RICO class actions filed against National Arbitration Forum, major credit card companies

Several weeks ago this blog noted that the State of Minnesota had filed suit against National Arbitration Forum ("NAF"), a major player in the field of credit card debt arbitrations.  In Blawg Review #221, the NAF story was updated with breaking news that NAF was abandoning the credit card arbitration business entirely.

The second shoe has now dropped.  "Two RICO antitrust class actions accuse the National Arbitration Forum of conspiring with American Express, Bank of America, Wells Fargo and other major credit card companies to make it difficult or impossible for consumers to get fair resolutions of disputes."  Jessica Chapman, Arbitrator Was a Conspirator, Classes Claim (July 29, 2009) www.courthousenews.com.  Having done more than the average amount of research into RICO claims, I admire anyone with the brass to bring one of the least favored civil causes of action on earth.  But this one may have a shot, given that it took all of a week to chase NAF out of an incredibly lucrative line of business.

Blawg Review #222 is now available at IP Think Tank

If Blawg Review #221 on The Complex Litigator was your first introduction to the migrating law blog carnival known as Blawg Review, and if you enjoyed the potpourri of sites about law, then head on over to Blawg Review #222 for more of the same, just upside down.  Be patient - web pages load in the opposite direction in Australia.

(Not) BREAKING NEWS: Denny's sued over salty food

A lawsuit was filed on July 23, 2009, in the Superior Court of New Jersey. The lawsuit, filed by The Center for Science in the Public Interest, seeks to compel Denny's to disclose the amount of sodium in each meal and include a warning notice on it's menus.

It was also discovered late last week that the "wet" sensation you experience in the shower is somehow connected to all the water shooting out of the nozzle on the wall. Also, the Pope is believed to be Catholic, although further testing is needed.

Denny's food is salty? Really?

Are Westlaw and LexisNexis violating copyrights by selling access to filed briefs? Some commentators say yes, maybe.

I'm as guilty of this lazy thought process as the next lawyer.  I've always assumed, perhaps incorrectly, that when a brief was filed with a court, it was some sort of public commodity, available for any use.  Not so fast.  The July 23, 2009 Daily Journal ran a story about Irvine attorney Edmond Connor, who wrote to the California Supreme Court to express concern about the the practice of providing all appellate briefs filed in California to Westlaw and Lexis, free of charge.  Paul Lomio, LexisNexis and Weslaw violating copyright? (July 23, 2009) legalresearchplus.com.

The Volokh Conspiracy stepped into the discussion:

The argument for infringement is actually moderately strong. Like most other documents, briefs are protected by copyright the moment they are written. The fact that they're filed in court doesn't waive any copyright. Lexis and Westlaw's distribution of the briefs is thus presumptively copyright infrigngement.

Eugene Volokh, Do Lexis and Westlaw Infringe Copyright When They Post Briefs Filed in Court? (July 23, 2009) volokh.com.  Legal Research Plus followed up with a link to the actual letter by Mr. Connor (in which he suggests that a class action could be one way to resolve the issue).  The letter is rather persuasive in describing the current system as unfairly favoring two commercial actors at the expense of the copyright holders.  I'm going to go out on a limb and say that it sounds like a federal class action waiting to happen if a corrective measure isn't implemented.

Via: @richards1000 (twitter page)

Brinker news, and other California Supreme Court activity

This blog's last post on Brinker Restaurant v. Superior Court (Hohnbaum) indicated that the Reply Brief would be filed on July 6, 2009.  After a few unexpected bumps, the Reply Brief was filed on July 20, 2009.  The case is fully briefed.  Now the amicus bloodbath may commence.

In other Supreme Court news, today the Supreme Court denied review in Gomez v. Lincare (April 28, 2009).  See this prior post for information about Gomez.

And in Miller v. Bank of America, 46 Cal. 4th 630 (2009), the Supreme Court denied a Petition for Modification of the opinion.

Blawg Review #221

Tough acts to follow. Blawg Review #220 was hosted by Overlawyered, believed by many to be the Internet’s oldest law blog. Then there was Blawg Review #214. We won’t speak much of that blawger from the UK who takes a bit too much delight in his smokedo, and his consumption of alcohol in its many forms, and his jabs at England’s prodigal child, the United States. No, we won’t dally there. And let’s not overlook the beautifully styled and beautifully written Blawg Review #216 (and be sure to “Click this link to continue...” if you want to know what I’m talking about). All of them and many others - tough acts to follow.

