Civil Procedure section 382 or the Consumer Legal Remedies Act demonstrate that records exist permitting the identification of class members?” While California appeared to have settled this question decisively many decades ago, the question arose when the First Appellate District (Division Four) opined that such identification was required. A decision may issue any time in the next couple of weeks. This is not likely to be an issue for wage and hour cases — where employer records are basically always available as a source of identification information — but is may be an issue in consumer class actions, where specific class members identification may not be possible.

Lubin v. The Wackenhut Corporation tackles Wal-mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, Brinker, and decertification

This opinion is like Christmas and Hanukkah, sitting in an Easter Basket filled with Valentine's Day treats.  And I overlooked it for two weeks!  In Lubin v. The Wackenhut Corporation, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Four) gets deep into the wage and hour weeds in 50-page opinion that is overflowing with interesting bits.  Here's the summary of how the matter ended up before the Court of Appeal:

Appellants Nivida Lubin, Sylvia M. Maresca, and Kevin Denton (together plaintiffs) filed this action on behalf of themselves and similarly situated persons, alleging defendant and respondent The Wackenhut Corporation (Wackenhut) violated California labor laws by failing to provide employees with off-duty meal and rest breaks and by providing inadequate wage statements. The trial court initially granted plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. However, as the case approached trial, the United States Supreme Court reversed a grant of class certification in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes (2011) 564 U.S. 338 (Wal-Mart). Relying on Wal-Mart, Wackenhut moved for decertification. The trial court granted the motion. 

Slip op., at 2.

I don't have time to try and summarize this monster opinion at the moment, but it is a must read.  The Court spends a lot of time explaining why Wal-Mart is not applicable to wage and hour certification questions, notes that the Supreme Court, which decided Wal-Mart, held this year in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 136 S.Ct. 1036, 1048 (2016) that statistical evidence is appropriately used in class actions, spends a substantial amount of time applying Brinker and the cases that followed to explain that variations in rates of missed meal and rest breaks, when certified based on an unlawful policy or procedure, is a damages issue, not a predominance question, and lots, lots, more!

Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld, Emily P. Rich, Theodore Franklin, Manuel A. Boigues; Posner & Rosen, Howard Z. Rosen, Jason C. Marsili, Brianna M. Primozic; James R. Hawkings, James R. Hawkings, and Gregory E. Mauro, represented the successful Plaintiffs and Appellants on appeal.

Ninth Circuit begins to define scope of Mazza in Ruiz Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc.

In Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit Rule 23 predominance was defeated where many (or even most) class members “were never exposed to the allegedly misleading advertisements” (666 F.3d at 597) because the defendant subjected only a small segment of an expansive class of car buyers to misleading material as part of a “very limited” advertising campaign (id. at 595).  This decision raised questions about how federal courts in the Ninth Circuit would actually evaluate UCL claims when faced with reconciling In re Tobacco II and Mazza.  In Ruiz Torres v. Mercer Canyons Inc. (9th Cir. Aug. 31, 2016), a wage & hour suit in which the District Court certified a class, the Ninth Circuit analyzed Mazza in a manner demonstrating that it may be constrained in its application moving forward.

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Overreach results in rare class action dismissal via demurrer in Schermer v. Tatum

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While getting a class certified is often a serious fight, defeating class allegations at the demurrer stage is generally rare.  But never say never.  In Schermer v. Tatum (March 18, 2016), the Fourth Appellate District, Division One, affirmed a trial court ruling sustaining a demurrer to class allegations in the plaintiffs' second amended complaint (SAC).  The plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of residents who live in the 18 mobilehome parks.  The plaintiffs alleged they were subjected to uniform unconscionable lease agreements and leasing practices by a collection of related defendants.  The SAC involved 18 mobilehome parks allegedly owned and/or operated by two defendants (Tatums and Kaplan), and were managed through defendant Mobile Community Management Company (MCM).  The plaintiffs also named as defendants the 18 "single-purpose" business entities that are each described as the owners of one of the mobilehome park in California.

The Court of Appeal began by summarizing the first amended complaint, the demurrer hearing related to it, and the SAC. And that summary is all you need to read to know where things are headed.  The Court described the "highlights" of the FAC as follows:

In the FAC, plaintiffs again alleged defendants Tatum and Kaplan, through MCM, engaged in unlawful conduct at each of the 18 mobilehome parks.  Specifically, they alleged defendants "charg[ed] excessive rent, pursu[ed] arbitrary evictions, and implement[ed] unreasonable polices."  Plaintiffs further alleged in their FAC that defendants Tatum and Kaplan took "advantage of vulnerable prospective and current residents" including "non-[E]nglish speaking and elderly residents" who, plaintiffs claimed, were "especially susceptible" to defendants' unlawful business practices.  Plaintiffs alleged defendants "most egregious practice" was the use of a "one-sided, standardized lease" agreement.  Plaintiffs provided 32 examples of lease clauses that allegedly violated California's Mobilehome Residency Law (Civ. Code, § 798 et seq.; MRL).
 Plaintiffs' FAC also set forth about 11 "factors" that plaintiffs alleged showed procedural unconscionability between plaintiffs and the putative class, on the one hand, and defendants, on the other.  Such factors included among others "residents' poor socio-economic background" and defendants' "knowledge of residents' vulnerability to oppression."  Plaintiffs also listed about 17 examples of substantive unconscionability in their FAC in connection with defendants' use of the standardized lease agreement in the 18 mobilehome parks.  As before, plaintiffs' class action allegations included any person who had an ownership interest in a mobilehome in any of the 18 parks, and a senior citizen and non-English-speaking subclass. 

