The Borello “right to control” employment test saves Nimrod

Greatsealcal100Once again, a California Court of Appeal has relied upon S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 [256 Cal.Rptr. 543] to articulate the test for employment.  In Caso, et al. v. Nimrod Productions, Inc., et al. (June 4, 2008) ___ Cal.Rptr.3d ___, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Seven) evaluated the interesting doctrine of "special employment."  Explaining the term, the Court said:

When an employer lends an employee to another employer and relinquishes to the borrowing employer some right of control over the employee’s activities, a “special employment relationship” arises between the borrowing employer and the employee.

(Slip op., at p. 7.)  Citing Borello and other authority, the Nimrod Court (heh) said:

“In determining whether a special employment relationship exists, the primary consideration is whether the special employer has ‘“[t]he right to control and direct the activities of the alleged employee or the manner and method in which the work is performed, whether exercised or not . . . .”’” (Kowalski, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 175; see Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 350.)

(Slip op., at p. 7.)

What makes this of interest is the (perceived - my opinion) increase in class action litigation arising from the practice of misclassifying employees as independent contractors, discussed previously hereEstrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 327] provides one example in this trend.  And it seems reasonable to speculate that if the economy is actually entering a significant downturn (a premise that the media repeats but I decline to accept until real data shows a major downturn), employers may attempt with greater frequency to re-classify employees as independent contractors.  Were that to happen, an increase in that type of wage & hour class action would surely follow.  However, given that the strong emphasis on Borello seems to confirm that "right to control" and not actual control is the touchstone test for finding an employment relationship, class actions challenging independent contractor classifications may not go well, on the whole, for employers.  The long term costs of that miscalculation would likely exceed the immediate savings of designating employees as independent contractors.

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Court of Appeal denies a Request for Rehearing in Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner, butressing its application of the Borello “right to control” test with an extra footnote

Greatsealcal100On April 30, 2008, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division 3), relying solely on S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341 [256 Cal.Rptr. 543], applied the Borello employment factors test to newspaper carriers delivering the Antelope Valley Press, concluding that paper deliverypersons were employees.  (See this blog's May 12, 2008 post on Antelope Valley Press.)  Apparently Antelope Valley Press wasn't thrilled by that decision and filed a Petition for Rehearing. As is usually the case, the Court of Appeal wasn't thrilled with receiving a Brief indicating that it had done a poor job analyzing the situation, because it added a small footnote to its original decision:

We reject AVP’s contention that the court’s analysis in JKH Enterprises is flawed. AVP asserts that JKH Enterprises did not “consider fully” the decision in Interstate Brands v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 26 Cal.3d 770, 773, 775, where the Supreme Court had affirmed the trial court’s determination that certain of the employees of Interstate Brands were not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits, and held that it was proper for the trial court to apply the independent judgment test in reviewing the evidence produced at an administrative hearing because the case affected a fundamental vested right of the employer. We note that the Supreme Court denied review in JKH Enterprises. We also note that the Interstate Brands court did not address the question whether the subject workers were employees or independent contractors. Their employee status was admitted by Interstate Brands. However, Borello did address that issue, and there the Supreme Court simply stated that “[t]he determination of employee or independent-contractor status is one of fact if dependent upon the resolution of disputed evidence or inferences, and the [administrative agency’s] decision [on that status issue] must be upheld if substantially supported.” (Borello, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 349, italics added.) The Borello court did not state whether the question of worker status involves or affects a fundamental vested right. As noted in footnote 13, post, the evidence in this case is disputed. Therefore, in deciding this appeal in favor of upholding the Commissioner’s decision that the carriers are employees and not independent contractors for purposes of workers’ compensation insurance, we did so by addressing the question whether that decision is substantially supported by the evidence in the administrative record.

(May 30, 2008 Order Modifying Opinion.)  The Court finished by denying the Petition for Rehearing.  You didn't see that one coming, did you?

I know that the Petition for Rehearing is often filed just to establish that every effort for review has been exhausted prior to filing a Petition for Review with the California Supreme Court.  In other words, the denial is presumed and the rehearing request is mechanical.  But if you file a Petition for Rehearing with the idea that it will actually help your client, think again.  Compared to Petitions for Writs, which are rarely granted, the odds on winning California's lottery must be better than getting a Rehearing Petition granted.

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Are punitive damages available in class actions asserting statutory wage & hour violations? Savaglio v. Wal-Mart may have the answer.

