BREAKING NEWS: Petition for Review granted in Brinker Restaurant v. Superior Court (Hohmbaum)

Greatsealcal100The Supreme Court has just GRANTED the Petition for Review in Brinker Restaurant Corporation, et al. v. Superior Court (Hohnbaum).  View the Supreme Court docket here.  Aside from Justice Werdegar, who was absent and did not participate, all other justices voted in favor of the Petition.  As I obliquely suggested in this post, so much for Brinker Restaurant Corporation's prediction that this matter would quietly return to the Superior Court after turning wage & hour class action precedent on its head.

UPDATE:  This post has been marked as "featured" so as to appear first on the home page of this blog while interest in this news remains high.

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Interesting brief excerpt persuasively argues that "independent contractors" are equally entitled to indemnity under Labor Code section 2802

I've been off my game with respect to blogging, but an interesting item that just crossed my electronic desk prodded me to start back in on the pile of items and partially completed posts that I need to finish. A regular reader supplied me with a trial court brief that advances a fascinating proposition:  "independent contractors" are entitled to indemnification (read: reimbursement of necessary expenses) under Labor Code section 2802 because the definition of "employee" that applies to Labor Code section 2802 encompasses what would be "independent contractors."  If accepted by courts, that contention would have significant consequences for the many businesses that attempt to avoid all costs of employment by designing systems that classify groups of workers as "independent contractors" or "franchisees."  Because the analysis is so thorough and so thought-provoking, I include it here (divided so that only a part appears on the front page due to length), with minimal editing:

[BEGINNING OF EXCERPT]

“‘California has a strong public policy that favors the indemnification . . . of employees by their employers for claims and liabilities resulting from the employees’ acts within the course and scope of their employment.’ [Citation.] Labor Code section 2802 codifies this policy . . . .” Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal.4th 937, 81 Cal.Rptr.3d 282, 293, 189 P.3d 285, 295 (2008). Section 2802(a) requires that “[a]n employer shall indemnify his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties . . . . (Emphasis added.) The “obvious purpose” of section 2802 is “to protect employees from suffering expenses in direct consequence of doing their jobs.” Grissom v. Vons Companies, Inc., 1 Cal.App.4th 52, 59-60, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 808 (1990). Section 2802 “shows a legislative intent that duty-related losses ultimately fall on the business enterprise, not on the individual employee.” Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics, 46 Cal.App.4th 55, 74, fn. 24, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 741 (1996). Section 2802 is unwaivable. Cal. Lab. Code § 2804 (“Any contract or agreement, express or implied, made by any employee to waive the benefits of this article or any part thereof, is null and void . . . .”) And “[a]rbitration awards have been reviewed to determine whether the arbitrators complied with statutes conferring unwaivable rights. [Citations.]” Cable Connection, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 1362.

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California Supreme Court construes validity of employees' release agreements

Greatsealcal100Last Thursday, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, LLP (August 7, 2008) __ Cal.4th __.  That decision addressed two questions, but the one of interest is the second of the two issues, which asks, "[I]s a contract provision requiring an employee to release “any and all” claims unlawful because it encompasses nonwaivable statutory protections, such as the employee indemnity protection of Labor Code section 2802?"  (Slip op., at p. 1.)  The answer, according to the Supreme Court, is no, but only because "any and all" is ambiguous, requiring resort to statutory presumptions that legal contructions are to be preferred over illegal constructions:  "[A] contract provision releasing 'any and all' claims does not encompass nonwaivable statutory protections, such as the employee indemnity protection of Labor Code section 2802 and, accordingly, is not void under Labor Code section 2804." (Slip op., at pp. 18-19, 21.)  The reaction to that holding is what interests me for purposes of this post.

While I routinely examine new appellate decisions, I first learned about Edwards through a post at WageLaw.  What caught my eye in the post was the statement that, as Justice Kennard mentioned in her dissent, the case may be misunderstood, to the detriment of employees.  Thus, I had to read the opinion for myself to see whether I agreed that negative consequences are likely.  Having read and considered the opinion, and although I habitually agree with WageLaw's analysis, I don't believe that this case presents the risk articulated by Justice Kennard and WageLaw.

The Supreme Court was faced with two possible outcomes to the question of how to construe a release of "any and all" claims, when the language could potentially waive claims that are statutorily nonwaivable.  The first option was to declare such a release entirely void.  The second option was to construe the release as encompassing only those claims that can be lawfully released.  The Supreme Court selected the second option.