And so, realizing that I just have to do what I do best to present a credible Blawg Review #221, I turn back to Overlawyered and Blawg Review #220 for inspiration. Overlawyered comments on (criticizes) the costs of the American legal system. According to Overlawyered, you don't always have to hire a lawyer. Not for every little thing. Sometimes, you “just have to get over it.” But sometimes...if you wait until you have lots of people suffering lots of little things...you just have to file a class action...

 

Remember, remember the Fifth of November...

So I promised that I wouldn’t dwell on “that blawger,” the author of Charon QC and notorious host of several Blawg Reviews. But before I direct your attention to the best (or not necessarily so) of the blawgosphere over the last week, there is something I want to talk about first: Guy Fawkes Night, also known as Bonfire Night. It seems that some well-intentioned, but ever-so-slightly misguided gang of Catholics (including Guy Fawkes) planned to blow up the Houses of Parliament in London on November 5, 1605. They might have succeeded, too, if one of the conspirators hadn’t been so worried about the number of Catholics in line for collateral damage status that he sent a warning note to Lord Monteagle.

Why do I care about any of this, you ask? It has to do with the resulting holiday and an important lesson that we can draw from it. Until 1859, it was mandatory to celebrate the failed assassination attempt by lighting bonfires each November 5th. So, in England you need an official holiday and an order of the King to light a bonfire. Here, in America, all you need is for a professional sports team to win a championship. See, Man Charged for Arson in Lakers Melee. The child surpasses the parent. Keep your soccer hooligans, England. We have <em>real</em> idiots. By the way, Charon QC, it’s “organization,” not “organisation.” Just thought I’d tweak your English a bit. It seems to have stopped evolving a few centuries back, after all the Americans left. Although I concede that I prefer your punctuation rules for quotation marks.  Lay on, McDuff.

 

Class Actions

Based on the number of daily visitors and readers at The Complex Litigator, the odds are good that you, kind reader, are visiting for the first time. That is not to say that this blog has no readers. It’s just that Blawg Review is at another level entirely. Thus, for those that are new visitors, I will introduce this blog and its primary area of pontification.

This blog is mostly about class actions. I would say that this blog is about “complex litigation,” but what actually qualifies as “complex litigation” is a bit of a judgment call. A class action, on the other hand, is fairly easy to spot, being that it is a lawsuit that calls itself a “class action.”

One might think that there are a lot of class actions, based upon the attention they receive in the media. In so thinking, you’d be wrong. As this blog noted some time back, several thousand class actions are filed each year in California, which compares somewhat poorly against civil filings totaling 1,418,490, and civil dispositions totaling 1,268,153 in FY 2005–2006. In a Judicial Council study, statistics taken from 12 sample courts around California revealed that class action cases represented less than one-half of one percent of all unlimited (greater than $25,000 in controversy) civil filings in the sample courts during the study period spanning 2000-2006.

So why all the fuss? One simple answer is that the level of fuss is proportionate to the size of the check written by the typical defendant. In the case of class actions, those checks tend to be much larger and draw more public attention as a result. And, by that measure, class actions are despicable. For example, the Institute of Legal Reform (right...a public service it is), an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (now we see the motivation), writes about The American Export You Don’t Want. It seems that some European countries, which do not have class actions of the type used in the American legal system, are contemplating adopting a form of the class action procedural device for mass litigation management. It’s hard for me to know whether to be excited by this news. On the one hand, Europeans have, as of late, shown the decidedly good judgment of moving away from the implausible socialism that dominated decades past. On the other hand, the E.U. thinks that it knows better than an upstanding American software company whether an Internet browser is or is not part of the core operating system on a computer. Thus, I have no idea whether their interest in class actions is motivated by a desire for market-based regulatory enforcement or some irrational pique.

On that same note, Popehat asks, What Do Rome, England, Germany, and Hamsters Have In Common? Turns out they’ve all conquered France. After the rimshot, Popehat goes on to observe that a representative action on behalf of abused hamsters will likely result in a decidedly American outcome: “If this follows the lead of American class actions, the lawyers will get $36.999 million and the hamsters will each get a coupon good for 10% off of a box of Hamster Chow, redeemable in a store operated by feral cats.” More than fair, I say. Those hamsters need chow anyhow, and a coupon’s a coupon. I apologize if you’ve seen this post that is several weeks old, but it deserves to be here.

In case you were wondering, my political leanings remain a bit vague on this blog, but I am definitely not a socialist. I leave the task of reconciling my occasional political observations and my defense of the class action device to each reader. The most amusing part is hearing the different deconstructions that follow from this reconciliation.

