Breaking News: Court of Appeal orders publication of previously unpublished decision in Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc. et al.

On January 12, 2010, the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division One) issued an informative but unpublished opinion in Jaimez v. DAIOHS USA, Inc., et al.  A number of requests to publish that opinion which addresses several novel aspects of wage & hour claims and class certification.  David Arbogast (Arbogast & Berns, LLP) and I authored a request for publication on behalf of CAOC and CELA.  It now appears from the docket that an Order granting publication has been filed.  I would assume that the published opinion will appear on the California Courts website in the next day or so.

I will post some discussion of the case this evening.

Class-related: Court of Appeal affirms wage law policies, power of trial court to direct order of proof

I briefly direct your attention to Pellegrino v. Robert Half International, Inc., in which the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three) affirmed a trial court judgment that invalidated a contractual agreement purporting to shorten statutes of limitation for wage & hour claims and decided an equitable defense of "administrative exemption" before the jury phase of the trial.

From Bridgeport's 6th Annual Wage & Hour Litigation Conference: Future attacks on Gentry v. Superior Court

 

I'm attending Bridgeport's 6th Annual Wage & Hour Litigation Conference. Today, one topic of discussion is the subject of class arbitrations after Gentry. According to Steven Katz, partner at Reed Smith LLP, Gentry is one of the California Supreme Court's most erroneously-reasoned decisions in quite some time. That's not the interesting part (it's the funny part). The interesting commentary comes from how the defense bar hopes to limit Gentry.

Mr. Katz starts from the premise that Gentry. does not state a bright-line rule precluding class action waivers in all wage & hour class actions. The defense bar hopes to elicit further review of Gentry by challenging trial and appellate orders that impose a bright-line rule when invalidating arbitration agreements with such waivers. The protective measure that plaintiffs should take is to draft proposed orders that identify the four-factor test from Gentry as having been satisfied.

The second major challenge to Gentry that is being tested at the appellate level is a species of "field" preemption. The defense contention is that Gentry allows for a type of contract impairment that isn't directed at arbitration agreements directly, but nevertheless affects only those types of agreements. This argument disregards the fact that the principles in Gentry are subject-neutral. It is merely the nature of the effect of these agreements that renders them invalid. The factors in Gentry don't seek out just arbitration agreements with class action waivers. Despite that weakness in the defense-side argument, plaintiffs should handle these arguments with great care. This species of "field" premption is very complex, and the attorneys bringing these arguments often have an advantage in the form of repeated experience with them. Don't take a novel preemption argument lightly.

Bates v. Rubio's Restaurants, Inc. reminds defendants to be sure the class list is complete before the money starts flowing

While most of this opinion has nothing to do with class actions and everything to do with whether a judge can sua sponte reconsider a prior order and then recuse himself in the same minute order, Bates v. Rubio's Restaurant's Inc. (November 30, 2009) includes an important lesson for the administration of class action.  The Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three) affirmed an interesting order of the trial court that had a significant effect on the constituency of a class in a settlement.  The concise summary of key events sets the stage for the discussion that follows in the opinion:

The parties in this wage and hour class action litigation entered into a $7.5 million settlement agreement, providing for three payments of $2.5 million to approved class members. After the initial $2.5 million payment was distributed among 529 approved class members, defendant and appellant Rubio‟s Restaurants, Inc. (Rubio‟s) realized it had not provided the names of all potential class members to the settlement administrator. One hundred forty potential class members had not received notification of the settlement.

After postjudgment briefing and status conferences, the court ruled that the 140 late-identified class members should receive notice and be folded into the settlement agreement. Later, the judge reconsidered his ruling sua sponte and vacated it. In the same minute order, the judge, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(i), then recused himself from any further proceedings in the matter, in the interests of justice.

Slip op., at 2.  Rubio's argued that the recusal negated the validity of the portion of the order vacating the prior ruling.  The Court of Appeal said that was nonsense, concluding that the trial court could properly rescing its earlier ruling and later, in the same minute order, recuse itself.

The only reason for all the fuss was the fact that 140 class members can file another class action and state with great certainty that they didn't receive notice of the prior settlement.  There's your class action angle.