Slip op., at 3-4.  Then, discussing the hearing on the demurrer to the FAC, the Court said, "At the demurrer hearing, plaintiffs' counsel agreed with the court that plaintiffs' FAC was 'a mess' and counsel admitted they 'did a horrible job in succinctly and systematically putting forth facts that show what the [FAC] -- what the case is about and how it shows a pattern of conduct that is deserving of being treated in a class action.' "  Slip op., at 4.  Not looking good.

Describing the subsequently issued Order on the demurrer to the FAC, the Court set forth key parts of the trial court's ruling:

"Plaintiffs allege multiple causes of action, all of which related in some way to the Lease Agreements utilized at the Defendants['] parks.  Based upon the allegations in the [FAC], it appears that some of the claims involved the alleged unconscionability of the contracts themselves, while others involve each Defendant's alleged actions in executing or enforcing the individual contracts as to individual Plaintiffs.  [¶]  The Court finds that multiple factual allegations predominate.  Plaintiffs['] measure of damages will be unique to each park.  The proposed class does not all reside at the same location or under the same circumstances.  Each putative class member is/was a resident at one of the eighteen separate mobilehome parks located throughout the State of California, giving rise to individualized factual questions related to causation, liability, and damages.
"Example of the individualized issues include the remedy (determining excess rents paid at each space requires a factual showing of fair market values for rents in a particular area [at] a particular time and park-by[-]park appraisal).  Further, there appear to be multiple lease agreements.  Although Plaintiffs allege Defendants used a 'standardized' Lease Agreement, they attach at least five different variations of the Lease Agreement and/or Amendments to the Lease Agreement.  (See Exhibits 'A,' 'B,' 'C,' 'D,' and 'E,' attached to the [FAC].)

Slip op., at 5. The trial court went on to identify additional issues, including the fact that many class members would not be able to state certain claims if they had not attempted to sell their homes, and there were no putative class representative plaintiffs for many of the mobilehome parks.

The SAC filed by the plaintiffs attempted to address many of the trial court's concerns, but a number of its allegations were found by the trial court to be conclusory assertions about defendants, and not allegations of fact.  The SAC did not address damage issues that would arise, which included the fact that several of the mobilehome parks were in cities with their own rent control ordinances.  The trial court was particularly concerned by the fact that each agreement at each park with each potential class member was individually negotiated and by the fact that a unique damage calculation would be required for each park and each person at each park. Moreover, the trial court took notice of the fact that many individuals were involved in their own litigation with their own park.

After discussing the procedural background, the Court made sure to note that it is undisputed that class allegations can be decided on demurrer:

It is beyond dispute that trial courts are permitted to decide the issue of class certification on demurrer.  (Tucker, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 212; see Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 440 [noting the issue is "settled" that courts are authorized to "weed[] out" legally meritless class action suits prior to certification by demurrer or pretrial motion].)  A trial court may sustain a demurrer to class action allegations where " 'it concludes as a matter of law that, assuming the truth of the factual allegations in the complaint, there is no reasonable possibility that the requirements for class certification will be satisfied.  [Citations.]'  [Citations.]"  (Tucker, at p. 211, italics added; see Canon U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 [noting that when the "invalidity of the class allegations is revealed on the face of the complaint, and/or by matters subject to judicial notice, the class issue may be properly disposed of by demurrer or motion to strike," and noting that "[i]n such circumstances, there is no need to incur the expense of an evidentiary hearing or class-related discovery"].)

Slip op., at 14. Much of the discussion that follows is unsurprising, given the discussion of the trial court's analysis.  The Court did wade into the murky waters of attempting to categorize an allegation as either an "ultimate fact" or a "conclusion":

We conclude plaintiffs' allegations in their SAC—which were noticeably absent from their original complaint—that defendants implemented a uniform policy and procedure in each and every lease transaction with plaintiffs and the putative class members over a four-year period (i.e., the proposed class period), in each of the 18 mobilehome parks owned and/or operated by Tatum and Kaplan, are not properly admitted for purposes of demurrer because such allegations are not ultimate facts but rather merely contentions and/or improper factual conclusions.

Slip op., at 17-18. In my experience, this is very much an eye-of-the-beholder call that deserves a clarifying opinion with more objective guidance as to how to distinguish between the two.