And now, more on class actions and blogging. Nothing about Blawg Review’s guidelines suggested that a post has to be long to be included. So I assume that quality over quantity is an acceptable measure (though we have both right here at The Complex Litigator, if I do say so myself. References available upon request.). The newsworthiness and timeliness of a post is as important as its length. On July 14, 2009, the new blog Oregon Class Action Blog reported that the State of Minnesota sued the National Arbitration Forum on July 14, 2009, over unfair credit card collection arbitrations. On July 19, 2009, Businessweek reported that the National Arbitration Forum was withdrawing from the credit card arbitration business entirely as part of a consent decree. It’s not easy to stay on top of a story lasting 5 days. Good job, Mr. Sugerman.

If you hang out with drugs and medical devices long enough, you end up with (1) a great party, (2) a horror movie, or (3) a whole bunch of opportunities for class actions! Jim Beck and Mark Herrmann hang out with drugs and medical devices, defending their manufacturers, and while I can’t speak about their experiences with options one and two, they do have a bit to say about class actions. This week, Drug and Device Law Blog offers a spirited defense of the proposition that punitive damages are unconstitutional in class actions in their article, Going Our Way? Class Actions, Punitive Damages & Due Process. They call their article something of a “legal smackdown” after a recent law review article criticized their position on the unconstitutionality of class actions for punitive damages, calling their views "tainted." In their post, they reiterate and explain their position, and critique the thesis of the law review article.

Sometimes the helpful government implements regulations that are so impossible to keep straight with other laws and regulations that widespread violations are almost inevitable. Class actions end up as the preferred tool for forcing compliance. HealthBlawg offers a warning to medical providers that they, soon, will need to reconcile their HIPAA and ARRA compliance policies with new rules from the FTC that impact a wide variety of “creditors” in many industries: Red Flags Rule: The FTC piles on, because HIPAA, ARRA and overlapping state laws just weren't enough. Good luck with that, Mr. Harlow. I think I smell blood in the water...

Class actions receive more than their fair share of criticism. But then again, when big piles of money and lots of people are involved, you’re bound to find some naughty behavior. ClassActionBlawg.com writes about one case, in which naughty attorneys promised incentive awards of specific amounts to the potential class representatives: Incentive Awards OK, But Not Incentive Agreements.

I know what you are thinking. The Class Action Fairness Act isn’t a laughing matter. That just means you haven’t read CAFA Law Blog. This past week, CAFA Law Blog explains why Dual Citizenship Does Not Give You a CAFAteria Pass to Eat at the Buffet in Federal Court. CAFA was designed for the primary purpose of dragging all but the smallest class actions and mass actions into federal court. Given the ferocity over which parties fight about remand, you’d have to think that plaintiffs don’t want to be in federal court and defendants do. I wish that there was a source of reliable statistical data tracking contested certification rates in state and federal courts, but I am unaware of comprehensive source. The study prepared by California’s Judicial Council (mentioned above) revealed that certifications occurred in contested cases at a rate that was most likely well below 20%. That’s lower than the appellate reversal rate in recent years in California’s appellate courts. Still, when the stakes are high enough, even single percentage points matter.

Some of my favorite class action and class action-related blogs have been fairly quiet in recent weeks. As a result, while preparing this edition of Blawg Review, I looked back a few weeks for class action news of interest. On Point supplies one story too good to exclude, the end of a class action lawsuit challenging the absence of “Crunch Berries” in Cap’n Crunch cereal: Lawyers’ Cereal Litigation Suffers Crunching Blow. News like this explains why life at Overlawyered is so easy. In baseball parlance, this is known as serving up a fat one. Translated into British English, this is known as throwing a ball that is very easy to hit with one of those funny bats while playing cricket, which is like baseball but much goofier.

Despite the recent lull due to other pressing business, you still shouldn’t overlook The UCL Practitioner, as she comments on all manner of decisions, such her recent post entitled Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court strikes down no-class-action arbitration clause: Feeney v. Dell, Inc., and other decisions affecting consumer litigation. Kimberly Kralowec, author of The UCL Practitioner, is a former host of Blawg Review and is usually out front with posts about class action and consumer law news affecting or of interest to California attorneys.

I want to end my discussion of posts emphasizing class actions with a special note of thanks to Shawn Westrick, a co-worker of mine, and the first true Contributing Author at The Complex Litigator. He earned his title when he came through with a second post in two weeks about recent California Supreme Court decisions involving the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004. PAGA actions will be inspiring confusion and awe in wage & hour actions, now that the California Supreme Court has determined that PAGA actions need not be certified to proceed as representative actions.