California Supreme Court activity for the week of October 26, 2009

The California Supreme Court held its (usually) weekly conference on October 28, 2009.  Notable results include:

  • A Petition for Review was denied in Messenger Courier Association of the Americas, et al. v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.  See this blog's prior post on this matter here.
  • A Petition for Review was denied in Ali v. U.S.A. Cab.  The interesting texture to this denial is that (1) I argued the appeal so I didn't cover this decision on this blog, and (2) aspects of Ali's construction of the Borello opinion are contrary to language in Messenger Courier, but both originate in the Fourth Appellate District, Division One.
  • A Depublication Request was denied in Clark v. American Residential Services LLC, et al.  See this blog's prior post on this matter here.

 

Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. holds that forfeiture of restricted stock shares during restriction period does not run afoul of Labor Code section 201, 201 and 219

Nothing all that exciting here, but in Schacter v. Citigroup, Inc. (November 2, 2009), the California Supreme Court examined a voluntary employee incentive compensation plan that provided employees with shares of restricted company stock at a reduced price in lieu of a portion of the employee's annual cash compensation.  Under the program, if an employee resigns or is terminated for cause before their restricted shares of stock vest, the employee would forfeit the stock and the portion of cash compensation they directed be paid in the form of the restricted stock.  The Supreme Court considered whether the "incentive plan's forfeiture provision violates Labor Code sections 201, 202, and 219, which provide that employees be paid all earned, unpaid wages upon termination or resignation and prohibit agreements that purport to circumvent that requirement."  Slip op., at 1.

The plan worked as follows:

Under the Plan, eligible employees could elect to receive awards of restricted company stock “in lieu of cash payment of a percentage of the employee‟s annual compensation.” Participating employees could elect to receive 5, 10, 15, 20, or 25 percent of their “total compensation in the form of restricted stock.” To participate in the Plan for the following calendar year, an employee had to execute a “Capital Accumulation Plan Election to Receive Restricted Stock” form at the end of the current calendar year indicating the amount of “total compensation in the form of restricted stock” he or she wished to receive. The percentage of “total compensation” received as restricted stock could be different for the first and second six-month periods of the year. 

Restricted stock could not be sold, transferred, pledged, or assigned for a two-year period commencing on the date of the award; however, the Plan provided that participating employees “shall have the right to direct the vote” and “receive any regular dividends on restricted stock shares” during the restricted period.

For purposes of determining the number of shares to be acquired under the Plan, the purchase price of the stock was discounted at a rate of 25 percent of its then-current market price, averaged over the five days preceding the date of the acquisition, to “reflect the impact of the restrictions on the value of the restricted stock, as well as the possibility of forfeiture of restricted stock.” On the date of the purchase, the company either issued stock certificates to a participating employee, to be held by the company until the restricted period lapsed, or made a “book entry” in the company's records evidencing the award. Although a participating employee could elect to pay taxes on the restricted stock when the stock was purchased (see 26 U.S.C. § 83), “the participating employees' restricted shares [were] not included in the participating employees' gross income for federal tax purposes until the two-year vesting period had expired.”

If an employee remained in the company's employ for the two years following the purchase of restricted stock, title to the shares vested fully with the employee, free of any restrictions. However, if an employee voluntarily terminated employment or was terminated for cause before the end of the two-year period, the employee forfeited his or her restricted stock as well as the percentage of annual income designated by the employee to be paid as shares of restricted stock. In contrast, if an employee was involuntarily terminated without cause, the employee forfeited his or her restricted stock, but received in return, without interest, “a cash payment equal to the portion of his or her annual compensation that had been paid in the form of such forfeited [r]estricted [s]tock.”

Slip op., at 2-3.  The facts surrounding this particular plan's terms made the Court's decision a relatively easy one (or at least a unanimous one):

Schachter voluntarily terminated his employment before his restricted stock fully vested. By the terms of the Plan, and Schachter's own concession, he is not entitled to those unvested shares of restricted stock. Having elected to receive some of his compensation in the form of restricted stock, a transaction he was aware carried risk as well as the potential for reward, Schachter cannot now assert that he should have been paid in cash that portion of his compensation he elected to receive as restricted stock. As the company persuasively argues, Schachter's “bargained-for 'wages' have been paid in full. He received all of his promised cash compensation, received immediately exercisable voting and dividend rights in the restricted stock, and was awarded contingent rights of full ownership in that stock. The only thing that has not been 'paid' is something Schachter never 'earned' — fully vested [company] stock. Schachter therefore has no claim under [section] 201 or [section] 202.”

