Does Anderson v. Nextel presage assault on percentage-of-fund fee awards?

United States District Court Judge Stephen V. Wilson refused to award a percentage-of-fund fee award, choosing, instead, to apply a lodestar approach with no multiplier and refused to award an incentive payment to the plaintiffs, as part of an Order granting in part and denying in part a final award of attorneys' fees, costs and incentive payments.  Anderson, et al. v. Nextel Retail Stores LLC (June 30, 2010).

The opinion includes an incredibly thorough analysis of hourly rates and fee billing entries (it is helpful reading in that regard), among other things, as part of the Court's decision to examine the lodestar and then cross-check against the requested 25% of the available fund in the wage & hour class action settlement.  After determining that the lodestar would need to multiplied by all of 1.64 to arrive at the percentage-of-fund request at the 25% level, the Court offers this surprising analysis:

In the present case, the Court is unable to conclude that counsel is entitled to a multiplier over the lodestar amount. The lodestar amounts provide perfectly adequate compensation, see generally Perdue, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 1674-75, and none of the relevant considerations justify an upward increase in the amount of compensation. For example, the considerations raised in Vizcaino – the complexity of the case, the duration of the litigation, the risk of nonpayment – are inapplicable. This case was little more than a run-of-the-mill wage-and-hour dispute.

Slip op., at 17.  I find this statement astounding.  No wage & hour class action is "run-of-the-mill" in federal court.  A survey of outcomes in the last few years would, I submit, confirm that.

If a trend favoring lodestar awards over percentage of the fund awards develops, plaintiffs' firms will face an asymmetrical result when compared to firms paid on an hourly basis.  The contingent award (the percentage of the fund in class actions) offsets to some degree the fact that a good percentage of cases generate no recovery to speak of.  This mitigation of risk allows plaintiffs with no resources to challenge unlawful practices causing comparatively smaller amounts of harm on a per capita basis.  An increase in lodestar awards won't cause children to starve, but it will likely result in decisions to decline difficult cases and induce some unscrupulous members of the bar to inflate billing entries.  Courts will then view all fee bills with even more skepticism, further punishing the ethical billers in the plaintiffs' bar.

"See, with those plaintiffs' lawyers, it's all about the fees."  Come closer so I can do that Moe thing to your eyes.  "Why I oughta..."  You don't like working for free any more than I do or anyone else does.  If I won the lottery, I'd be willing to work for a trifling.  Then it would be just about the ability to help others and the intellectual reward.  But I digress.  Taking percentage of the fund awards off the table means that a good portion of the work done by plaintiffs' attorneys in class actions will be done for free.  I hear that at some defense firms, partners don't get paid their shares unless they collect their clients' accounts receivable.  Who's all about the fees again?

In another fairly uncommon move, the Court declined to award any incentive payment to the plaintiffs that obtained the recovery for the class.  So much for rewarding the plaintiffs that accept the stigma associated with suing their employer.

You can view the embedded opinion in the acrobat.com flash viewer below:

If the viewer isn't working for you (say, if you are viewing this on an iPad or iPhone), you can download the opinion here.  Thanks to the (other) reader that alerted me to this decision.