 

Sotomayor's Confirmation Hearings

It’s arguably big news that a new United States Supreme Court Justice is, by all accounts, about to be confirmed by the Senate. It’s also allegedly big news that Judge Sotomayor will be the first Hispanic member of the United States Supreme Court. It’s also allegedly big news that Judge Sotomayor will be the third woman to ever sit on the United States Supreme Court. As for the last two, wouldn’t Martin Luther King be so proud to know that we’re still checking off quota boxes to prove how egalitarian we’ve become? Sounds more like a scrivener on Noah’s Ark: “Two lions. Check. A Hispanic. Check. Third Woman – who’s also Hispanic. Double-check.” We’re eventually going to choke ourselves on the fumes of our societal guilt if we don’t move on to a place where ability matters first.

As for the first observation, Judge Sotomayor is more likely than not a “liberal” in a very general sense. She replaces a Justice that was generally liberal. Very exciting. But perhaps that’s just the grumpy cynic in me.

Regardless of your political leanings, you have to admire anyone that makes it as far as one of the United States Court of Appeals and sits on the cusp of appointment to the United States Supreme Court. I recall the giddy sensation when I was admitted to the bar of the United States Supreme Court. I was elated to know that I had permission to speak in front of that Court. I can’t fathom the notion of being confirmed to sit on that Court. Speaking of which, I won’t be holding my breath waiting for my appointment. I recall a reporter saying a few days ago that Senators’ expressions were inscrutable after receiving a briefing from the FBI on their investigation into Sotomayor’s background. If that had been a briefing on my background, the Senators would have returned from the briefing with that sallow look and vomit stained chin seen only on persons whom have received far too much information and wish they could wash their ears out with soap. Or they’d have high-fived me.

I now direct your attention to the wealth of commentary about Judge Sotomayor’s confirmation process.

Balkinization provides a wealth of information about the confirmation process. But first, Balkinization asks, What are Supreme Court confirmation hearings good for? Balkinization answers that questions by delicately suggesting that the confirmations are a dog and pony show for Senators to pontificate, look important, and speak to their core constituents. (The dog and pony show comment is my editorializing.) Next, Balkinization provides A Brief History of Supreme Court Partiality. It turns out that we’ve been blasting nominees for bias since Chief Justice John Marshall announced his retirement. Balkinization completes our education about the confirmation process by reviewing the famous testimony elicited during the Confirmation Hearings of Master Yoda, Day Two:

Senator Patrick Leahy: Now I wanted to get your views on some constitutional issues. To begin with, what is your opinion of President Bush and Vice-President Cheney and their views of executive power?

Yoda: Always two there are, no more, no less. A master and an apprentice. But which one is the master and which one is the apprentice?

PrawfsBlawg treats the confirmation questioning as an opportunity to discuss how judges can “use” foreign law in the educational, rather than conceptual sense: Misunderstanding Judging: Foreign Law.

Volokh Conspiracy presented a look from the inside of the confirmation circus; Ilya Somin testified at the confirmation hearings and blogged about the experience.

PointofLaw theorizes that Judge Sotomayor’s very controlled testimony may undermine President Obama’s ability to appoint Justices with a more decidedly liberal bend. Additional thoughts can be found in the post entitled Deconstructing Law and Sotomayor’s Testimony.

ScotusBlog runs with the baseball imagery (no cricket for us yanks) in Box Score: Calling “balls and strikes” at Sotomayor’s confirmation hearing. Here’s a preview: “An (incomplete) review of the senators’ written statements and oral testimony finds the phrase ‘balls and strikes’ used 11 times, ‘umpire’ or ‘umpires’ used 16 times, and ‘playing field’ used twice today.”

Likelihood of Success expresses second thoughts about guarded enthusiasm for Sotomayor when asking Was Rosen Really Right?

Carolyn Elefant, at My Shingle, uses the confirmation hearings to discuss an interesting ethics issue. In The Lessons of Sotomayor and Associates, My Shingle discusses the bending of the truth by solo practitioners that append to their firm names “and Associates,” which Sotomayor apparently did some years ago.

I’ll wrap up the Sotomayor-inspired posts by mentioning Concurring Opinions, which also talks (briefly) about The Confirmation Hearings.

 

Around The World And Back Again

Class actions often utilize statistics to determine all sorts of information, from liability to damages. But Carl Gardner explores what happens when you take sacrifice common sense for statistical methods in Truth, bias and blue taxis.

Charon QC reviews and raves about the book BabyBarista and the Art of War. After reading the book, Charon QC says that “whatever he was drinking as he plotted out and wrote BabyBarista and The Art of War... I want some... it certainly does the business.” According to Charon QC, BabyBarista is proof that not all barristers are boring. Geeklawyer’s Blog concurs and revels, “BabyBarista enters the fray with his Machiavellian flailing, undoing all attempts at the rehabilitation of our image. Excellent.”

