a California-centric collection of comments and resources about complex litigation and class action practice
Episode 5 is now available for streaming, direct download, and, shortly, through iTunes and the XBox music store. Thanks to Keith Jacoby of Littler and Josh Konecky of Schneider Wallace for contributing as guests. My apologies for the bit of echo in this episode, but it was beyond my control.
In Urbino v. Orkin Servs. of California, Inc. (9th Cir. Aug. 13, 2013), the Ninth Circuit took up the question of whether PAGA claims aggregate for purposes of CAFA's damage prerequisite. Plaintiff, a California citizen, worked in a nonexempt, hourly paid position for defendants, each of whom is a corporate citizen of another state, in California. Alleging that defendants illegally deprived him and other nonexempt employees of meal periods, overtime and vacation wages, and accurate itemized wage statements, plaintiff filed a representative PAGA action. Defendants removed. Plaintiff moved to remand. The district court was obligated to decide whether the potential penalties could be combined or aggregated to satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. If they could, federal diversity jurisdiction would lie because statutory penalties for initial violations of California’s Labor Code would total $405,500 and penalties for subsequent violations would aggregate to $9,004,050. If not, the $75,000 threshold would not be met because penalties arising from plaintiff’s claims would be limited to $11,602.40. Acknowledging a split of opinion, the district court found PAGA claims to be common and undivided and therefore capable of aggregation.
The Court examined the "common and undivided interest" exception to the rule that multiple plaintiffs cannot aggregate claims. Observing that common questions do not create that common and undivided interest, the Court said:
But simply because claims may have “questions of fact and law common to the group” does not mean they have a common and undivided interest. Potrero Hill Cmty. Action Comm. v. Hous. Auth., 410 F.2d 974, 977 (9th Cir. 1969). Only where the claims can strictly “be asserted by pluralistic entities as such,” id., or, stated differently, the defendant “owes an obligation to the group of plaintiffs as a group and not to the individuals severally,” will a common and undivided interest exist, Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 944 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Slip op., at 8.
The defendants then argued that the interest asserted by plaintiff was not his, but was actually the state's interest. The Court's majority did not find that argument compelling:
To the extent Plaintiff can—and does—assert anything but his individual interest, however, we are unpersuaded that such a suit, the primary benefit of which will inure to the state, satisfies the requirements of federal diversity jurisdiction. The state, as the real party in interest, is not a “citizen” for diversity purposes. See Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 461 (1980) (courts “must disregard nominal or formal parties and rest jurisdiction only upon the citizenship of real parties to the controversy.”); Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Hickman, 183 U.S. 53, 59 (1901); see also Moor v. Cnty. of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973) (explaining that “a State is not a ‘citizen’ for purposes of the diversity jurisdiction”).
Slip op., at 9. By the way, this cleverly avoids deciding an unnecessary issue that is of some consequence in the world of arbitration. It does, however, suggest a point upon which the California Supreme Court will likely have to express an opinion when it decides whether PAGA claims are excused from arbitration clause enforcement or, alternatively, from arbitration clauses that preclude “class” claims.
The dissent, like the majority opinion, is also relatively short, but it is also well argued.
Thanks to the tipster for directing me to the decision (since I don't know whether you want to be identified, you remain anonymous).
NOTE: This is an updated version of an earlier post on this case. The older post has been removed.
In Rodriguez v. AT&T Mobility Services LLC (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 2013), the plaintiff brought a putative class action against AT&T Mobility Services, LLC, on behalf of himself and all other similarly situated retail sales managers of AT&T wireless stores in Los Angeles and Ventura counties. The plaintiff asserted various claims related to alleged unpaid wages, overtime compensation, and damages for statutory violations, filing in Los Angeles County Superior Court in a doomed effort to escape federal court. AT&T removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). Plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that defendant could not establish subject-matter jurisdiction because the total amount in controversy did not exceed $5 million. Plaintiff cited his First Amended Complaint, in which he alleged as much, that “the aggregate amount in controversy is less than five million dollars.” To bolster his position, in that pleading, he also “waive[d] seeking more than five million dollars ($5,000,000) regarding the aggregate amount in controversy for the class claims alleged.” The district court rejected AT&T’s argument and ordered remand to state court. The trial court did not address the parties’ calculations of amount in controversy.
The Ninth Circuit recognized the applicability of the U.S. Supreme Court's first CAFA decision, Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1345 (2013). As to Standard Fire, the parties agreed that Standard Fire mandated reversal of the district court's remand order, which was issued before Standard Fire was decided. The Ninth Circuit directed the district court to reconsider the remand motion. Slip op., at 7.