California Punitive Damages has an intriguing post about a pending appeal that could affect punitive damage claims in wage & hour class actions.  (Cutting, Pending Appeal Will Affect Punitive Damages Claims In Wage & Hour Class Actions (May 16, 2008) calpunitives.blogspot.com.)  In an appeal to the First Appellate District, Division Four, Wal-Mart is contesting, among other things, a $115 million punitive damages award by asserting the "new right-exclusive remedy" rule:

Among the issues that Wal-Mart has raised on appeal is whether California's "new right-exclusive remedy" rule bars the punitive damages award in this wage and hour case. Under this rule, "where a statute creates a right that did not exist at common law and provides a comprehensive and detailed remedial scheme for its enforcement, the statutory remedy is exclusive." (Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 79.) According to Wal-Mart's opening appellate brief, no California appellate cases have upheld an award of punitive damages for any statutory wage and hour claims, and at least three federal district courts have applied the "new right-exclusive remedy" rule to dismiss claims seeking punitive damages predicated on alleged wage and hour violations.

(Ibid.)  So what is the "new right-exclusive remedy" rule you ask?  Tell me about Rojo you say?  You had but to ask.

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Littler Mendelson, P.C., provides educational report on how to achieve total wage & hour compliance

Littler Mendelson, P.C. released a wage & hour report entitled, "Total Wage and Hour Compliance: An Initiative to End the Wage and Hour Class Action War."  The abstract on the firm's website summarizes the focus of the report:

Wage and hour class actions are rising sharply and the potential exposure is unprecedented. The number of wage and hour class actions filed in federal courts more than doubled from 2001 to 2006, and settlements are frequently in the multi-million dollar range. Absent a complete and comprehensive approach to tackling wage and hour compliance, the trend is unlikely to end. In this report, a Littler Task Force lays out seven key components to help employers reach and maintain a level of compliance that greatly reduces the likelihood and cost of litigation. By implementing these components, a systematic process can be developed to move the level of wage and hour compliance as close to "total" as is reasonably possibly, with a sensible allocation of corporate resources.

(Abstract: Total Wage and Hour Compliance: An Initiative to End the Wage and Hour Class Action War (April 2008) www.littler.com.)

The report has received quite a bit of attention around the blogosphere in a variety of contexts.  Wage Law notes that "[s]ome of the best ideas for the plaintiff's bar have come from defense lawyers. . . . It isn't just a learning tool for employers. It also provides considerable food for thought if you are represent employees . . . ."  (Walsh & Walsh, New Littler Report on Wage and Hour Compliance (May 9, 2008) wagelaw.typepad.com.)  Cal Biz Lit cites from the Littler report in a detailed article about attorney fee-shifting statutes in California.  (Nye, Attorneys' Fee Awards in California III: More Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes (May 14, 2008) www.calbizlit.com.)   California Punitive Damages also quotes from the Little report, saying, "Indeed, a recent report issued by Littler Mendelson (which specializes in labor and employment law) indicates that at least 311 wage and hour related class actions were filed in California state courts alone in the nearly six-month period between October 1, 2007, and March 28, 2008."  (Curt Cutting, Pending Appeal Will Affect Punitive Damages Claims in Wage & Hour Class Actions (May 16, 2008) calpunitives.blogspot.com.)

I have faced off against one of the report's authors, Kevin Lilly, in a wage & hour class action.  He's a sharp attorney (and a gentleman), and I have no hesitation in suggesting that you take a look at the Littler report.  In any case, I have to commend a defense-oriented firm that essentially says, "If you want to avoid wage & hour class actions, your only choice is to comply with the law 100% of the time."  If everyone would offer sage advice like that (and if the recipients would follow it), I could get into some other line of work.

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Class of "technical writers" seeking overtime certified in suit against Sun Microsystems

In a case that may draw renewed attention to wage & hour practices at high tech businesses, Santa Clara Superior Court Judge Jack Komar certified a class comprised of "technical writers" employed by Sun Microsystems since 2002.  Plaintiff Hoenemier is challenging the company's practice of treating Hoenemier and about 300 other writers as exempt from state labor laws governing overtime and breaks.  At issue in this case is the overtime exemption applicable to "computer professionals," found at Cal. Labor Code section 515.5.  "If the company loses, it could owe 'well over $20 million' in back pay, according to Hoenemier's attorney, Aaron Kaufmann of Walnut Creek."  (Brandon Bailey, Sun overtime lawsuit a class action (May 15, 2008) www.mercurynews.com.)

Sun contends in the suit that it is an industry-wide practice to classify technical writers as exempt under section 515.5.  If the Court ultimately determines that Sun is wrong in its classification, the whole industry will face a wave of wage & hour lawsuits, given that suits for back wages remain viable, irrespective of a corrective classification going forward.