China Law Blog explains that it’s not as hard as one might thing to do business in China: Enforcing Contracts In China. Way, Way Better Than You Think.

Family Lore describes a nearly inoperative family law court that is Barely Functioning. That phenomenon isn’t unique to family law, or England. For example, courts in Los Angeles are now closed one day a month because of the bankrupt state I live in is so incompetently run that even its massive resources are insufficient to fix freeways and keep courts open.

Defending People lauds Anita Mugeni: Criminal Defense Hero of the Day for her work in Rwanda, where she is one of only 300 lawyers and was responsible for training 80 of them to work as criminal defense lawyers.

Idealawg offers guidance on the art of storytelling in closing arguments.

 

The Law Beyond: What I Don't Practice

I know something about class actions. I know a bit about employment law. I’ve handled a fair number of appeals. And I’ve learned that what I know is a drop in the bucket. Here are some posts from the wide variety of legal subjects that comprise bits and pieces of “the law.”

Ideoblog explains that legislators are thinking of crushing non-public businesses with SOX-like disclosure requirements: SOX for the little guy.

TradingSecrets discusses IBM’s ongoing efforts to restrict post-IBM employment of its former executives: First Apple, Now Dell: IBM Pursues a Departing Executive.

I don’t know what to say about The Arab-Israeli Peace Process as a Real Estate Transaction, but I commend Opinio Juris for writing it.

The photographer of the image used for the Obama “Hope” poster has joined the fracas over the use of the photo. Marquette University Law School Faculty Blog comments about the new player in The Obama “Hope” Poster Case — Mannie Garcia Weighs In.

In HITECH Headaches: HIPAA issues for Business Associates, The Employment News Spot explains that HIPPA penalties now apply to entities providing services to covered entities. Here’s yet another example of a significant law sliding into operation without much fanfare but with much potential to trip up companies unaware of its passage.

Does your insurance company cover you for cyber attacks or denial of service outages? Corporate Insurance Blog discusses this new frontier of insurance.

 

Interesting Miscellany

Eugene Volokh, of the famous Conspiracy, politely let a Feminist Law Professor feel his ire in his post "Where Are The Women? A precious few were published in recent addition of the UCLA Law Review", after she criticized the lack of female authors in a Symposium edition dedicated to the Second Amendment.

Google continues to face challenges by trademark holders over its AdWords practices. Blogger Eric Goldman tries to keep up with the mounting suits but is showing signs of fatigue.

Mad Kane’s Political Madness is pretty angry about Amazon.com’s ability to yank books you’ve purchased off your Kindle. I have to admit, it would be strange to come home and find that your paperback book had been repossessed and replaced with a credit for future purchases.

In Search Of Perfect Client Service challenges the notion that you can’t be dedicated to your profession and enjoy a quality of life outside work in the post: Work Life Balance and the Kobayashi Maru. As an employee of a law firm, I have no comment. None. Simple Justice offers the contrarian view to the work-life balance debate.

Above The Law weighs in on the controversy surrounding a visiting professor at NYU Law School. Dr. Li-ann Thio is credited with some remarks that would not be described as supportive of a non-hetero lifestyle (I’m not interested in having filters block my blog, hence the circumspection). The Volokh Conspiracy weighs in with a discussion that is somewhat more academic in its approach. That’s “academic” as in scholarly, not simple.

 

The Periphery: All That Stuff You Want Or Need To Practice Law Better

Lawyers need to write well. I say that Twitter won’t help to improve your writing. But there are ways to do so: 7 Simple Ways to Improve Everything You Write.

Lawyers, those scoundrels, aren’t considered entirely trustworthy. But lawyers need to be trusted. Learn techniques for making your firm more trustworthy: Four Principles of Organizational Trust: How to Make Your Company Trustworthy. Speaking of trust, Adrian Dayton hosts the July edition of the Carnival of Trust.

I love my iPhone and it loves me. I stroke it and it tells me things. Sui Generis – a New York law blog says Practicing law: There's an iPhone app for that. Not the phone-stroking part... Just wanted to clear that up.

Oh, look, Another new networking site for lawyers, at Robert Ambrogi’s LawSites. The site is HubSTREET. I can barely keep up with the ones I do use, so what makes anyone think that I’m going to add another?

 

Ethics

I grew up in Las Vegas. As a kid, I thought it seemed like a shady place. Legally Unbound agrees, noting that Nevada Needs Strict Judicial Canons, Increased Judicial Evaluations, Not Judicial Appointment By The Governor.