On the second issue involved in the appeal, the burden of proof, the Court held that Standard Fire overruled Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank National Association, 479 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2007), which had imposed a "legal certainty" standard, instead of a “preponderance of the evidence” standard, for defeating a pleading’s allegations of amount-in-controversy:
The reasoning behind Lowdermilk's imposition of the legal certainty standard is clearly irreconcilable with Standard Fire. We hold that Standard Fire has so undermined the reasoning of our decision in Lowdermilk that the latter has been effectively overruled. A defendant seeking removal of a putative class action must demonstrate, by a preponderance of evidence, that the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum. This standard conforms with a defendant's burden of proof when the plaintiff does not plead a specific amount in controversy.
Slip op., at 14. The Court went on to observe that a “lead plaintiff of a putative class cannot reduce the amount in controversy on behalf of absent class members, so there is no justification for assigning to the allegation weight so significant that it affects a defendant's right to a federal forum under § 1332(d)(2).” Slip op., at 15.
With this decision in mind, a lead plaintiff is taking a serious chance with their adequacy if there is an attempted waiver of any recovery exceeding $5 million that cannot be supported down the road as having been based on a good faith calculation of recoverable damages.
When it comes to certification, you can fix almost any problem other than commonality (community of interest). Inadequate representative? Get a new one. Problem with inexperienced class counsel? Co-counsel. Numerosity is not really amenable to correction, but most of the time firms just pass on the tiny classes. But commonality, there's where the rubber meets the road. In Hendelman
v. Los Altos Apartments, L.P. (Jul. 22, 2013; pub. ord.
Aug. 20, 2013), the Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Three) affirmed a trial court order denying plaintiffs' motion for class certificaiton for lack of ascertainability, community of interest, and superiority. The bulk of the Court of Appeal opinion addresses the commonality-related failings.
The Court first held that the warranty of habitability claim was not suitable for resolution through common proof:
[T]he mere “existence of a prohibited (uninhabitable) condition or other noncompliance with applicable code standards does not necessarily constitute a breach of the warranty of habitability.” (Friedman et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant (The Rutter Group 2012) § 3:39, p. 3-13, citing Green v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 637-638.) “Whether the defect or code noncompliance is ‘substantial’ (and thus a cognizable breach) or ‘de minimis’ (no actionable breach) is determined on a case-by-case basis.” (Friedman et al., supra, § 3:40, p. 3-13.) “In considering the materiality of an alleged breach, both the seriousness of the claimed defect and the length of time for which it persists are relevant factors. Minor housing code violations standing alone which do not affect habitability must be considered de minimis and will not entitle the tenant to reduction in rent; and likewise, the violation must be relevant and affect the . . . common areas which [the tenant] uses.” (Hinson v. Delis (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 62, 70, disapproved on other grounds by Knight v. Hallsthammar (1981) 29 Cal.3d 46, 55, fn. 7.) Stated otherwise, whether a particular defect or violation of a housing code constitutes a breach of the implied warranty of habitability depends on the severity and duration of the defect or violation. Breach is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence. (Friedman et al., supra, §§ 3:46 to 3:47, pp. 3-14 to 3-15.)
Slip op., at 11. The
trial court concluded that even the code violations impacting all tenants did
so differently and to different degrees, and the Court of Appeal, giving
deference to the trial court, agreed.
One question raised by this decision is whether variation in entitlement
to damage tainted the analysis as to whether liability could be shown through
common proof, especially where strict liability is imposed on the landlord. At times the Court seems to conflate proof of liability with nominal damages.
The Court then found that the claim for increased rent injected the same individualized questions about whether services to each tenant were reduced in any substantial manner that amounted to an implied increase in rent.
As to the retaliation claim, the Court found that no representative could state that claim, either due to statute of limitations problems or a failure to have been a tenant during the relevant time period. And as with the habitability claim, the Court agreed that a nuisance action depended heavily on facts unique to each tenant, defeating commonality.
The Court declined to consider the many proposed adjustments or amendments to claims or the class definition on Appeal, finding that such arguments are, in the first instance, matters for the trial court.
Once again, I find myself playing catch-up after devoting a lot of spare time to examining the logistics of career moves. In this installment, we see that evidence still matters when moving to compel (or resist) arbitration. In Avery
v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc., (Jun. 27, 2013; pub.
ord. Jul. 23, 2013), the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three) affirmed a trial court order denying motions to compel individual arbitration. The plaintiffs filed a wage & hour class action against
defendants, alleging failure to pay overtime properly for employees working on
12-hours shifts. Defendants filed eight
motions to compel individual arbitration against the plaintiffs. The trial court denied all motions, finding
Integrated “failed to meet [its] burden to show that any of the Plaintiffs are
subject to an enforceable arbitration agreement."