Other coverage:

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Showing laudable common sense in Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc., a California Court of Appeal limits Alvarez v. May Dept. Stores Co.

Greatsealcal100I must confess that, of all decisions for which I may take blame or credit, Alvarez v. May Dept. Stores Co. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1223 sticks in my craw as the most abhorrent and most memorable (by a slight margin).  Not that I didn't give Alvarez my all; I have no shame there.  But I lost the appeal.  Then my Petition for Review was denied by the California Supreme Court (though Justice Kennard was of the opinion that it should have been granted), and I even went so far as to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.  It was, of course, denied.  The oral argument in the Court of Appeal lasted something like 45 minutes (it went way over the allowed time), and about 40 minutes of it were non-stop questions from all three justices.  It was brutal, educational, and intensely disappointing.  Mostly disappointing.

Enter Bufil v. Dollar Financial Group, Inc. (April 17, 2008, ord. pub. May 13, 2008), issued by the First Appellate District, Division Four.  The introduction to the opinion summarizes the legal terrain:

On the heels of the denial of class certification against employer and respondent Dollar Financial Group, Inc. (Dollar), in a suit alleging violation of meal and rest break labor laws, appellant Caren Bufil pursued class certification in a new suit which significantly narrowed the class definition. Relying on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of Dollar. Also relying on this doctrine as well as traditional concerns relevant to the issue of certification, the court denied Bufil’s motion for class certification. We reverse.

(Slip op., at p. 1.) 

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In Antelope Valley Press v. Poizner, the Borello “right to control” and related factors were again applied to find an employer-employee relationship

Greatsealcal100Because employers reap substantial savings when independent contractors can satisfy the needs of a business in place of employees, there is a financial incentive to misclassify employees as independent contractors. Decisional authority agrees that, due to the “infinite variety of service arrangements,” it is difficult to formulate a single test or standard that can determine whether an individual should be classified as an employee or an independent contractor. (S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 350 [256 Cal.Rptr. 543].)

In Borello, the California Supreme Court collected its decisions on the determination of an employment relationship. Borello held that “ ‘[t]he principal test of an employment relationship is whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired....’ ” (Borello, at p. 350.) Borello then discussed “secondary” indicia of the nature of the service relationship. First, Borello said that “ ‘[s]trong evidence in support of an employment relationship is the right to discharge at will, without cause.’ ” (Ibid.) Borello then summarized other “secondary” indicia of employment status:

Additional factors have been derived principally from the Restatement Second of Agency. These include (a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without supervision; (c) the skill required in the particular occupation; (d) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work; (e) the length of time for which the services are to be performed; (f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; (g) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the principal; and (h) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of employer-employee.

(Borello, at p. 351.) Since Borello, defendants have chafed at reliance upon Borello outside of the worker’s compensation context. Those challenges have uniformly been rejected:

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The second of Senator Margett's attacks on California's meal break law is also in freefall

The likely demise of SB 1192 was covered previously by The Complex Litigator.  (See, "That would be 'Plaintiffs: 2, Defendants: 0'".)  Senator Margett's second challenge to the present formulation of California's meal break law, SB 1539, a bill that sought to dillute the statutory entitlement to meal breaks or sue for missed meal break wages, made it out of committee, was substantially amended on April 15th, and set for hearing today.  That hearing was withdrawn.  It looks like legislative efforts to revise how meal breaks are treated is back to square one.  With a democratically controlled legislature and a governor that, despite liberal tendencies, is generally in favor of any legislation that eases requirements for business, it appears unlikely that anything will be sorted out any time soon.

[Via Wage Law.]

UPDATE:  For an alternative view on the significance of the recent history of SB 1539, read the recent post at the California Labor & Employement Law Blog, entitled "California Legislature Indicates Intent To Clarify Meal Period Law."  California Labor & Employment Law Blog says, "While the meal period laws have not been changed, the Legislature’s declaration of intent is a good sign that lawmakers recognize the need for change and will continue to have further discussions to try to find consensus on a solution that contains adequate protections for employers and employees."  Only time will tell, but I don't share their "optimism." 