Justice Kennard (with Justice Werdegar concurring) argues that the release may have been devised to trick employees into not bringing indemnity claims, even though such a release was void:

As the Court of Appeal observed, Andersen’s actions suggest a possible purpose of misleading employees into thinking they had waived rights that could not be waived, thereby minimizing the number of indemnity claims these employees might bring against Andersen.

(Slip dissent, at p. 5.)  While Andersen's actions may have been intentional, I don't see why the intent is a significant factor in analyzing whether employees will be deceived.  An innocently vague release of "any and all" claims may also cause an employee to relinquish a statutorily protected claim out of the mistaken belief that it had been released.  In fact, had the Supreme Court declared such releases completely void, the use of such a release could still trick employees into believing that they had released claims when they had not.  Ultimately, an employee needs to seek legal counsel if they have any question about the extent of their rights with respect to releases, or any other employment issue.  The value of the Edwards decision is that a definitive ruling has found that general release language cannot be construed as any sort of release or waiver of statutorily protected claims or rights.  The concerns about its negative consequences are, I think, overstated.

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The Pioneer ripples continue to expand in Lee, et al. v. Dynamex, Inc., et al.

Greatsealcal100Back on August 14th, I commented on yet another decision giving a further boost to the Supreme Court's decision in Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (Olmstead), 40 Cal.4th 360 (2007), in which the California Supreme Court confirmed the right of plaintiffs to discover the identity and contact information of putative class members.  Discussing Alch v. Superior Court (August 14, 2008) in this post, I commented that it furthered the trend of Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court, 149 Cal.App.4th 554 (2007) and Puerto v. Superior Court, 158 Cal.App.4th 1242 (2008).  It turns out that appellate courts aren't done reminding parties about the fundamental right to engage in discovery in class actions.

On August September 17, 2008, the Second Appellate District (Division Seven) added to the discussion regarding the substantial right to basic discovery of information about putative class members.  In Lee, et al. v. Dynamex, Inc., et al., the Court of Appeal tied all of the threads emanating from Pioneer together and concluded that the failure to permit discovery about class member identity was grounds for reversing the trial court's order denying class certification:

After first denying Lee’s motion to compel Dynamex to identify and provide contact information for potential putative class members, the trial court denied Lee’s motion for class certification. Because the trial court’s discovery ruling directly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 40 Cal.4th 360 (Pioneer), as well as our decisions in Belaire-West Landscape, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 554 and Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242 (Puerto), and that ruling improperly interfered with Lee’s ability to establish the necessary elements for class certification, we reverse both orders and remand for further proceedings regarding class certification.

(Slip op., at p. 2.)  In light of Dynamex, defendants must carefully weigh whether to offer any opposition to plaintiffs seeking discovery of the identity and contact information for class members.  A successful opposition to such discovery may lead to a second chance at certification if the trial court denies certification.  In order to control costs and avoid such a result, we may see defendants electing to stipulate to an order to produce such discovery (as the expedient means of satisfying the defendant's obligation to maintain some degree of control over class member contact information).  As an aside, Dynamex had the misfortune of drawing the last panel they would have wanted to review this appeal.  I'd guess that Appellate Justices don't take kindly to trial court decisions that essentially ignore that panel's prior, controlling decisions on the issues confronting the trial court.

The opinion also includes an educational discussion about the "ascertainability" requisite for certification.  In short, the Court of Appeal again reminds us that all class members need not be identified or identifiable at the certification stage.

I'm still trying to catch up after two weeks of depositions out of state.  This has been a busy week for class-related decisions (and the week's not over yet); I'm working through the decisions and other news as fast as I can get to them.

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Petition for Review filed in Brinker

Although it shouldn't come as a surprise, a Petition for Review in Brinker Restaurant Corporation, et al. v. Hohnbaum, et al (July 22, 2008) was filed with the Supreme Court on August 29, 2008.  The Supreme Court docket is available for viewing here.

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Evidence surfaces that some class action lawyers don't actually file bad cases

According to anecdotal accounts collected by a reporter for the Houston Chronicle, at least some class action attorneys practicing in the area of wage & hour law have reportedly turned away problematic clients or those with non-viable claims.  (L.M. Sixel, Employment lawyers know no-go cases when they see them (August 27, 2008) www.chron.com.)  I know that this may be viewed as a shocking (and unsubstantiated) development, but my experience is that this actually happens.  Perhaps I'm just filled with a bit too much sarcasm tonight, or maybe I was possessed of some peculiar wave of partisanship in advance of attending CAALA's annual convention.  In any case, I hope to do a bit of "live blogging" from CAALA if I can find some useful sessions, so check back on Friday in particular to see if anything interesting is going on here.