The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that defendants could not simply collect an assortment of documents, modified over time, and claim enforceable arbitration agreements or class waiver clauses:
Integrated sought to compel Plaintiffs to individually arbitrate their claims based on two arbitration agreements: (1) the Fair Treatment Process in the Tenet Employee Handbook, and (2) the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process in the Integrated Employee Handbook. We conclude Integrated is limited to the Fair Treatment Process because (1) it issued the Integrated Employee Handbook and its Alternative Dispute Resolution Process after Plaintiffs’ claims accrued, and (2) it failed to notify Plaintiffs or any other employees about the Integrated Employee Handbook.
Four months after Avery filed her initial class action complaint, Integrated unilaterally modified the Fair Treatment Process in the Tenet Employee Handbook by renaming it the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process and adding a class arbitration waiver. Integrated modified the Fair Treatment Process based on a provision that authorized the employer to “change or modify the FTP procedures from time-to-time without advance notice and without the consent of employees.” Integrated posted the Integrated Employee Handbook containing the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process on its intranet page, but it did not provide employees with a copy of the new handbook, instruct employees to review the new handbook on the intranet page, or even notify employees of the new handbook’s existence.
Slip op., at 10. The Court went on to hold that the right to unilateral modification is governed by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing: “An arbitration agreement between an employer and an employee may reserve to the employer the unilateral right to modify the agreement. (24 Hour Fitness, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1214-1215.) But the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract requires the employer to exercise that right fairly and in good faith so as not to deprive the employee of his or her reasonable expectations under the agreement.” Slip op., at 10.
The Court also found that defendant failed to provide adequate evidence of an enforceable agreement accepted by the plaintiffs. Having affirmed the trial court on that ground, the Court declined to analyze whether the class waivers that defendants added later were simply statements of existing law under Stolt-Nielsen.
The
Court concluded its opinion by stating that an arbitration agreement in an
employee handbook could be enforceable, so long as the agreement and its
acceptance are adequately proven by substantial evidence.
After four years at Spiro Moore (formerly, Spiro Moss), I have decided to take the biggest step of all and chart my own course. There are still some things to sort out, but in short order I will have an announcement about my landing spot and my partner in this venture. Until then, let me say that it was a privilege to work at Spiro Moore, but I am very excited by what is to come.
I won't be leaving the class action field, but I will be re-tooling my focus a bit. Much more of my time will be devoted to union corruption cases, and much less will be focused on wage & hour. There will be some other things to work on, but why spoil every good surprise, right?
This will be a very short post on the subject, but the California Supreme Court issued a decision today on the question of whether a UCL claim may be based on the violation of a federal statute after the civil remedy provision was repealed by Congress. In Rose v. Bank of America (August 1, 2013), the Supreme Court held that it could. Describing the issue, the Court said: "May a claim of unlawful business practice under California's unfair competition law be based on violations of a federal statute, after Congress has repealed a provision of that statute authorizing civil actions for damages?" Slip op., at 1.
The Court unanimously held that it could:
Whether framed in terms of preemption or not, the issue before us is a narrow one. The Bank and the courts below have taken the position that Congress ruled out any private enforcement of TISA by repealing former section 4310. However, considerations of congressional intent favor plaintiffs. By leaving TISA’s savings clause in place, Congress explicitly approved the enforcement of state laws “relating to the disclosure of yields payable or terms for accounts . . . except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with the provisions of this subtitle, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.” (§ 4312.) The UCL is such a state law.
Slip op., at 4. The Court then emphasized that the UCL does not "enforce" other laws. A violation of the UCL is independently actionable in its own right:
Contrary to the Bank’s insistence that plaintiffs are suing to enforce TISA, a UCL action does not “enforce” the law on which a claim of unlawful business practice is based. “By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, [Business and Professions Code] ‘section 17200 “borrows” violations of other laws and treats them as unlawful practices’ that the [UCL] makes independently actionable. [Citations.]” (Cel-Tech, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 180, italics added.) In Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 17 Cal.4th 553, 570 (Stop Youth Addiction), we explained the independent nature of a UCL action. There the UCL claim was based on alleged violations of Penal Code section 308, which bans the sale of cigarettes to minors. The defendant contended the suit was barred because Penal Code section 308 and the Stop Tobacco Access to Kids Enforcement Act (STAKE Act; Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 22950- 22959) “embodie[d] the Legislature’s intent to create a comprehensive, exclusive scheme for combating the sale of tobacco to minors.” (Stop Youth Addiction, at p. 560.) We rejected this argument, and emphasized that the plaintiff was enforcing the UCL, not the statutes underlying their claim of unlawful business practice.
Slip op., at 6. UCL still has teeth in the view of the California Supreme Court, it would seem. Check with The UCL Practitioner later for Kim Kralowec's write-up on this case. She will no doubt have some other interesting observations.