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Whiplash warning: Bell v. Superior Court (H.F. Cox, Inc.) is depublished

We live in amazing times.  Not three minutes after I published my last post about Bell v. Superior Court (H.F. Cox, Inc.), 158 Cal.App.4th 147 (2007), Ms. Kralowec (The UCL Practitioner) was kind enough to alert me via e-mail to the fact that the Supreme Court has reversed itself on the depublication request in Bell:

The order filed on April 23, 2008 is hereby amended to read in its entirety: The petition for review is denied. The requests for an order directing depublication of the opinion are granted. The Reporter of Decisions is directed not to publish in the Official Appellate Reports the opinion in the above-entitled appeal filed November 21, 2007, which appears at 158 Cal.App.4th 147. (Cal. Const., art. VI, section 14; rule 8.1125(c)(1), Cal. Rules of Court.) George, C.J., was absent and did not participate. Kennard J., is of the opinion the petition should be granted.

(Kralowec, "Supreme Court depublishes class certification opinion: Bell v. Superior Court (H.F. Cox, Inc.)" The UCL Practioner, www.theuclpractitioner.com.)  The customary blog nomenclature is "Hat Tip to...." or "Nod to ...." as a thank you for being the source of useful information.  That just doesn't seem good enough in this case, so...Thanks!

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The value of precedent depends on perspective: Bell v. Superior Court (H.F. Cox, Inc.)

Greatsealcal100 In a post from earlier today, The UCL Practitioner reported that "[o]n Wednesday, the Supreme Court denied review and depublication in Bell v. Superior Court (H.F. Cox, Inc.), no. S160423."  (Kralowec, "Supreme Court denies review and depublication in class certification case: Bell v. Superior Court (H.F. Cox, Inc.)," The UCL Practioner, www.theuclpractitioner.com.)   In an earlier post on that same blog, The UCL Practitioner, noting that the Bell decision contained "some interesting language on the 'superiority' element of class certification," quoted from the opinion:

The opinion contains some interesting language on the "superiority" element of class certification: The party seeking class certification has the burden to establish that class action will be a superior means of resolving the dispute. (Aguiar v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 132-133.) Our Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of the superiority of a class action in a wage and hour case. In Gentry v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 443, the Supreme Court concluded that both factors on which the trial court relied in this case – the size of some claims suggesting individual enforcement and the possibility of administrative proceedings before the Labor Commissioner – were insufficient to deny class certification. The court noted that there are many other factors in favor of class resolution in such cases, including that current employees might not bring individual claims out of a fear of retaliation, that current employees might not know of their rights (especially where, as here, the employer has affirmatively told them they are not eligible for overtime), and the necessity of class actions to give teeth to wage and hour laws even when some employees may have claims large enough for individual enforcement. (Id. at p. 459-462.) The court specifically held that an administrative action before the Labor Commissioner was an inadequate substitute for a class action. (Id. at p. 465.) As such, the trial court’s conclusion that a class action is not superior cannot stand.

(Kralowec, "New class certification decision: Bell v. Superior Court (H.F. Cox, Inc.)," The UCL Practioner, www.theuclpractitioner.com, quoting Bell.) My reaction to Bell at the time was that it seemed substantially more useful to plaintiffs than defendants.  As an aside, this is almost always true when a Court of Appeal reversed any part of a denial of certification.  Reversing a certification denial order, in any part, is a big deal.  Certification decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, and trial courts get the benefit of the doubt on appeal.

Today, I argued (successfully) against a defendant that sought to decertify a class.  Relying heavily on Bell, the defendant attacked a garden-variety class definition used in overtime/off the clock cases as lacking ascertainability.  Bell included some language that made defendant's argument more than trivial to overcome.

The defendant's use of Bell, an apparently plaintiff-friendly case, was sobering.  I was reminded of the danger inherrent in evaluating new precedent through the bias of one's primary practice area, in my case, predominantly plaintiff-side class actions.  While it is usually the case that a defendant, seeking decertification, would shy away from any certification opinion where any portion of a denial of certification was reversed, there are no guarantees that you won't have to deal with "surprise" citations.  In Bell, as in most cases, there are bits and pieces that are as useful to defendants as to plaintiffs, depending upon what issues are in play.

My unsolicited advice to erstwhile class action practitioners is to set aside some time to read each and every new class action decision, front to back, at least once while it is still hot off the presses.  Your early read of new authority may be enough to help you avoid surprises down the line.

UPDATE:  Aside from also reporting on the depublication of Bell earlier today, Wage Law notes that while Bell "had seemed to favor the plaintiff (who was the petitioner seeking Supreme Court review) the Court of Appeal's endorsement of the denial of certification in the off-the-clock and meal period causes of action had been embraced by the employers' bar, who will lament the depublication of the case."  ("Supreme Court Depublishes Bell v Superior Court (HF Cox, Inc.)," Wage Law, www.wagelaw.typepad.com.)

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