Slip op., at 13.

I hope we don't see a rash of employers trying to concoct illusory bonus plans or divert vested wages from employees as a result of this plan.  But given some of the crazy attempts that I have seen some employers do to accomplish such purposes, I don't hold out much hope that Schachter won't be misused somewhere by some employer or other.

Consumer Attorneys of San Diego offers its Second Annual Class Action Symposium on October 23-24

The educational opportunities for class action practitioners in California improved greatly in recent years (oddly coincident with significant increase in the number of attorneys trying their hand at class action litigation).  One of those great new opportunities for class action CLE occurs this Friday and Saturday in San Diego's gaslamp quarter.  Consumer Attorneys of San Diego will present its 2nd Annual Class Action Symposium.  The speakers include judges, mediators, and practitioners from both sides of the "v."

The blogosphere will be well represented by speaker Kim Kralowec, The UCL Practitioner and a Partner at Schubert Jonckheer Kolbe & Kralowec LLP.  And speaking of The UCL Practitioner, her blog now notes that you can register for one day of the two day symposium.  If obligations on Friday prevent you from attending, consider attending on Saturday.  You can also save money by registering more than one attendee from the same firm.

If nothing else, send the youngest attorneys in your firm so they can learn first hand from the people that do it right.  Because of the special nature of representative litigation, we have an obligation to maintain the highest possible practice standards.

In theory, Brinker Restaurant Corporation, et al. v. Superior Court (Hohnbaum) is fully briefed

The Brinker docket shows that all parties have filed their answers to the many amicus briefs.  In theory, this means that briefing is done.  But don't doubt the ability of attorneys to come up with a (good) reason for some supplemental brief or other.  See you next year for more on Brinker.

Brinker Restaurant Corporation, et al. v. Superior Court (Hohnbaum) is even closer to being fully briefed

Real Party in Interest, Adam Hohnbaum, has filed his consolidated answer to amicus curiae briefs.  The docket only shows the filing by Real Party in Interest, but, presumably, the Petitioner's consolidated answer has also been filed.  Depending upon where and how the brief is filed, it can take a day or two for the Court to indicate the filing on the docket.  This is very exciting news.  Now Brinker descends into the cone of silence until oral argument is set.  Seeing no basis for adjustment at this time, The Complex Litigator's Brinker projected Opinion Release Date remains at August 2010.

Brinker gets a little bit closer to the finish line

So Brinker Restaurant v. Superior Court (Hohnbaum) moves a bit closer to the light at the end of the tunnel.  After extensions were granted, the Petitioner and the Real Parties in Interest will both file their consolidated answers to amicus briefs on October 8, 2009.  But that's no small task; by my quick count, there are 22 amicus briefs filed in Brinker (view the docket).  That's twenty-two, give or take, in case you thought I double-clutched on the keyboard.  I'd say good cause exists for an extension to file consolidated answers.  Now, without having seen the amicus briefs, what do think the odds are that most of those amicus briefs (1) do nothing but repeat arguments that were in the 100+ page briefs by the parties, and/or (2) repeat other amicus briefs?  My bet is that about 90% of the amicus briefing from both sides could be run through a shredder with no loss of any argument.

Turning back to the timetable for resolution, imagine that you are a research attorney at the Supreme Court.  Imagine you have cases to review aside from Brinker.  Imagine you receive a couple of briefs in the 125-page range and around 22 amicus briefs.  Imagine they fall on you and crush your spine.  How long do you think it would take you to work up a draft opinion with a Justice?  Factor in the holidays, and I now think that my estimate of oral argument in March 2010 is a very optimistic.  I'm officially adjusting The Complex Litigator's Brinker Opinion Release Date from June 2010 to August 2010.  I should work up a graphic for this, like "Stormwatch Winter 2009" or "Firestorm!"  It will need shading and some sort of 3-D effect.