Episode 4 is in the can and available for streaming or access through iTunes or the Xbox Music store. However, some internet connectivity issues are interfering with my efforts to edit the podcast information on the hosting service,.
Still playing catch-up. Today's edition of blog from the past concerns the Automobile Club of Southern California, an organization that inspires mixed feelings in me. On the one hand, they do provide what I consider to be excellent insurance services. But I can't help but feel that there is a dark underbelly at AAA of SoCal. Some of that underbelly was challenged but escaped unscathed in Thompson
v. Automobile Club of Southern California (pub. Ord. June 27, 2013), in which the Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three) affirmed the trial court's denial of class certification in a case alleging claims based on the backdating of the membership renewals when the renewal is late.
The plaintiff specifically challenged the practice of “backdating” late renewals to the member’s original expiration date if the renewal occurs within 95 days. The plaintiff contended that this practice resulted in late-renewing members receiving less than a full year of services. The Auto Club argued that the 95-day period is a “grace period” and that members are generally permitted to continue receiving services, particularly during the first 31 days, and saves members the $20 fee to start a new membership. The plaintiff moved for class certification. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the class members could not be ascertained and that individual questions predominated.
With respect to the factual issues surrounding class certification, we afford the trial court “ ‘great discretion in granting or denying certification.’ ” (In re Tobacco II Cases (2009) 46 Cal.4th 298, 311.) The trial court’s ruling will be reversed only if a “ ‘manifest abuse of discretion’ ” is present. (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1022.) “ ‘A certification order generally will not be disturbed unless (1) it is unsupported by substantial evidence, (2) it rests on improper criteria, or (3) it rests on erroneous legal assumptions. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.)
Slip op., at 6. The Court said, “ ‘We may not reverse, however, simply because some of the court’s reasoning was faulty, so long as any of the stated reasons are sufficient to justify the order. [Citation.]’ (Kaldenbach v. Mutual of Omaha Life Ins. Co. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 830, 843-844.)” Slip op., at 6-7.
The Court then examined the bases of the trial court’s decision. Looking first at the trial court’s ascertainability finding, the Court concluded that the class definition was significantly overbroad, and thus not ascertainable from the available records:
If putative class members either received benefits during the delinquency period, were not damaged as a result of the renewal policy, or renewed after the Auto Club’s membership policy was disclosed, their ability to recover is called into serious question. If class members received benefits during the delinquency period or they were told about the Auto Club’s renewal practices, they cannot maintain a cause of action under the UCL. If they were not economically damaged, they cannot recover on a breach of contract, under the CLRA, or through an unjust enrichment claim. (See Civ. Code., § 1780, subd. (a); Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1388; Lectrodryer v. SeoulBank (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 723, 726.)
Slip op., at 11. As it so happens, I disagree that the ability to identify the class from available records is the touchstone of ascertainability. Certainly that is one very useful way, but the purpose of a class definition is to allow a potential class member to determine when reading the definition whether they are a member of the class. Consider consumer class actions involving retail transactions. Often, there is no way to know the identity of purchasers of a product; but the purchasers know. The notion that the class can only be ascertained if they are identified in available records is simply an invitation to maintain shoddy records and a strangely narrow view of what it means to have an ascertainable class. This portion of the opinion is horse hockey.
Anyhow, the Court of Appeal then agreed that the same issues impacting the ability to identify the class (under the Court's narrow view of ascertainability) presented individualized issues that predominated over common questions:
The trial court found that individual issues predominate: “(A) Individual issues predominate regarding whether a putative class member is entitled to recover on any of Plaintiff’s causes of action. This is because, as stated above, there were members who suffered no injury because they (i) received services during their delinquency, (ii) had the Auto Club’s renewal policy explicitly disclosed to them, and/or (iii) were economically better off under the Auto Club’s system of renewal than they would have been if they had begun new memberships on the date of payment and paid the $20 new enrollment fee. Determining whether a member falls into any of these categories and would therefore not be entitled to recover from the Auto Club on any of Plaintiff's theories of liability, can only be done on a case-by-case basis.” The court went on to explain that essentially the same reasons applied to each cause of action.
Slip op., at 13-14. The Court concluded by finding that the arguments concerning typicality and superiority were not significant because of the substantial problems with ascertainability and commonality. The decision presents an example of the potential for a serious entanglement of merits questions with certification issues when the Court considered the viability of the plaintiff’s theory.
Don't do what I did. Don't accidentally copy curly quotes when pasting some html code into a code injection area (a little under-the-hood work for authorship signals). Even basic html hyperlinks don't behave so well when you use curly quotes. Just sayin'.
The Complex Litigator reports on developments in related areas of class action and complex litigation. It is a resource for legal professionals to use as a tool for examining different viewpoints related to changing legal precedent. H. Scott Leviant is the editor-in-chief and primary author of The Complex Litigator.