In any event, the Court agreed with the trial court's assessments, finding, in particular, that the individual nature of the transactions was such that each course of dealing is unique, and damages, because of different circumstances, park locations, and local ordinances, are also unique to each potential class member.  The Court declined to grant leave to amend to the plaintiffs, agreeing with the trial court that the problems were insurmountable.  The lesson here is that overreach can be fatal.  It might have been more workable to describe uniform leasing practices at one mobilehome park and seek class relief for the aspects of the transaction that were common to all of the residents, while, at the same time, addressing how damages will be calculated and distributed.

The "separate location" argument seems better suited to this sort of consumer circumstance than it is in the wage & hour context, where defendants nevertheless try the "each of our stores is unique and different" argument, as if they have no uniform policies regulating employees and allow each store to run their own affairs like the wild West. Hey, at least this Court cited Brinker (but it felt like an ironic cite to me).

Misclassifcation of independent contractors gets a boost in Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers

As I fill the backlog, we have yet another big decision from the California Supreme Court. In Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, 59 Cal. 4th 522 (June 30, 2014), the Supreme Court examined how the question of certification should be answered in the context of misclassification of independent contractors.  Newspaper carriers, classified as independent contractors, filed suit to obtain remedies available to employees under California’s wage & hour laws.  Plaintiffs moved for class certification.  The trial court concluded the case could not proceed as a class action, holding that on the critical question whether plaintiffs and the class were employees, plaintiffs had not shown common questions predominate.  The trial court held that to determine employee status for the class would necessitate numerous unmanageable individual inquiries into the extent to which each carrier was afforded discretion in his or her work.  The Court of Appeal disagreed in part, holding that the trial court had misunderstood the nature of the inquiries called for, and remanded for reconsideration of the class certification motion as to five of the complaint’s claims.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal.  Beginning with the test for employee status as the key issue for evaluating the commonality issue, the Court said:

We begin by identifying the principal legal issues and examining the substantive law that will govern. In doing so, we do not seek to resolve those issues. Rather, the question at this stage is whether the operative legal principles, as applied to the facts of the case, render the claims susceptible to resolution on a common basis. (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1023–1025, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 273 P.3d 513; Sav–On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 327, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 906, 96 P.3d 194 [the focus “is on what type of questions—common or individual—are likely to arise in the action, rather than on the merits of the case”].)

The trial court and Court of Appeal correctly recognized as the central legal issue whether putative class members are employees for purposes of the provisions under which they sue. If they are employees, Antelope Valley owes them various duties that it may not have fulfilled; if they are not, no liability can attach. In turn, whether putative class members' employee status can be commonly resolved hinges on the governing test for employment.

Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 59 Cal. 4th 522, 530 (2014).  The Court observed that the test relied upon in the Courts below was the Borello common law test. After considering the need to examine other employment tests, the Court concluded that the case could be resolved by focusing on the common law test exclusively.  The Court then restated the essentials of the common law test for employment:

Under the common law, “ ‘[t]he principal test of an employment relationship is whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.’ ” (Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 350, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399, quoting Tieberg v. Unemployment Ins. App. Bd. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 943, 946, 88 Cal.Rptr. 175, 471 P.2d 975; accord, Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Emp. Com. (1946) 28 Cal.2d 33, 43, 168 P.2d 686.) What matters is whether the hirer “retains all necessary control” over its operations. (Borello, at p. 357, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399.) “ ‘[T]he fact that a certain amount of freedom of action is inherent in the nature of the work does not change the character of the employment where the employer has general supervision and control over it.’ ” (Burlingham v. Gray (1943) 22 Cal.2d 87, 100, 137 P.2d 9; see Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 864, 876, 269 Cal.Rptr. 647; Grant v. Woods (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 647, 653, 139 Cal.Rptr. 533.) Perhaps the strongest evidence of the right to control is whether the hirer can discharge the worker without cause, because “[t]he power of the principal to terminate the services of the agent gives him the means of controlling the agent's activities.” (Malloy v. Fong (1951) 37 Cal.2d 356, 370, 232 P.2d 241; see Borello, at p. 350, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399; Kowalski v. Shell Oil Co. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 168, 177, 151 Cal.Rptr. 671, 588 P.2d 811; Isenberg v. California Emp. Stab. Com. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 34, 39, 180 P.2d 11; Burlingham, at pp. 99–100, 137 P.2d 9.)

Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 531.  The Court added an additional, significant observation to this formulation, observing, “The worker's corresponding right to leave is similarly relevant: “ ‘An employee may quit, but an independent contractor is legally obligated to complete his contract.’ ” (Perguica v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1947) 29 Cal.2d 857, 860, 179 P.2d 812.)”  Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 531 n. 2.  The Court then listed the secondary factors that a court may consider, including: (a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; (d) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (e) the length of time for which the services are to be performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (g) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and (h) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee.