Unsilent partners writes about The legalo-ethics position on assisted suicide. No jokes to see here.

Twitter. Facebook. LinkeIn. Do you spend any time considering the ethical implications of these new marketing tools. Lawyerist.com does, in Legal marketing ethics in a web 2.0 world.

 

That last paragraph mentioned Twitter. That’s makes this as good a time as any to wrap this edition of Blawg Review. After all, Twitter is the alpha and the omega of legal networking. It is the panacea that will solve all problems, build community, develop clients and spread accurate news with greater speed than any conventional media. I’d better upload this post so I can Twitter about it. I not supposed to thank the sherpas, so I won’t.

Blawg Review has information about next week's host, and instructions how to get your blawg posts reviewed in upcoming issues.

In Doe v. MySpace Incorporated the Court of Appeal holds that the Communications Decency Act immunizes MySpace and similar web sites

When you see that "Doe" in the case name, you already know that an opinion is likely to tread where you'd rather it didn't.  In Doe v. MySpace Incorporated (June 30, 2009), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Eight) has the thankless task of deciding whether Myspace Incorporated is liable for sexual assaults by men that the minors met through MySpace.com.  The Court framed the issue in simple terms: "Can an internet Web server such as MySpace Incorporated, be held liable when a minor is sexually assaulted by an adult she met on its Web site?"  Slip op., at 2.  The Court determined that the answer hinged upon application of section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which provides limited immunity for certain content publishers.

The Court described the test for immunity under section 230:

Immunity under section 230 requires proof of three elements: (1) MySpace is an interactive computer services provider, (2) MySpace is not an information content provider with respect to the disputed activity, and (3) appellants seek to hold MySpace liable for information originating with a third party user of its service. (Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 327, 330 (Zeran); Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 804-805.)

Slip op., at 7.  After examing federal authority that consistently found immunity existed in similar circumstances, the Court nevertheless discharged its obligation to examine the issue under California law:

While the Fifth Circuit‟s holding in Doe v. Myspace, Inc. is certainly persuasive, especially as it relates to an interpretation of a federal statute, its holding is not binding upon this court. Neither are the other federal precedents cited above. (Southern Cal. Ch. of Associated Builders etc. Com. v. California Apprenticeship Council (1992) 4 Cal.4th 422, 437; Wagner v. Apex Marine Ship Management Corp. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1451.) However, where the decisions of the federal courts on a federal question are " ' "both numerous and consistent," we should hesitate to reject their authority [citation].' " (Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 58 (Barrett).) Nevertheless, we must look to our own state‟s treatment of section 230 immunity to confirm the above analysis.

Slip op., at 10-11.  The Court's survey of California decisions didn't reveal any basis for departing from the federal cases construing section 230, and the Court concluded that MySpace was immunized by section 230.  Go hug your child.  Teach them what not to do online, even if you don't understand it all that well.  And pay attention to what they are doing on the internet anyhow. 

e-Discovery: California Governor signs AB 5, the delayed e-discovery bill

After several weeks of slim pickings, this week is turning out to have more than enough news.  As a big for-instance, on June 29, 2009, Governor Schwarzenegger signed into law AB 5.  The Governor had previously vetoed a prior version of the bill for reasons probably related to some budgetary brinkmanship.  As before, the new rules track closely with the federal rules and would spell out how and when records from fax machines, computer databases, e-mails and cell phones should be exchanged in litigation. They also set up procedures for settling disputes over data that one party contends are trade secrets or privileged attorney work-product.

Your quarterly Brinker update

When the California Supreme Court grants a Petition for Review, it's okay to leave and go get a cup of coffee.  You have time.  But that doesn't mean that nothing is happening behind the scenes.  In Brinker Restaurant v. Superior Court (Hohnbaum) we have developments.  On May 7, 2009, Real Party in Interest Hohnbaum requested an extension until August 4, 2009 to file the Reply Brief on the merits.  On May 14, 2009 the Supreme Court granted an extension through June 22, 2009, with the additional proviso that no further extensions were contemplated.  However, today the Supreme Court granted a two-week extension to that previously firm deadline.  The Reply Brief on the merits is now due on July 6, 2009.  After that, the amicus bloodbath will ensue (they are due on July 20, 2009).

In Strauss, et al. v. Horton, as State Registrar of Vital Statistics, et al., the California Supreme Court denied original writs of mandate challenging Proposition 8 (constitutionally definining valid "marriage" as being between a man and a woman)

Although it's an issue that isn't customarily within my wheelhouse, the Opinion issued by the California Supreme Court this morning is undoubtedly "complex."  As one barometer of the complexlity, the introductory comments span some twelve pages.  Most opinions get a paragraph or two to set the stage.  But after perusing the Opinion out of general curiosity, I decided that a few remarks (and a few long excerpts) are in order to press against the inevitability of mischaracterizations about what the California Supreme Court actually did and did not do in its opinion.  In other words, the more obscure the legal analysis, the more likely it is that it won't be summarized correctly.

