In the "Pitts" of despair, a "Terrible" attempt to pick off a class representative fails
I remember when what was probably the first Terrible Herbst gas station opened a mere block from my home in Las Vegas. Refilled a lot of bike tires there. But enough about my childhood. Terrible Herbst isn't the friendly local gas station of my youth. Now it's just another corporate slave to the whisperings of defense counsel skilled in the dark arts. In Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc. (August 9, 2011), the Ninth Circuit considered whether a rejected offer of judgment for the full amount of a putative class representative's individual claim moots a class action complaint where the offer precedes the filing of a motion for class certification. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it did not.
Pitts filed a hybrid FLSA and Nevada labor law class action. The defendant removed it to federal court. With a discovery motion pending, Terrible made a Rule 68 offer of judgment in the amount of $900. Pitts claimed $88.00 in damages but rejected the offer. Terrible then sought to have the matter dismissed. The Ninth Circuit rejected this attempt to impede consideration of the class certification question:
An inherently transitory claim will certainly repeat as to the class, either because “[t]he individual could nonetheless suffer repeated [harm]” or because “it is certain that other persons similarly situated” will have the same complaint. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 110 n.11. In such cases, the named plaintiff’s claim is “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” id., and “the ‘relation back’ doctrine is properly invoked to preserve the merits of the case for judicial resolution,” McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 52; see also Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 398; Sosna, 419 U.S. at 402 n.11.
Slip op., at 10453. The Court then discussed the argument that the claims in this matter were not "inherrently" transitory:
We recognize that the canonical relation-back case—such as Gerstein or McLaughlin—involves an “inherently transitory” claim and, correspondingly, “a constantly changing putative class.” Wade v. Kirkland, 118 F.3d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1997). But we see no reason to restrict application of the relation-back doctrine only to cases involving inherently transitory claims. Where, as here, a defendant seeks to “buy off” the small individual claims of the named plaintiffs, the analogous claims of the class—though not inherently transitory—become no less transitory than inherently transitory claims. Thus, although Pitts’s claims “are not ‘inherently transitory’ as a result of being time sensitive, they are ‘acutely susceptible to mootness’ in light of [the defendant’s] tactic of ‘picking off’ lead plaintiffs with a Rule 68 offer to avoid a class action.”
Slip op., at 10454. Interestingly, the Court essentially found that the right to certify a class was an additional right not satisfied by the Rule 68 offer, and that right could not be extinguished unless certification were denied and all appellate efforts were exhausted.
Next, the Court ruled that it was error to find that Pitts failed to timely file a motion for class certification when the trial court refused to rule on a pending discovery motion to obtain evidence necessary for certification.
Other issues raised in the appeal were not addressed by the Court once it concluded that the trial court erred in its ruling regarding the timing of certification.