Next the Court turned to the question of whether certification should have been granted in this matter. Before doing so, however, the Court framed the core question, right to control, at issue in the case:

Significantly, what matters under the common law is not how much control a hirer exercises, but how much control the hirer retains the right to exercise. (Perguica v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra, 29 Cal.2d at pp. 859–860, 179 P.2d 812 [“The existence of such right of control, and not the extent of its exercise, gives rise to the employer-employee relationship.”]; Empire Star Mines Co. v. Cal. Emp. Com., supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 43, 168 P.2d 686 [“If the employer has the authority to exercise complete control, whether or not that right is exercised with respect to all details, an employer-employee relationship exists.”]; Industrial Ind. Exch. v. Ind. Acc. Com. (1945) 26 Cal.2d 130, 135, 156 P.2d 926 [“The right to control and direct the activities of the alleged employee or the manner and method in which the work is performed, whether exercised or not, gives rise to the employment relationship.”]; S.A. Gerrard Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 411, 414, 110 P.2d 377 [“the right to control, rather than the amount of control which was exercised, is the determinative factor”]; Hillen v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1926) 199 Cal. 577, 581–582, 250 P. 570 [“It is not a question of interference, or non-interference, not a question of whether there have been suggestions, or even orders, as to the conduct of the work; but a question of the right to act, as distinguished from the act itself or the failure to act.”].) Whether a right of control exists may be measured by asking “ ‘ “whether or not, if instructions were given, they would have to be obeyed” ’ ” on pain of at-will “ ‘ “discharge[ ] for disobedience.” ’ ” (Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 875, 269 Cal.Rptr. 647.)

Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 533.  Applying this test to the case before it, the Court observed that:

at the certification stage, the relevant inquiry is not what degree of control Antelope Valley retained over the manner and means of its papers' delivery. It is, instead, a question one step further removed: Is Antelope Valley's right of control over its carriers, whether great or small, sufficiently uniform to permit classwide assessment? That is, is there a common way to show Antelope Valley possessed essentially the same legal right of control with respect to each of its carriers? Alternatively, did its rights vary substantially, such that it might subject some carriers to extensive control as to how they delivered, subject to firing at will, while as to others it had few rights and could not have directed their manner of delivery even had it wanted, with no common proof able to capture these differences?

Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 533-34.  The Court concluded that the trial court lost sight of these questions in its analysis:

The trial court lost sight of this question. Its order reveals the denial of certification ultimately rested on two related determinations: (1) the record reflected considerable variation in the degree to which Antelope Valley exercised control over its carriers; and (2) the putative class as a whole was not subject to pervasive control as to the manner and means of delivering papers. Neither of these considerations resolves the relevant inquiry. Whether Antelope Valley varied in how it exercised control does not answer whether there were variations in its underlying right to exercise that control that could not be managed by the trial court. Likewise, the scope of Antelope Valley's right to control the work does not in itself determine whether that right is amenable to common proof.

Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 534.  The Court discussed briefly the evidence available to the Court, focusing heavily on the contract between the newspaper carriers and the defendant.  The Court found that even variations in the actual degree of control over different carriers was likely irrelevant if the right to control them all was effectively identical:

[T]he existence of variations in the extent to which a hirer exercises control does not necessarily show variation in the extent to which the hirer possesses a right of control, or that the trial court would find any such variation unmanageable. That a hirer may monitor one hiree closely and another less so, or enforce unevenly a contractual right to dictate the containers in which its product is delivered, does not necessarily demonstrate that the hirer could not, if it chose, monitor or control the work of all its hirees equally. (See Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1, 13–14, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 327 [recognizing that how a hirer exercised control over a particular hiree might show, not the hirer's differential control of that hiree, but the extent of its common right to control all its hirees].) For class certification under the common law test, the key question is whether there is evidence a hirer possessed different rights to control with regard to its various hirees, such that individual mini-trials would be required. Did Antelope Valley, notwithstanding the form contract it entered with all carriers, actually have different rights with respect to each that would necessitate mini-trials?

Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 535-36.  The Court then explained the frequent error made in the certification analysis of claims based on independent contractor misclassification:

Certification of class claims based on the misclassification of common law employees as independent contractors generally does not depend upon deciding the actual scope of a hirer's right of control over its hirees. The relevant question is whether the scope of the right of control, whatever it might be, is susceptible to classwide proof. Bypassing that question, the trial court instead proceeded to the merits. In so doing, the court made the same mistake others have when deciding whether to certify claims predicated on common law employee status, “focus[ing] too much on the substantive issue of the defendant's right to control its newspaper deliverers, instead of whether that question could be decided using common proof.” (Dalton v. Lee Publications, supra, 270 F.R.D. at p. 564.) Moreover, by purporting to resolve on a classwide basis the scope of Antelope Valley's right to control its carriers, the trial court contradicted its own conclusion, that classwide assessment of Antelope Valley's right to control is infeasible.

Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 537.  The Court concluded by noting that many of the secondary factors must also be evaluated correctly to determine if common proof will adequately determine the secondary factor in question:

Preliminarily, we caution that courts assessing these secondary factors should take care to correctly identify the relevant considerations. Here, for example, the trial court noted variation in the “place of work.” The inquiry that sheds light on a hiree's common law employee status, however, is into who provides the place of work, the hirer or hiree (Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 351, 256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399; Rest.3d Agency, § 7.07, com. f, p. 211; Rest.2d Agency, § 220, subd. (2)(e)), and thus the relevant inquiry is whether there is variation in who provides facilities. That carriers could pick up papers at any of several Antelope Valley warehouses or drop locations, as Antelope Valley argued, does not show variation in the underlying secondary factor.