On May 26, 2009, in Strauss, et al. v. Horton, as State Registrar of Vital Statistics, et al., the California Supreme Court denied Petitions for Original Writs of Mandate.  The Petitions challenged the validity of California Proposition 8, which added a new section to article I of the California Constitution.  That new section, section 7.5, reads in full: "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California."  (Slip op., at p. 8.)  The language of section 7.5 is identical to language previously included in Proposition 22, which proposed the adoption in California of a new statutory provision, Family Code section 308.5.   Proposition 22 was approved by voters and later found to be unconstitutional by the California Supreme Court in the consolidated matter entitled In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757.

Today's Opinion in Strauss offers some important clarifications about what the Court could and could not do in the exercise of its constitutional role:

For the third time in recent years, this court is called upon to address a question under California law relating to marriage and same-sex couples.

In Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1055 (Lockyer), we were faced with the question whether public officials of the City and County of San Francisco acted lawfully by issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples in the absence of a judicial determination that the California statutes limiting marriage to a union between a man and a woman were unconstitutional. We concluded in Lockyer that the public officials had acted unlawfully in issuing licenses in the absence of such a judicial determination, but emphasized in our opinion that the substantive question of the constitutional validity of the marriage statutes was not before our court in that proceeding.

In In re Marriage Cases (2008) 43 Cal.4th 757 (hereafter the Marriage Cases), we confronted the substantive constitutional question that had not been addressed in Lockyer — namely, the constitutional validity, under the then-controlling provisions of the California Constitution, of the California marriage statutes limiting marriage to a union between a man and a woman. A majority of this court concluded in the Marriage Cases that same-sex couples, as well as opposite-sex couples, enjoy the protection of the constitutional right to marry embodied in the privacy and due process provisions of the California Constitution, and that by granting access to the designation of "marriage" to opposite-sex couples and denying such access to same-sex couples, the existing California marriage statutes impinged upon the privacy and due process rights of same-sex couples and violated those couples’ right to the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the California Constitution.

Proposition 8, an initiative measure approved by a majority of voters at the November 4, 2008 election, added a new section — section 7.5 —to article I of the California Constitution, providing: "Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California." The measure took effect on November 5, 2008. In the present case, we address the question whether Proposition 8, under the governing provisions of the California Constitution, constitutes a permissible change to the California Constitution, and — if it does — we are faced with the further question of the effect, if any, of Proposition 8 upon the estimated 18,000 marriages of same-sex couples that were performed before that initiative measure was adopted.

In a sense, this trilogy of cases illustrates the variety of limitations that our constitutional system imposes upon each branch of government — the executive, the legislative, and the judicial.

In addressing the issues now presented in the third chapter of this narrative, it is important at the outset to emphasize a number of significant points. First, as explained in the Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th at page 780, our task in the present proceeding is not to determine whether the provision at issue is wise or sound as a matter of policy or whether we, as individuals, believe it should be a part of the California Constitution. Regardless of our views as individuals on this question of policy, we recognize as judges and as a court our responsibility to confine our consideration to a determination of the constitutional validity and legal effect of the measure in question. It bears emphasis in this regard that our role is limited to interpreting and applying the principles and rules embodied in the California Constitution, setting aside our own personal beliefs and values.

Second, it also is necessary to understand that the legal issues before us in this case are entirely distinct from those that were presented in either Lockyer or the Marriage Cases. Unlike the issues that were before us in those cases, the issues facing us here do not concern a public official’s authority (or lack of authority) to refuse to comply with his or her ministerial duty to enforce a statute on the basis of the official’s personal view that the statute is unconstitutional, or the validity (or invalidity) of a statutory provision limiting marriage to a union between a man and a woman under state constitutional provisions that do not expressly permit or prescribe such a limitation. Instead, the principal issue before us concerns the scope of the right of the people, under the provisions of the California Constitution, to change or alter the state Constitution itself through the initiative process so as to incorporate such a limitation as an explicit section of the state Constitution.