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State Bar offers Teleseminar on Brinker

In its ongoing effort to reduce any chance for physical activity associated with the practice of law, the State Bar's Labor & Employment Law Section is offering a Teleseminar on everyone's favorite wage & hour decision, Brinker Restaurant Corporation v. Superior Court.  The seminar, entitled Brinker: the End of California Meal and Rest Break Litigation -- or Only the Beginning?, will include speakers William Sailer and Miles Locker, who argued Brinker as amicus for the respective sides.

You need to act quickly to participate.  The particulars can be found at the link above, but the basics are as follows:

  • Friday, August 15, 2008
  • 12:00 p.m. - 1:00 p.m.
  • 1 Hour Total Participatory MCLE Credits
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Wage & hour class actions won't be ending any time soon

"[T]he dirty little secret among employers and HR departments is that classifying employees as exempt—even if it means breaking the law—is in their best interest provided, of course, that they don't get caught."  It's an observation that goes unsaid most of the time, but a recent article on cio.com airs that dirty laundry just a bit.  (Meredith Levinson, Fair Labor Standards Act: Six Things Tech Workers Need to Know (August 11, 2008) www.cio.com.)

The article quotes Jahan Sagafi, a partner with Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, who explains the strong incentive for employers to misclassify workers.  Observing that (1) governmental enforcement entities have little ability to heavily enforce wage & hour laws, and (2) employers can profit by breaking the law, even when caught, Sagafi concludes that wage & hour violations are inevitable.  The profit incentive is worth a few addition comments.

One counter-argument to the profit incentive is that employers will lose any profit in litigation costs and wage payments.  There are several reasons why this couter-argument does not supply a sound basis for discounting the strong incentive on employers to cross the line in wage & hour practices.

First, small employers and very large employers have different incentive sets that may very well result in the same behavior, a fact that we can at least anecdotally observe.  Large employers can essentially cheat with enough employees that, even if ultimately caught and sued, the settlement of the suit, combined with the costs of litigation, can still be much lower that the unpaid wages at the 100% level.  In this instance, cheating on wage & hour compliance is actually a rational course of conduct; it is a profit center as compard to conservative, fully legal conduct.

Small employers, on the other hand, could face a scenario where the costs of litigation eradicate any savings from wage & hour compliance cheating.  Nevertheless, a rationally acting small employer would be aware that enforcement occurs far less than 100% of the time.  Thus, the expected value of wage & hour cheating remains positive unless, in varying degrees, the following is true: (1) the chance of getting caught approaches 100%, (2) the payment in litigation approaches the full amount of unpaid wages owed, and (3) the cost of litigation plus the compromised amount of unpaid wages is higher than the full amount of wages owed.

Small employers face an addtional incentive to cheat that is often attenuated in large employers - the greater difficulty in maintaining operating capital.  Thus, small employers may avoid full wage & hour compliance partly out of necessity.  Growing organizations often operate on the edge of the financial cliff.  A misclassified group of employees could be difference success and failure.  To be clear, I don't defend wage & hour violations as a means of sustaining an employer in tough times.  Rather, I think that there is a troubling lack of honesty about the fact that, so long as it is profitable, employers will not fully comply with wage & hour laws.

The next time you hear that plaintiffs' lawyers are to blame for wage & hour class actions, consider the possibility that employers ought to shoulder a significant portion of the blame.

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Daily Journal includes column on weak economic analysis supplied in Brinker

Yesterday's Daily Journal (Wednesday, August 6, 2008) includes my article entitled "A Bad Meal Deal: ‘Brinker’ Gets the Incentive Question Wrong," in the Forum column.  Once again, thank you, Daily Journal.  Online access is by subscription only, so no link to the article is provided here.  The article focuses on the incomplete discussion of economic incentives that are used as a basis for justifying the outcome in Brinker.

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Legal Pad reports on California Labor Federation letter to Labor Commissioner

In a post entitled Bradstreet Riles Labor Unions.  High Court Ahead?, Legal Pad, a legal news blog, reported on the strong reaction from labor unions to Bradstreet's memo declaring Brinker to be "binding precedent."  The Complex Litigator's scoop on the response to Bradstreet's memo was featured prominently in Legal Pad's reporting.

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