Ayala, 59 Cal. 4th at 538.

The Court remanded with instructions to consider the certification question in light of the Court’s guidance.

Decertification reversal in suitable seating case

Rage, rage against the dying of the light. Chastise the universe for failing you, and sometimes it responds. Just earlier today I decried the absence of any decisions having anything to do with the subjects usually covered here. But soft! what light through yonder window breaks? It is an opinion, and suitable seating is the sun. In Hall v. Rite Aid Corporation (May 16, 2014), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division One) reversed a trial court order decertifying a suitable seating claim.

The plaintiff successfully certified a class action alleging failure to provide suitable seating. Later, defendant Rite Aid moved for decertification, citing to other decisions and to evidence it offered. The trial court granted the motion to decertify and denied the cross-motion to permit the matter to proceed as a non-class representative action. (Oh my gosh, this is already exciting!) Based on the analytic framework of Brinker ("O, speak again, bright angel! for thou art As glorious to this night, being o'er my head As is a winged messenger of heaven Unto the white-upturned wondering eyes Of mortals that fall back to gaze on him When he bestrides the lazy-pacing clouds And sails upon the bosom of the air."), the Court of appeal concluded that the trial court erroneously considered the merits of the action, rather than whether the action was amenable to class treatment.

The decertification train got rolling after Rite Aid cited the recently decided matter of Duran v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn., 203 Cal. App. 4th 212 (2012) (review granted).  Rite Aid then pounced, asking the trial court to sua sponte decertify.  The trial court declined, but briefing was requested. Rite Aid then submitted federal court decisions and declarations from cashiers that had opted out of the action, along with other evidence. In spite of numerous bases for opposition, the trial court granted the motion to decertify and denied the motion to permit the case to proceed as a representative action.

The Court began its review by thoroughly analyzing Brinker and its progeny. Describing several of those subsequent decisions, the Court said:

Subsequent cases have concluded, considering Brinker, that when a court is considering the issue of class certification and is assessing whether common issues predominate over individual issues, the court must "focus on the policy itself" and address whether the plaintiff's theory as to the illegality of the policy can be resolved on a class-wide basis. (Faulkinbury v. Boyd & Associates, Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 220, 232 (Faulkinbury); accord, Bradley, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1141-1142 ["[o]n the issue whether common issues predominate in the litigation, a court must 'examine the plaintiff's theory of recovery' and 'assess the nature of the legal and factual disputes likely to be presented' "]; Benton v. Telecom Network Specialists, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 701, 726 (Benton) ["under Brinker . . . for purposes of certification, the proper inquiry is 'whether the theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff is likely to prove amenable to class treatment' "].) Those courts have also agreed that, where the theory of liability asserts the employer's uniform policy violates California's labor laws, factual distinctions among whether or how employees were or were not adversely impacted by the allegedly illegal policy does not preclude certification. (See, e.g., Bradley, supra, at pp. 1150-1153 [where theory of liability was employer's uniform policy violated labor laws by not authorizing employees to take meal and rest breaks, class certification is proper and fact some employees in fact took meal and rest breaks is a damage question that " 'will rarely if ever stand as a bar to certification' "].)

Slip op., at 13. Once the Court turned to plaintiff's theory, it wasted no time in applying the mandates of Brinker (and I sense no trace of bitterness):

Our review of Brinker, which is binding on this court (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450), compels the conclusion the trial court erroneously based its decertification order on its assessment of the merits of Hall's claim rather than on the theory of liability advanced by Hall. We are instructed under Brinker that the starting point for purposes of class certification commences with Hall's theory of liability because, "for purposes of certification, the proper inquiry is 'whether the theory of recovery advanced by the plaintiff is likely to prove amenable to class treatment.' " (Benton, supra, 220 Cal.App.4th at p. 726.) Here, as in Brinker and its progeny, Hall alleged (and Rite Aid did not dispute) that Rite Aid had a uniform policy of the type envisioned by Brinker: Rite Aid did not allow its Cashier/Clerks to sit (and therefore provided no suitable seats for its Cashier/Clerks) while they performed check-out functions at the register. Hall's theory of liability is that this uniform policy was unlawful because section 14 mandates the provision of suitable seats when the nature of the work reasonably permits the use of seats, and the nature of the work involved in performing check-out functions does reasonably permit the use of seats. Hall's proffered theory of liability is that, regardless of the amount of time any particular Cashier/Clerk might spend on duties other than check-out work, Rite Aid's uniform policy transgresses section 14 because suitable seats are not provided for that aspect of the employee's work that can be reasonably performed while seated.

Slip op., at 18-19. The Court then dismissed Rite Aid's arguments on appeal:

Rite Aid's arguments on appeal largely ignore the analysis of Bradley, Benton and Faulkinbury. Instead, Rite Aid asserts the trial court properly reached the merits of (and correctly rejected) Hall's theory of liability when it ruled on the decertification motion because Brinker cannot be read to permit a plaintiff to "invent a class action by proposing an incorrect rule of law and arguing, 'If my rule is right, I win on a class basis.' "

Slip op., at 20.