In considering this question, it is essential to keep in mind that the provisions of the California Constitution governing the procedures by which that Constitution may be amended are very different from the more familiar provisions of the United States Constitution relating to the means by which the federal Constitution may be amended. The federal Constitution provides that an amendment to that Constitution may be proposed either by two-thirds of both houses of Congress or by a convention called on the application of two-thirds of the state legislatures, and requires, in either instance, that any proposed amendment be ratified by the legislatures of (or by conventions held in) three-fourths of the states. (U.S. Const., art. V.) In contrast, the California Constitution provides that an amendment to that Constitution may be proposed either by two-thirds of the membership of each house of the Legislature (Cal. Const., art. XVIII, § 1) or by an initiative petition signed by voters numbering at least 8 percent of the total votes cast for all candidates for Governor in the last gubernatorial election (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (b); id., art. XVIII, § 3), and further specifies that, once an amendment is proposed by either means, the amendment becomes part of the state Constitution if it is approved by a simple majority of the voters who cast votes on the measure at a statewide election. (Id., art. XVIII, § 4.)

(Slip op., at pp. 1-4, origial emphasis.)  The Court then explained the scope of its holding, which may prove to be somewhat different than what was sought by any of the parties:

In analyzing the constitutional challenges presently before us, we first explain that the provision added to the California Constitution by Proposition 8, when considered in light of the majority opinion in the Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th 757 (which preceded the adoption of Proposition 8), properly must be understood as having a considerably narrower scope and more limited effect than suggested by petitioners in the cases before us. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, Proposition 8 does not entirely repeal or abrogate the aspect of a same-sex couple’s state constitutional right of privacy and due process that was analyzed in the majority opinion in the Marriage Cases — that is, the constitutional right of same-sex couples to "choose one’s life partner and enter with that person into a committed, officially recognized, and protected family relationship that enjoys all of the constitutionally based incidents of marriage" (Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 829). Nor does Proposition 8 fundamentally alter the meaning and substance of state constitutional equal protection principles as articulated in that opinion. Instead, the measure carves out a narrow and limited exception to these state constitutional rights, reserving the official designation of the term "marriage" for the union of opposite-sex couples as a matter of state constitutional law, but leaving undisturbed all of the other extremely significant substantive aspects of a same-sex couple’s state constitutional right to establish an officially recognized and protected family relationship and the guarantee of equal protection of the laws.

By clarifying this essential point, we by no means diminish or minimize the significance that the official designation of "marriage" holds for both the proponents and opponents of Proposition 8; indeed, the importance of the marriage designation was a vital factor in the majority opinion’s ultimate holding in the Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th 757, 845-846, 855. Nonetheless, it is crucial that we accurately identify the actual effect of Proposition 8 on same-sex couples’ state constitutional rights, as those rights existed prior to adoption of the proposition, in order to be able to assess properly the constitutional challenges to the proposition advanced in the present proceeding. We emphasize only that among the various constitutional protections recognized in the Marriage Cases as available to same-sex couples, it is only the designation of marriage — albeit significant — that has been removed by this initiative measure.

Taking into consideration the actual limited effect of Proposition 8 upon the preexisting state constitutional right of privacy and due process and upon the guarantee of equal protection of the laws, and after comparing this initiative measure to the many other constitutional changes that have been reviewed and evaluated in numerous prior decisions of this court, we conclude Proposition 8 constitutes a constitutional amendment rather than a constitutional revision. As a quantitative matter, petitioners concede that Proposition 8 — which adds but a single, simple section to the Constitution — does not constitute a revision. As a qualitative matter, the act of limiting access to the designation of marriage to opposite-sex couples does not have a substantial or, indeed, even a minimal effect on the governmental plan or framework of California that existed prior to the amendment. Contrary to petitioners’ claim in this regard, the measure does not transform or undermine the judicial function; this court will continue to exercise its traditional responsibility to faithfully enforce all of the provisions of the California Constitution, which now include the new section added through the voters’ approval of Proposition 8. Furthermore, the judiciary’s authority in applying the state Constitution always has been limited by the content of the provisions set forth in our Constitution, and that limitation remains unchanged.

(Slip op., at pp. 6-8.)  Although it is small consolation to the proponents of gay marriage, my reading of this Opinion is that the California Supreme Court construes the Constitutional amendment effectuated by Proposition 8 as having reserved the word "marriage" for state-recognized unions between men and women, while preserving the Marriage Cases holding that gay couples are entitled to "choose one’s life partner and enter with that person into a committed, officially recognized, and protected family relationship that enjoys all of the constitutionally based incidents of marriage."  (Marriage Cases, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 829).  They just can't call it a marriage.  In other words, everybody is going to be unhappy with this decision.

While there is likely to be much commentary about what should happen in our society after this Opinion, I think that, in a difficult circumstance, the California Supreme Court correctly discharged its limited role in our government.  The Court doesn't deserve to be pilloried here, and I hope that it is not.