The Court found it unnecessary to address the representative action theory and declined the plaintiff's request to address the correct standard applicable to section 14's seating mandate.

I remarked on a number of occasions during Class Re-Action podcast episodes that Brinker's true impact was in the certification sphere, not the wage & hour issues it addressed. Q.E.D. Well, that's insanely smug and pretentious. But, you know, scoreboard.

Court of Appeal delivers stunnig rebuke of misclassification certification opinions based on Brinker

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I was pretty confident that you would need to have an unhealthy love of pain to take on a manger misclassification class action after the long line of bad outcomes for those cases (Dunbar, Mora, Arenas, Tuesday Morning, etc.).  But Martinez v. Joe's Crab Shack Holdings, 221 Cal. App. 4th 1148 (pub. ord. Dec. 4, 2013), once again channeling the ghost of Brinker, makes me think that we are back to wait-and-see time.  And, yes, another case that deserved attention a lot sooner than this.  That's what I get for starting my own firm.  Anyhow, on to our story...

In Martinez, employees of different Joe's Crab Shack (JCS) restaurants in California filed suit, seeking to represent a class of salaried managerial employees who worked at JCS restaurants in California.  The parties submitting conflicting groups of declarations.  Presented with this evidence, the trial court denied the motion for class certification on the grounds plaintiffs had failed to establish (1) their claims were typical of the class, (2) they could adequately represent the class, (3) common questions predominated the claims, and (4) a class action is the superior means of resolving the litigation.  The first two findings were based on plaintiffs' inability to estimate the number of hours spent on individual exempt and nonexempt tasks and their admission that the amount of time spent on particular tasks varied from day to day. As to the third and fourth findings, the trial court acknowledged the existence of common questions of law and fact, but concluded there remained significant individual disputed issues of fact relating to the amount of time spent by individual class members on particular tasks. The variability among individual members of the putative class would require adjudication of the affirmative defense of exemption for each class member, “a time- and resource-consuming process.” The trial court rejected as unfair plaintiffs' proffered trial plan, under which their expert proposed to assess the rate at which managerial employees are engaged in nonexempt tasks through statistical sampling methods. Under these circumstances, the court concluded, a class action would not be the superior means of resolving the litigation.

Examining the trial court’s reasoning, the Court began with a discussion of its typicality and adequacy findings, rejecting the narrow analysis supplied by the trial court:

With respect to typicality, this analysis suffers from an overly focused examination of the facts that looked toward individual differences rather than commonality. In essence, the trial court resolved the factual conflict between plaintiffs' declarations, in which they stated nonexempt tasks routinely occupied more than 50 percent of their time, and their deposition testimony that they could not estimate the number of hours they spent on individual tasks because those tasks varied day to day. The inability of the witnesses to specify time spent on particular tasks is hardly surprising, however, and does not create an issue that must be resolved on a motion for class certification. What was common to plaintiffs, in addition to the standard policies implemented by CAI at each of their restaurants, were their assertions their tasks did not change once they became managers; they performed a utility function and routinely filled in for hourly workers in performing nonexempt tasks; and they worked far in excess of 40 hours per week without being paid overtime wages. Their claims—and the defense of executive exemption to those claims—are thus typical of the class.

Martinez, 221 Cal. App. 4th at 1159.  Turning to the conflict between general managers and assistant manager, the Court agreed that antagonism existed but found it non-fatal:  “This apparent conflict, however, is not fatal. In the interest of preserving the claims of subordinate managerial employees, the trial court may on remand exercise its discretion to create a general managers subclass or to exclude general managers entirely from the class definition.” Martinez, 221 Cal. App. 4th at 1160.

Next, the Court found that the trial court’s reasoning regarding commonality shifted the burden of proof improperly onto the plaintiffs:

The trial court's failure here to focus on the impact of JCS policies and practices on its managerial employees essentially shifted the burden of disproving the executive exemption to plaintiffs. Indeed, although the court recognized the evidence established the existence of a finite task list that could aid in the identification of common issues among the putative class members, its analysis effectively omitted any consideration of this potential class-wide proof.

A recent decision from our colleagues in Division Two of this court simplifies this endeavor and illustrates the enormous cost of resolving these claims on an individual, rather than a class-wide basis. (See Heyen v. Safeway Inc. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 795, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 280 (Heyen ).)21 After reviewing analogous regulations for mercantile workers, Heyen articulated the appropriate manner of evaluating an employer's duties: “Several general principles emerge from these regulations. First, work of the same kind performed by a supervisor's nonexempt employees generally is ‘nonexempt,’ even when that work is performed by the supervisor. If such work takes up a large part of a supervisor's time, the supervisor likely is a ‘nonexempt’ employee. [Citations.] [¶] Second, the regulations do not recognize ‘hybrid’ activities—i.e., activities that have both ‘exempt’ and ‘nonexempt’ aspects. Rather, the regulations require that each discrete task be separately classified as either ‘exempt’ or ‘nonexempt.’ [Citations.] [¶] Third, identical tasks may be ‘exempt’ or ‘nonexempt’ based on the purpose they serve within the organization or department. Understanding the manager's purpose in engaging in such tasks, or a task's role in the work of the organization, is critical to the task's proper categorization. A task performed because it is ‘helpful in supervising the employees or contribute[s] to the smooth functioning of the department’ is exempt, even though the identical task performed for a different, nonmanagerial reason would be nonexempt. [Citations.] [¶] Finally, in a large retail establishment where the replenishing of stocks of merchandise on the sales floor ‘is customarily assigned to a nonexempt employee, the performance of such work by the manager or buyer of the department is nonexempt.’ [Citation.] Similarly, in such a large retail establishment, a manager's participation in making sales to customers is nonexempt, unless the sales are made for ‘supervisory training or demonstration purposes.’ ” (Id. at pp. 822–823, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 280.)

Applying these principles to the tasks identified by CAI and Landry's, inventory, restocking, serving, cooking, bussing tables, cleaning and other tasks ordinarily performed by nonexempt employees remain nonexempt when performed by a managerial employee. Likewise, when a managerial employee fills in for a nonexempt employee, the task remains nonexempt. On the other hand, if the managerial employee is performing the task for the purpose of supervisory training or demonstration, the task is exempt. California law does not recognize a hybrid category in which the employee is deemed to be performing an exempt task at the same time he or she is performing a nonexempt task. (Heyen, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 826, 157 Cal.Rptr.3d 280.)

Martinez, 221 Cal. App. 4th at 1163-64.

Finally, in a stunning, but subtle rebuke of prior decisions on misclassification, the Court identified a new mandate from Brinker, saying:

We have not ignored the substantial case authority, including our own, upholding trial court decisions not to certify class actions for claims similar to those raised here (see, e.g., Dailey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 974, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 480; Mora v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th 496, 124 Cal.Rptr.3d 535; Arenas v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 723, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 15); nor do we express any disagreement with the outcome of those cases. However, we understand from Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 273 P.3d 513, a renewed direction that class-wide relief remains the preferred method of resolving wage and hour claims, even those in which the facts appear to present difficult issues of proof. By refocusing its analysis on the policies and practices of the employer and the effect those policies and practices have on the putative class, as well as narrowing the class if appropriate, the trial court may in fact find class analysis a more efficient and effective means of resolving plaintiffs' overtime claim.

Martinez, 221 Cal. App. 4th at 1165.

At least until Duran is decided, there appears to be a change of direction in the pendulum following Brinker.  I would note that in the last Class Re-Action Podcast, we discussed with our mediator panel whether there was something akin to a market correction to the overly hostile treatment class actions received in recent years.  The panel generally though it was too soon to tell.  It's looking less anecdotal with every decision.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes receives some analysis from a California Court of Appeal

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While Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes was quickly applied by lower federal courts, it took some time to see how California courts would apply Dukes.  (Heck, it took quite some time for me to get around to writing this post, so I suppose we can excuse others for not racing their appeals up the ladder just to generate opinions for us to dwell upon.)  In Williams v. Superior Court (Allstate Ins. Co.), 221 Cal. App. 4th 1353 (Dec. 6, 2013), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Eight) offered us our first look at how a California Court of Appeal views the relevance of Dukes in a state class action, outside the Title VII context.

The background of the case generated some additional interesting points, so it's worth a quick summary.  The trial court initally certified a class. After Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes was decided, the parties and trial court discussed Dukes. The trial court thereafter permitted Allstate to file a motion based on Dukes for decertification of the Off–the–Clock class. In its decertification motion, Allstate emphasized two points from Dukes. First, “there must be some ‘glue’ holding the class members' claims together, such that common facts can resolve the claims for everyone in the class.” And, second, “a trial-by-formula using statistical sampling is an improper means to try class claims, as it deprives a defendant of due process by precluding a defendant from proving its individual defenses against each class member.” Allstate told the trial court, “In light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes [, supra,] 131 S.Ct. 2541, which the Court admitted changed the relevant legal landscape for this case, and additional discovery since the class certification order, it is apparent that the close call on certification must be reversed.”  The trial court agreed, and decertified the Off–the–Clock class and the corresponding Unfair Competition Claim.

The Court of Appeal began its discussion by addressing the standard applicable to decertification motions generally:

We review a decertification order for an abuse of discretion. (Brinker, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1022, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 315, 273 P.3d 513; Sav–On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 906, 96 P.3d 194; Ghazaryan v. Diva Limousine, Ltd. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1524, 1530, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 518.) Decertification requires new law or newly discovered evidence showing changed circumstances. (Weinstat v. Dentsply Internat., Inc. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1225, 103 Cal.Rptr.3d 614.) A motion for decertification is not an opportunity for a disgruntled class defendant to seek a do-over of its previously unsuccessful opposition to certification. “Modifications of an original class ruling, including decertifications, typically occur in response to a significant change in circumstances, and ‘[i]n the absence of materially changed or clarified circumstances ... courts should not condone a series of rearguments on the class issues.’ [Citation.].” (Driver v. AppleIllinois, LLC N.D.Ill., Mar. 2, 2012, No. 06 C 6149) 2012 WL 689169, *1 (Driver ).) “A class should be decertified ‘only where it is clear there exist changed circumstances making continued class action treatment improper.’ ” (Green v. Obledo (1981) 29 Cal.3d 126, 147, 172 Cal.Rptr. 206, 624 P.2d 256.)

Williams, 221 Cal. App. 4th at 1360-61.  Frankly, the point that a decertification motion is not a "do-over" was a point long overdue.  Talk about motions that are nothing but billing opportunities and time wasters.

Then the Court turned its attention to Dukes, giving it all the love it richly deserves.  Since Dukes was effectively the only reason for decertification, essentially all of the discussion was about Dukes.  The Court began by addressing the unique factual background:

The trial court erred in concluding Dukes required decertification. In Dukes, a nationwide class of 1.5 million current and former female employees from 3,400 stores sued Wal–Mart, alleging that the company engaged in a pattern or practice of gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The female plaintiffs were required to prove that thousands of store managers shared the same discriminatory animus toward women in denying them promotions and pay raises. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's certification order on the grounds that the plaintiffs could not offer “significant proof that Wal–Mart operated under a general policy of discrimination.” In reversing class certification, the Court found that there was no unifying theory holding together “literally millions of employment decisions” that turned on the subjective intents of thousands of supervisors in thousands of stores to explain for each class member the “crucial question why was I disfavored” for a promotion or pay raise. (Italics original.) (Dukes, supra, 131 S.Ct. at p. 2552; see e.g. Espinoza v. 953 Assocs. LLC (S.D.N.Y.2011) 280 F.R.D. 113, 130 [distinguished Dukes where “claims were based on the countless subjective decisions made by Wal–Mart's local supervisors regarding compensation and promotions” from worker's overtime claims where workers alleged employer “failed to pay minimum wages and overtime compensation as a result of certain policies and practices.”]; see also Ross v. RBS Citizens, N.A. (7th Cir.2012) 667 F.3d 900, 908–910judgment vacated and matter remanded for further reconsideration in light of Comcast Corp. v. Behrend (2013) ––– U.S. –––, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 185 L.Ed.2d 5153 [distinguishing Dukes in case involving 1,129 class members who alleged they were unlawfully denied overtime because of the employer's “unofficial policy” which was “the glue holding together [the class members] based on the common question of whether an unlawful overtime policy prevented employees from collecting lawfully earned overtime compensation.”].)

Williams, 221 Cal. App. 4th at 1361-62.  The Court then discussed the inapplicability of the Rule 23(b)(2) standard to the case before it:

Despite the trial court's turning to Dukes' analysis of the restrictions on, if not outright unavailability of, money damages under rule 23(b)(2) to explain the trial court's decertification order, appellant was not pursuing a 23(b)(2) type of class action. Appellant instead sought class certification under California's class action statute, Code of Civil Procedure section 382.5 Section 382 is analogous to subpart (a) of Rule 23, which establishes the four requirements of a class action. (In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 318, 93 Cal.Rptr.3d 559, 207 P.3d 20.) The trial court's reliance on Dukes' analysis of subpart (b)(2) of Rule 23—a class action seeking injunctive relief—was thus misplaced because appellant's class members here were seeking principally, if not exclusively, monetary damages, that the federal rules establish is a different type of class action. (Compare Rule 23(b)(2) with 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(3); Dukes, supra, 131 S.Ct. at p. 2558 [“monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3)”].) More fundamentally, the concern expressed in Dukes about the unmanageability of trying 1.5 million claims which depended on proof of the subjective intents of thousands of individual supervisors is not present here. Appellant asserts there is a companywide policy to deny overtime pay. The resolution of that issue does not involve the subjective intents of countless supervisors.

Williams, 221 Cal. App. 4th at 1363-64.

Next, the Court explained that the Dukes discussion of the right to assert statutory defenses under Title VII did not have a corresponding analogue in the Williams matter:

The Supreme Court's second area of focus in Part III of Dukes involved the statutory affirmative defenses in the anti-discrimination statute Title VII. Because the affirmative defenses were statutory, Dukes concluded a class proceeding could not deprive Wal–Mart of its right to present those defenses. (Dukes, supra, 131 S.Ct. at pp. 2560–2561.) As those affirmative defenses required individualized evidence, Dukes disapproved a “Trial by Formula” of Wal–Mart's affirmative defenses because it prevented Wal–Mart from offering its individualized evidence.

Williams, 221 Cal. App. 4th at 1364.

Finally, the Court concluded that nothing in Dukes rendered the original certification order of the trial court incorrect, which necessarily rendered decertification inappropriate.  There is one major lesson here: you can't predict with very much accuracy the ultimate impact of a big decision when it is first released.  This opinion stems from Brinker, which is having a much more far reaching impact than the subject matter of that case initially suggested.  Dukes is having less of an impact at the state level.